Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a2-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things that the Word knows.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things that the Word knows. And that it does so seems to be the case.

1. The blessed soul of Christ had the Spirit not by measure, according to what is said in John, chapter three; but the Spirit is for knowing and loving: therefore it had the Spirit for knowing without measure; and if this is so, then God conceals nothing from that soul: therefore that soul knows in the Word all those things that God himself knows.

2. Likewise, for that soul knowing things in the Word, the Word itself is the ground of knowing: but the Word is the ground of knowing that voluntarily offers itself for this thing, or for that, or for any other whatsoever: if therefore the eternal Word offers itself with full self-giving to the soul united to it, since it is itself the ground of knowing all things, it seems that the soul of Christ knew all things in the Word united to it.

3. Likewise, the eternal Word was most perfectly united to the very soul of Christ, insofar as it is the *Word*; therefore by parity of reasoning it was most perfectly united to it insofar as it is the *exemplar*; but insofar as it is the exemplar, it caused the soul of Christ to know things other than itself: therefore if it was united to it by the most perfect union, than which none can be more perfect, it seems that it communicated to it the knowledge of all things, which it had.

4. Likewise, the soul of Christ knew certain things in the Word and knows them: either therefore it *can* know more, or it *cannot*. If it *can* know more: then its possibility is not wholly complete, because it can learn more day by day. If it *cannot* know more than it knows; but everyone who knows things in a determinate number can know more, because the knowable things do not crowd one another in the knowing soul, whence if it knows certain things, it can still know the rest: if therefore the soul of Christ cannot know more, it seems that it knows infinite things and all that the supreme wisdom of God itself knows.

5. Likewise, the soul of Christ is much more familiar with the eternal Word itself and joined to it by a greater friendship than the Apostles were to Christ himself, indeed it is so familiar with it that it cannot be more familiar: therefore it gives it the knowledge of all things which it can receive; but the soul never knows so much that it cannot still know more: therefore it seems that the uncreated Word would cause the soul united to it to know infinite things.

6. Likewise, either the soul of Christ knows only those things which are, have been, and will be, or more than these. If it knows only those: then if God should do anything beyond those things which he has disposed to do, the soul of Christ would be ignorant of it. If it knows more than these; but by whatever reason it knows some of those things which God is not going to do, by the same reason it knows all things: therefore it seems that it knows all things that the eternal wisdom knows.

7. Likewise, the soul of Christ is far more powerful for knowing things through the very Word united to it than any soul is for knowing things through a created habit; but a soul having a created habit knows all things to which that habit extends: therefore the soul of Christ, having the uncreated Word united to it, knows all things that the Word itself knows.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the twelfth book of *The City of God*: « Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the one knowing »; but the soul of Christ, since it is finite, cannot comprehend infinite things in such a way that those infinite things are finite to it, because it is impossible that the infinite be made finite by a finite thing; but the eternal Word knows infinite things: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ should know in the Word all things that the Word itself knows.

2. Likewise, knowledge ought to be made equal to the thing known, according as it is known, whether it be knowledge in habit or knowledge in act; likewise it is necessary that it be made equal to the power, and the power must be made equal to the substance, in such a way that it does not exceed it disproportionately; but the infinite exceeds the finite disproportionately: if therefore the substance of the soul of Christ is finite, it is necessary that the power of knowing in it also be finite, and the knowledge likewise: therefore it is necessary that the knowable things be finite. If therefore the eternal wisdom of God knows infinite things, it seems, etc.

3. Likewise, the knowledge of the soul of Christ, which it has in the Word, is created — for if the substance of the soul of Christ is created, by parity of reasoning so is the knowledge — but all created things are in a certain weight, number, and measure, and all such things are finite: therefore it is necessary that the knowledge which the soul of Christ has be finite. But finite knowledge is only of finite things: therefore the soul of Christ knows only finite things; and the Word knows infinite things: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, nothing created exceeds another created thing of the same genus by infinity; but the soul of Christ and its knowledge is created and of the same genus as any other blessed soul and its knowledge: therefore the soul of Christ does not exceed by infinity the knowledge of any other created soul. But the knowledge of the Word exceeds by infinity the knowledge of any blessed soul: therefore it seems that the soul of Christ never knows as much as the Word itself knows.

5. Likewise, just as the knowledge of the Word is immeasurable *intensively*, so it is also *extensively*, because, just as it has infinite clarity, so also it knows infinite things; but it is impossible that the soul of Christ comprehend the infinity of the Word itself intensively and that it know as clearly as the Word itself: therefore it is impossible by parity of reasoning that it know all things that the Word itself knows, since the Word knows infinite things.

