Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a2-q1
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## ARTICLE II.
### *On the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word.*

Consequently inquiry is made concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether by the same habit it knows the Word and other things in the Word.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in act, in the Word, what it knows in habit.

Thirdly it is asked whether in the Word it knows all things, whatsoever the Word knows.

### Question I. *Whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word. And that [it knows them] by the same [knowledge], it seems.

1. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter*, says that the angels knew things in a threefold way, namely in the Word, in themselves, in their proper genus: therefore the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in the Word is distinct from the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in itself; but an angel in itself knows things through some species given to it: therefore it seems that by that knowledge which is in the Word it knows things without the mediation of any likeness of the thing, besides that which is in the Word: therefore by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows another thing in the Word.

2. Likewise, the Word is the sufficient ground for knowing all things other than the Word — as an exemplar is the ground for knowing what is exemplified — but to know the sufficient ground of something else is nothing other than to know the thing itself; for the knowledge of the ground-of-knowing and of the known thing itself is the same: therefore by the same knowledge by which the soul knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word.

3. Likewise, a thing is better known in the divine exemplar than it is known in itself, and it is also better known through the divine exemplar than it is known through its proper likeness; but by the same knowledge by which one knows the likeness of a thing, one knows the thing itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if the likeness of a thing in a mirror in no way differed from the mirror itself, then by the same knowledge by which the mirror itself would be known, the likeness of the thing itself and the thing itself would be known: therefore since in the eternal Word the likeness of a thing does not differ from itself — for it is the exemplar and ground of knowing — it seems that by the same knowledge by which one knows the Word, one knows also things in the Word: therefore Christ's soul, by the same habit of knowledge, knows the Word and other things in it.

5. Likewise, if Christ's soul knew a thing in the Word through another habit and another likeness than that by which it knows the Word itself; either that likeness would be one, or [there would be] many. It cannot be one, because each created thing has its own proper likeness in the genus of creature. If [there are] many: then, since there is no rest in many but in one, the knowledge of things other than the Word in the Word itself would not pertain to the knowledge of glory, in which there is rest and repose: therefore if this is unfitting, it remains that by the same habit of knowledge by which the Word itself is known, other things too are known in the Word, both by Christ's soul and by any other beatified soul.

**On the contrary:** 1. As matter is related to form, so the possible intellect is related to the things which it knows; but it is impossible that the highest being give *being* to matter itself except by impressing on the matter some created form, distinct from itself: therefore it is impossible that the highest light make the possible intellect actually understand anything, except by impressing on it the species and likeness of the known thing itself: therefore the knowledge of things other than the Word, in the Word itself, demands something more than the knowledge of the Word itself, and is through a ground of knowing other than is the knowledge of the Word itself.

2. Likewise, in order that the intellect understand something, it is necessary that it be assimilated to the known thing: therefore when it knows things other than the Word, it is necessary that it be assimilated not only to the Word itself, but also to things other than the Word; but it cannot be assimilated to things other than the Word except through the reception of other likenesses: therefore in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know other things in the Word, it does not suffice to know the Word itself.

3. Likewise, if I were to gaze upon some thing, the likeness of that thing would be generated in me: likewise, if I were to gaze upon a mirror, not only would the likeness of the mirror be generated in me, but also the likeness of the thing: therefore if the eternal Word contains in itself the ideas of all things, the likenesses of things will be generated in the soul gazing upon it, just as if the soul beheld the things themselves: therefore it seems that a thing in the Word is known by a created intellect not only through the Word itself, but also through impressed likenesses: therefore through one knowledge and another.

4. Likewise, it happens that the Word itself is known as light, and it happens that it is known as exemplar — now the Word is known as *light* when it is known in itself; and it is known as *exemplar* when other things are known in it — but it is impossible to know the Word itself as light without a light being infused into us which makes us conformed to that light: therefore it is impossible to know it as exemplar without a knowledge being infused into us which makes us conformed to those eternal ideas and grounds: therefore neither did Christ's soul know in any other mode than this. If you should say that that which is assimilated to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is the same; on the contrary: it is possible to know the Word itself, and yet the thing whose exemplar the Word is would not be known: therefore it seems that the ground by which one is conformed to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is different.

