Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether Christ's soul actually knows in the Word all that it knows in habit.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in the Word in act all that it knows in habit. And that it does, seems to be the case:

1. Because, according to what Augustine holds in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, « in the Blessed there will be no fluctuating thoughts »: if therefore Christ's soul, among the other blessed souls, is the most blessed, it does not then have fluctuating thoughts : therefore if it once thinks or knows something in act, it always thinks or knows that thing : therefore whatever it thinks in habit, it knows in act.

2. Likewise, glory is a habit in act — for it is impossible that a man be blessed and at some time cease from the act of the divine vision — if therefore the knowledge by which Christ's soul knows things in the Word is a glorious knowledge; it seems that that knowledge always has its habit joined to act : therefore whatever it knows in habit, it knows in act.

3. Likewise, a habit joined to act is more perfect than one separated, for the reason that act is the completion of a habit; but Christ's soul knows things in the Word by a most perfect knowledge : therefore whatever it knows there in habit, it knows in act.

4. Likewise, by one and the same knowledge by which Christ's soul knows the Word itself, it knows things other than the Word; but it knows nothing of the Word itself in habit which it does not know in act : therefore it knows nothing of other things in habit which it does not know in act.

**On the contrary:**

1. As the Philosopher holds: « We know many things, but we understand one only »; and this is for no other reason than that *to know* (*scire*) names knowledge in habit, but *to understand* (*intelligere*) names it in act : therefore habit extends to more things than act by nature ; and if this is so, it is not necessary that in Christ habit be made equal to act : therefore it is not necessary that whatever Christ's soul knows in the Word in habit, it know in act.

2. Likewise, as Christ's soul's knowledge is perfect, so is its joy perfect; but Christ's soul does not rejoice in act over everything in which it rejoices in habit — for it rejoices over one sinner doing penance, although it did not actually rejoice in him when he was sinning — therefore by parity of reasoning it is not fitting that everything it knows in habit, it know in act.

3. Likewise, the actual consideration of things known in the Word is, in Christ, subject to the will : therefore it can now consider some created thing which is not of the essence of glory, and now also not consider it : therefore if it has the habit of that thing, it is not necessary that the habit always be joined to act with respect to any knowable thing whatever.

4. Likewise, either Christ's soul actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it, or it does not. If it actually considers everything the eternal Word is fitted to represent to it; since those things are infinite, it seems that Christ's soul in considering passes in act through infinite things, which is impossible for a finite power. If it does not actually consider everything the Word united to it is fitted to represent to it; then Christ's soul has some aptitude toward something with respect to which it is not always in act ; but its every aptitude is completed by the glorious habit : therefore it knows something in habit which it does not know in act.

5. Likewise, when something extends to infinite things, it is impossible that it be wholly in act, if act differs in it from potency ; but the habit of knowledge in Christ extends to infinite things : therefore it is impossible that everything it knows in habit, it know in act. The major is manifest, because, since the continuum is divisible to infinity, it is impossible that it be wholly divided in act. The minor is proved by this, that Christ in the eternal Word knows that all the species of even number are divisible into two equal parts, and this he knows in habit of each of its species : if therefore the species of number are infinite, then he knows infinite things in habit.

6. Likewise, Christ's soul knows nothing in act upon which it does not actually turn itself ; but its intellect and gaze is simple and finite ; but a simple and finite thing turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself: therefore if it actually turns itself to one thing, it is impossible that simultaneously and at once it actually turn itself to that which is disparate from it : therefore Christ's soul does not know in act all that it knows in habit.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, as to those things which are essential to glory, knows in act all that it knows in habit, which is not necessary as to those things which are not essential to glory.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that Christ's blessed soul has knowledge of some things which are essential to glory, and of some which are not of the essence of glory. — If therefore we speak of the knowledge of those things which are essential to glory, I say that Christ's soul knows in act all that it knows in habit, because glory is a habit in act. Hence just as its soul cannot fail to be glorious, so it is impossible that the actual consideration of those things which are of the essence of glory be interrupted in it. — But if we speak of the knowledge of those things which are not essential to glory, then it is not necessary that all that it knows in habit, it know in act. — And a sign of this is that God, to the Blessed existing in glory, that is, to the holy Angels, reveals and shows in himself something anew which nevertheless he did not show before. And therefore it is not repugnant to the state of glory to consider now something which was not considered before. — Nor is it repugnant to the perfection of the creature, since for a creature to be perfected is for its capacity to be filled ; but a creature is capable of more according to habitual knowledge than according to actual consideration, as was shown in the objections. And therefore not only in the Angels, but also in Christ's soul this is true, that it knows more in habit than it considers in act; and therefore it must be conceded that it does not consider in act all that it has in habit, as to those things which are not of the substance of glory. — And the reasonings which make for this side are to be conceded.

To the last reasoning, however, an answer can be given, lest it give occasion for going astray. For what is said, that a simple and finite intellect turns itself wholly to that to which it turns itself, does not compel the conclusion, because the intellect of a blessed soul, and most of all of Christ's soul, is dilated through grace; and, what is more, in the Word, through one and the same thing, it knows many things distinctly, and therefore the glorified intellect, in knowing many things in the Word, is not divided but united, because it is not applied to this or that first and immediately, but by means of the eternal Word, which, since it is one, leads to many things to be known. The other reasonings, which were brought forward for this side, can be conceded.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary, that in the Blessed there are no fluctuating thoughts or considerations; it must be said that that statement is to be understood of those things which are of the essence of glory, because those will always be in actual knowledge and consideration; but of those whose knowledge is not of the essence of glory, it is not necessary to have the truth in act. — It can also be said otherwise, that fluctuation of thought is twofold: one through inquiry and intimation or discursive course, by which one comes into the knowledge of an unknown thing; and such fluctuation will not be in the Blessed. There is also another fluctuation through the passage of consideration from one thing into the consideration of another; and such fluctuation will not be taken away from the Blessed. Augustine's authority therefore is understood of the first fluctuation, not of the second ; and therefore by that authority it cannot be concluded that a blessed soul knows in act whatever it knows in habit.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that glory is a habit in act; it must be said that it is true; but from this it does not follow that all knowledge which is in glory is in continuous act, but only that which is of the essence of glory; and since Christ's soul knows many things in the Word, and other souls too, which are not of the essence of glory: hence it is that it is not necessary for it to consider in act all that it knows in habit.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a habit in act is more perfect than a habit apart from act; it must be said that it is true, when it is in the noblest act, which is owed to that very habit; but the noblest act, which is owed to glory itself, is the actual consideration of the highest truth, not the actual consideration of any creatable or created truth whatever. Therefore, for Christ's soul to have a perfect habit of knowledge, it is not necessary that it actually consider every truth, but it suffices that it actually consider the highest truth.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word, etc. ; it must be said that this is true of the knowledge as to habit, but it is not fitting as to the knowledge in act. For the actual knowledge and consideration of the eternal Word is essential to glory itself, but not so the actual knowledge of things other than the Word; and therefore it is not necessary that it so consider other things actually, in the way it actually considers the Word itself, but rather habitually. For that habit has a more essential relation with respect to the Word, which is the principal thing known, than with respect to the other things known in the Word, which are known as it were consequently and secondarily.