6. Likewise, just as the intellect of the soul of Christ from its union to the eternal light has it to know many things, so too the very substance of the soul, from its union to the Word, is born to be in many places; but it is impossible that the soul of Christ ever be wherever the Word is, although it is united to it: therefore it is impossible that its intellect know all things that the Word knows, although it is united to it.

7. Likewise, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is able to know; but the uncreated substance of the Word exceeds the soul of Christ by infinity as regards simplicity: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ ever be so exalted that it know as much as the Word itself knows.

8. Likewise, if the soul of Christ knows all things that the Word knows, either this is through the Word itself immediately, or through some other created thing superadded to it. Through the Word itself immediately it cannot be, as was shown in the preceding, because it is necessary that the intellect itself be informed by the ground of knowing. If through some created thing superadded to it, either this is a light proceeding from the Word, or some species of the thing known. If it is a light proceeding from the Word; since that does not exceed by infinity the light which is conferred on other souls, if the other souls know only finite things, it is necessary that the soul of Christ know only finite things: therefore it does not know all things that the Word knows. If through species given to it, then it will have as many species as there are knowable things; and if this is so, since the knowable things are infinite, there will be in the soul of Christ infinite species in act: therefore if it is impossible that infinite things be in act in a creature, it is impossible that the soul of Christ know infinite things, or all things that the Word knows.

9. Likewise, for the knowledge of a thing two things are required, namely reception and judgment, therefore in order that anyone know certain things, it is necessary that he have the power of judging concerning them; but the judgment of the soul of Christ is finite: therefore neither through itself nor through its conjunction with the Word does it judge concerning infinite things, because no finite power issues into an infinite operation, neither through itself nor with another — for it cannot be joined to it in any infinite operation — therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ judge concerning as many things as the eternal Word judges; and if this is so, it cannot know all things that the Word knows.

> **Conclusion.** The soul of Christ, by habitual knowledge, which is like a science, knows all things that the Word knows; but not by actual knowledge, which is like consideration.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, on account of its difficulty, this question is answered by various men in various ways; and some answer *by simply conceding*, others *by distinguishing*. — The first vary according to a threefold mode of speaking.

For some say that the soul of Christ knows all things that the Word knows, for the reason that the eternal Word knows only finite things. For it is the exemplar only of those things which are, or have been, or will be; and all these are finite. — But this mode of speaking cannot stand, because, as Augustine himself says, and as was shown in the first book, the eternal wisdom of God knows infinite things, as is plain, because it knows all the species of number, and it also knows all the things it can do.

Another mode of speaking is that the soul of Christ knows all things that the Word knows, and knows infinite things, because by one and the same thing it knows all things, that is, by the Word. And hence it is that not only the soul of Christ *in act* knows infinite things, but also any blessed soul that beholds the eternal light itself, according to what they assert. — But that neither agrees with reason nor with the authorities of the Saints, because omni-

science is not attributed to any soul other than the soul of Christ. And besides, a finite power does not seem able to be joined to an infinite power in the comprehension of infinite things, which indeed is an infinite operation.

A third mode of speaking is that the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, because through the Word it knows other things, not, I say, by participating wisdom, as other souls do, but by possessing wisdom itself. And this Master Hugh of Saint Victor seems to have held, in his little book on the Wisdom of Christ. For he speaks thus: « We believe that the full and perfect and whole wisdom of God was in the soul of Christ; and that this wisdom made that same soul fully and perfectly wise, not by participating from it, but by possessing it wholly, which it singularly possessed and comprehended ineffably ». And a little later: « This one thing I affirm without doubt, that either there was no other wisdom in Christ besides the divine, or, if there was, it was not equal to it ». And thus he says that the soul of Christ knows all things, because the wisdom of Christ was no other than that wisdom by which God is wise. Yet in this there is a difference, that God *is* that wisdom, whereas the soul of Christ is not that wisdom, but personally *united* to that wisdom. Likewise, God is wise by that wisdom by *nature*, whereas the soul of Christ is so by the *grace of union*. — But how that word of Hugh's may satisfy one who inquires, is difficult to make clear. For, as was shown in the preceding, in order that the soul of Christ know the Word, it is necessary that a *created* wisdom intervene, which indeed is *disposing* and enabling the soul itself for the knowledge of the Word, and is not the supreme wisdom itself, but an influence proceeding from it. — And therefore it must be attempted whether in some way another mode can be reasonably found than any of the three aforesaid.

It must therefore be considered that others have attempted to settle the aforesaid question *by distinguishing*; and these are diversified according to a threefold mode of distinguishing.