5. Likewise, let us suppose that someone in the Word knows some thing by seeing the Word itself, and afterward ceases to see, as was the case in the rapture of Paul; it is possible that such a one, after he has ceased to see the essence of the Word itself, has a memory of what he saw in the Word; but this would not be, unless the thing in the Word were known by a knowledge other than the Word itself: therefore Christ's soul and every other soul, if it knows things in the Word, [knows them] not through the same knowledge, but through one knowledge and another.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to relation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the habit of knowledge is to be enumerated according to the ground of knowing. Since therefore the eternal Word is the most sufficient ground of knowing all things other than itself — which is clear, because by itself it knows all things — for this, that someone know things in the Word, there need not be in him a twofold knowledge, of the Word itself and of the known thing itself; twofold, I say, as to the habit of knowing, on account of this, that one having the deiformity of glory, by which he knows the Word itself, has that whereby he is assimilated to the Word itself, which is the perfect ground of knowing all other things, and so, in knowing the Word, he has the habit by which he can know other things, so that that habit, insofar as it is said to be of the Word and of things other than the Word, differs only by relation. — For by the same thing by which the eternal Word is *light* and *truth* in itself, it is the *exemplar* of other things; and therefore he who has that whereby he is conformed to the highest truth itself has that whereby he is conformed to the ground of knowing all things. Since therefore the eternal Word is by the same [thing] the ground of knowing itself and other things; therefore I say that Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word itself, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to comparison or relation. — The arguments which show this are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that it is necessary that the possible intellect be formed to the likeness of the understood thing, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because, although God can be the *perfecting* form of nothing, he can nevertheless be the *exemplary* form and the ground of knowing; therefore, although he does not perfect matter through himself, by giving it *being* and completion, he can nevertheless through himself make the intellect know any other created thing. And if you object that it is still necessary that the possible intellect be in some way formed, in order that it understand something in act; it must be said that thus it is in the matter proposed. For it is formed by something, but this is nothing other than the very influx of the eternal light, through which it becomes deiform and conformed to the Word itself, which is the ground of knowing other things; and therefore consequently it becomes in act with respect to the other things knowable by the Word, and through the likeness of the Word — which Word indeed is the likeness of all things — it becomes in a certain way similar to all things. Therefore there is no need that a new habit be given to it for knowing.

2. And through this is clear the answer to the following [objection], which objects that it is necessary that the knower be assimilated to the knowable; for the assimilation which suffices for knowledge is not only through a species received from the thing, or even through a species appropriated to the thing itself, but also through an assimilation to that which is the ground of knowing the rest.

3. To that which is objected, that if I were to gaze upon a thing, the likeness of the thing would be generated in me, and likewise, if [I gazed] upon a mirror, the likeness of the mirror and of the thing itself would be generated in me; it must be said that if in the mirror the likeness of the thing did not differ from the very form of the mirror, there would be no need that another likeness of knowing be generated in me with respect to the mirror itself and with respect to the thing itself shining in the mirror; and thus it must be understood in the matter proposed, for the idea in God is nothing other than the eternal truth itself, as was shown in the first book.

4. To that which is objected, that it is impossible for me to know the eternal light without my being made conformed to it through the influx of light; it must be said that this is true; but because God, by the very same [thing] by which he is *light* in himself, is the *exemplar* of other things; therefore there is no need that I be made conformed to him by one thing and another, as he is light and as he is exemplar, but by the same [thing] standing in another mode. For the same light of glory enables the soul itself to know the eternal Word itself, insofar as the light is compared to the Word itself under the formal character of light; the same also enables the soul itself to know things other than the Word in the Word itself, insofar as it is compared to the Word itself, as it is the exemplar of other things. — And because the Word is an exemplar representing voluntarily, therefore that light is not compared except to those things which the divine exemplar itself voluntarily represents; hence it is that through that light, although it knows the Word, there is no need that it know all other things than the Word, of which the Word itself is the exemplar. — And if you object that, although in God wisdom and goodness are the same, yet that by which I am conformed to the divine wisdom and goodness is in me one thing and another: therefore by parity of reasoning there will be another [thing] by which the intellect is conformed to the Word itself, according as it is *light*, and according as it is *exemplar*;

it must be said that it is not alike, because the formal character of truth and of exemplarity in the same [thing] differs only by comparison. For the exemplar itself is nothing other than the eternal truth, as it is the ground of knowing other things.

5. To that which is objected last concerning the memory which remains; it must be said that if some intellect sees certain things in the Word by the knowledge of glory and ceases to see the Word, he does not remember the knowledge of those things, except insofar as he remembers the knowledge of the Word, unless he had otherwise an impressed knowledge of those things, or unless God should impress [it] on him dispensatively; [but] then this would not be fitting. But, as has been said, in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know things in the Word, it suffices that it have the deiformity of glory, by which it is similar to the Word itself; nor is it necessary that likenesses of things, or particular habits, be given to it, because the highest truth itself suffices it more for knowing all things than all the special likenesses of things. Hence the angel, and also Christ's soul, knows things more limpidly in the Word than it knows [them] in themselves, or in their proper genus.