For some have wished to say that in Christ there is a twofold mode of knowing, which he has in the Word: one through the *grace of union*, the other, which is through the *grace of comprehension*. And by that mode indeed which is through the grace of comprehension, it does not know all things that the Word knows, but those things which pertain to its glory. But by the other mode, which is through the gra-

ce of union, it knows all things that the Word itself knows, since the grace of union, by reason of the extreme to which it is united, is grace without measure and infinite grace; and therefore it is no wonder if it knows according to it infinite things and all things that the Word knows. — But this mode of speaking does not seem to be easily intelligible. First indeed, because, if the soul of Christ knows whatever it knows through a created habit; nor is there any other created habit in the soul of Christ by which it knows all things through the Word itself or in the Word itself except the habit of the glory of the comprehensor, because, that being set aside, it would now know nothing in the Word — for the union does not cause the divine nature to be known by the human, insofar as it is union, but the glory of the comprehensor; for the flesh is united to the Word, although it does not know the Word itself — if therefore by some habit it knows all things that the Word knows, it is necessary that it know through that knowledge which indeed is the habit of comprehension. — Besides, whatever the grace of union may be, whether created or uncreated, the soul of Christ is always within the bounds of a creature: therefore its knowing power is always finite, therefore it never knows infinite things. And thus the question previously proposed returns.

But another mode of speaking is that in God a twofold mode of knowing is posited, not on account of a diversity on the part of the *knowing power*, but on the part of the *connotation*. For there is said to be in him a knowledge of *vision* and a knowledge of *intelligence*: and the knowledge of vision is with respect to all those things which he has *disposed* to do, the knowledge of intelligence with respect to all those things which he *can* do. And each is called *omniscience*, although the knowledge of vision is of finite things, the knowledge of intelligence of infinite things. For he has disposed to make finite things, but he can make infinite things. When therefore it is asked whether Christ knows all things that the Word knows; if it be understood of the knowledge of *vision*, they grant certainly that the soul of Christ was *capable* of all those things, and that he communicated to it the knowledge of all those things which he disposed to make, on account of his great liberality and the capacity of the soul itself. But if it be understood of the knowledge of *intelligence*, then they say that it does not know all things which the Word itself knows, because that extends to infinite things, and the soul of Christ in knowing is capable only of finite things; but God did not communicate to that soul except as much as it could re-

ceive. And according to this way the reasons for both parts can be resolved. And this mode indeed is sufficiently easy and reasonable. — Nevertheless the mind of one in doubt does not yet rest, because, supposing that God should now do some new thing, which however he has not disposed to do, such as a new world, it would already be hidden from Christ. — It would also follow that Christ could learn something anew, and thus would not have the fullness of knowledge. — And again, since the knowable things do not crowd one another in the knowing soul, it never seems that the soul knows so much that it cannot still know more; how then will there be a limit on the part of the capacity of the creature?

And therefore there is a third mode of distinguishing, that a thing happens to be known by *habitual* knowledge and by *actual* knowledge, that is, by a knowledge which is like *science*, and a knowledge which is like *consideration*. If therefore we speak of knowledge as regards the *act of consideration*, then it must be said that the soul of Christ never knows as much as the Word itself knows. For by no glory can a creature be so elevated that it judge *simultaneously* and *in act* concerning infinite things, since this belongs to an infinite power. But if we speak of *habitual* knowledge, then it can be conceded that it knows all things that the Word itself, united to it, knows. — And this is shown thus: that, since the soul of Christ knows the Word itself by a glorious habit so perfectly that it cannot know it more perfectly; and the eternal Word itself has a ready will to open to that soul all things that shine forth in it, nor does anything shine forth in it which is not born to be known by the soul of Christ: the soul of Christ has something whereby it is ready to know all things that the Word knows. And the sign of this is that, in order that it know something which the Word knows, whatever it be, it is not necessary that a new *habit* of knowing be given to it, but everything that it wills it can read in it.

If therefore you ask concerning that habit, whether it is a *finite* or an *infinite* habit; I respond that it is *finite*, yet it has relations to infinite things; nor is it impossible to posit this in a creature. For the infinity of relations does not posit an actual infinity, just as it does not posit a real comparison. — If you ask again whence comes that infinity of relations concerning the habit of knowledge of the soul of Christ; I say that it comes from the will of the mirror united to it, which has a ready will to disclose all things that shine forth in it; but this it does not do for any other soul. And therefore concerning the soul of Christ alone it can and ought to be conceded that it is omniscient as regards habitual knowledge. — And the reasons which are for this part are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the one knowing; it must be said that this is understood of actual knowledge, which indeed consists in actual comprehension; which is intimated in the authority itself. But of habitual knowledge it is not necessary that it have truth; nor is it necessary further that it have truth concerning every actual thing, but concerning that which is through comprehension. For although God is known by the soul, yet it is not necessary that he be finite to the soul knowing him, but rather he is simply infinite.

2. To that which is objected, that knowledge ought to be made equal to the knowable; the response is plain through what has been said, that this is true of the knowledge of comprehension and of that knowledge which actually judges concerning the whole knowable; but in such a mode of knowing the soul of Christ does not know all things that the Word knows.

3. To that which is objected, that the knowledge which the soul of Christ has is finite, therefore it cannot be of infinite things; it must be said that in the knowledge of the soul of Christ there are three things to consider, namely the *ground of knowing* itself, which is the Word itself, and the *habit* itself according to the very substance of the habit, and the *relation* of that habit to the knowable. I say therefore that although that habit is finite, nevertheless the ground of knowing is infinite, and through it that habit has a relation to infinite things, not *in act*, but *in aptitude*. And in this way nothing prevents finite knowledge from being with respect to infinite things. For from this no infinity is posited to be in the creature in act, but actual infinity is posited only in the ground of knowing.

4. To that which is objected, that a created thing does not exceed another created thing of the same genus by infinity; it must be said that this is true of that excess which is in the created thing itself *in itself* and *absolutely*; but of that excess which is by reason of the *creating essence*, it does not hold. And in this way the knowledge of Christ is said to exceed the knowledge of other souls by infinity, not because the light of Christ is by infinity greater *in act* than the light of other souls, but because the eternal Word itself shows itself by infinity more readily to manifest the things it has in itself to the soul of Christ than to any other soul.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ cannot know the immensity of the clarity of the divine knowledge, therefore neither its immensity with respect to the knowable things; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason: one indeed, because the soul of Christ, whatever it knows *in habit* concerning the eternal Word itself, it knows *in act*, since the knowledge of the Word itself in itself is of the essence of glory; but it is not so concerning the knowledge of other things, which shine forth in the Word. — Besides, the Word itself is infinite, and whatever is understood concerning the Word is wholly infinite: but it is not so concerning the infinite knowable things, because each of them in itself is finite and can be known by a finite substance and power and by the mediation of a finite habit. Whence, although the soul of Christ knows all things that the Word knows; nevertheless it is never made equal to it in knowledge, because it never comprehends all those things *actually*, according as the eternal Word itself by one glance judges concerning all things and beholds all things.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ, although it is united to the Word, is nevertheless not wherever the Word is, therefore neither its knowledge with respect to all things that the Word knows; it must be said that it is not alike, because to be here or there expresses an act of *existing*; and therefore, if the soul of Christ were wherever the Word is, it would already be immense, and its existence would be made equal to the existence of the Word. But it is not so concerning knowledge, because the soul of Christ knows many things in habit which it will never consider in act; therefore neither through this is equality posited, nor is immensity posited concerning its knowing power.

7. To that which is objected, that the simplicity of the soul is never elevated to the simplicity of the Word; it must be said that this word is understood not only of habitual knowledge, but also of actual consideration; and as regards this it is true that the soul never ascends to as many things to be considered as the Word itself considers. And if you object that neither by habit nor by act does it seem able to reach all things that the Word knows, since in all things the Creator exceeds the creature; it must be said that, as has been said, the habitual knowledge of infinite things does not posit an infinity in the habit of knowing; and therefore neither does it posit an equality of the very knowledge of the soul of Christ with respect to the knowledge of the Word itself.

8. To that which is asked, by what the soul of Christ knows all things that the Word knows; it must be said, by some light given to it; but this is not because that light is infinite, but because it is compared to the infinite knowable things on account of the readiness of the exemplar united to it.

9. To that which is finally objected, that in knowledge there is reception and judgment; it must be said that this is understood of actual consideration; but of habitual knowledge it is not true that one judges in act concerning all things that one knows in habit, but that one can and has the faculty of judging through certain grounds which are implanted in it for this, that it may be able to judge concerning those things known.

In order therefore that the sum of what has been said, which has been treated at greater length, may be more briefly summarized, it must be held that the soul of Christ has habitual knowledge of infinite things and of all those things that the Word itself, united to it, knows, although it does not have actual knowledge; and that habitual knowledge indeed does not posit an actual infinity in the habit itself or in the knowing power, but only in the ground of knowing, or in the comparison of the habit of knowing to the knowable things themselves. — Now this sixth mode of speaking I have rather striven to hold than the fifth — although the fifth is easier to maintain — both on account of the authorities of the Saints, on which in arduous questions one must especially rely, and also for reverence of Jesus Christ, to whose soul we ought to attribute as much of wisdom and grace as we can, and even above what we understand, for his reverence and honor.