Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word, and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether Christ's soul had any knowledge from the Word besides that which it had in the Word. Second it is asked whether it advanced according to that knowledge, or had it perfect from the beginning. Third it is asked whether God ought to have communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, just as he communicated omniscience.

### Question I. *Whether Christ had any other knowledge besides that which he had in the Word.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether Christ had any other knowledge from the Word besides that which he had in the Word. And that there was no necessity of having another, it seems:

1. *First*, by that which Damascene says: « Just as the flesh of a man according to its own nature is not life-giving, but the Lord's flesh, united according to the hypostasis to God the Word himself, was made life-giving on account of the union which is according to the hypostasis; so also human nature indeed does not substantially possess the knowledge of future things, but the Lord's soul, on account of the union which is toward God the Word, was enriched with the knowledge of future things »: therefore just as Christ's flesh cannot give life except on account of its union with the Word, so his soul will not know anything except in the Word itself.

2. *Likewise*, of one thing according to one nature there is one perfection; but the intellect of Christ's soul was perfect in knowledge, knowing all things in the Word itself: therefore, since knowledge is a perfection of the intellect itself, it did not have another knowledge besides that one.

3. *Likewise*, it is superfluous to do through more what can sufficiently be done through fewer; but Christ's soul most sufficiently knows every knowable thing by the knowledge which is in the Word itself: therefore it seems that it is superfluous to attribute another knowledge to it.

4. *Likewise*, it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser: if therefore the knowledge which Christ's soul has in the Word itself was of perfect luminosity, because it was in the very fount of light; it seems that there could not coexist with it another kind of knowledge in Christ's soul.

5. *Likewise*, when that which is perfect comes, that which is in part is done away with; but the knowledge of Christ's soul in the Word is the most perfect knowledge, while the knowledge of things in their proper genus is a less perfect knowledge: therefore if Christ from the beginning had the most perfect knowledge, which is in the Word; it seems that the other had no place in him.

**On the contrary:** 1. As Augustine says *On Genesis according to the Letter*, treating those three words, in Genesis chapter one: *Let it be made, he made it, and it was made*, the Angel knew things in a threefold way: in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus; but the intellect of Christ's soul was not less perfect than the angelic intellect: therefore it not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also in itself.

2. *Likewise*, Christ assumed what was of dignity from every state, namely from the state of glory, from the state of innocence, and from the state of fallen nature: therefore he not only had the knowledge befitting the state of glory, but also that befitting the state of innocence: if therefore Adam had the knowledge of all created things divinely given to him in himself, it seems that besides the glorious knowledge Christ had that knowledge.

3. *Likewise*, Christ's soul in every gift of graces ought to exceed all other souls, and not only in the gift of grace that makes pleasing, but also in the gift of grace freely given: if therefore to have the knowledge of those things in oneself is a gift of grace freely given; it seems that Christ had this knowledge besides that knowledge which is in the Word.

4. *Likewise*, just as the higher reason ought to have its perfection, so also the lower reason in Christ; but the higher reason is fitted to know things in the eternal Word itself, while the lower is fitted to consider them in their proper genus: therefore as he had the knowledge of the higher, so also of the lower, and so on.

5. *Likewise*, Christ was at once a perfect wayfarer and comprehensor; but knowledge is necessary for each state: therefore just as he had the knowledge due to the state of the comprehensor, knowing things in the Word itself, so it seems that he had the knowledge befitting the state of the wayfarer, knowing things in themselves.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, also had the knowledge of things from the Word, not only the knowledge of simple intelligence, but also of experience.

**I respond:** Without doubt it must be conceded that, besides the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word itself, which is the glorious knowledge, it had a knowledge from the Word, which is the knowledge of grace freely given, by which knowledge Christ also knows things in themselves through the species imparted to him from the very beginning of his condition, just as was the case in the intellect of Adam, or also in the angelic intellect.

Now the ground of this is the perfection of Christ's soul itself, which ought to have been perfect not only according to the higher portion, but also according to the lower and according to the sensible part, not only as to the state of the homeland, but also as to the state of the way, which is twofold, namely of innocence and of fallen nature. And according to this Christ had a threefold knowledge befitting that threefold state, namely the knowledge of glory, the knowledge of integral nature, and the knowledge of penal experience, that he might have in himself something of each state. — Again, because Christ's soul was perfect as to knowledge not only with respect to the knowables, but also with respect to the modes of knowing; therefore, since things are knowable in a threefold way, ac-
cording as they have being in a threefold way — for they have being in the Word, they have being in the created intellect, and they have being nonetheless in their proper genus — therefore, in order that the intellect of Christ's soul might have full knowledge of things, it knew things by this threefold knowledge.

And thus it is clear that Christ's soul not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also of things from the Word, knowledge, I say, not only of simple acquaintance, but also of experience. — Clear too is the sufficiency, necessity, and distinction of these three kinds of knowledge, which can be taken either on the part of the powers, namely the higher reason, the lower, and sensuality; or on the part of the states, namely of glory, of innocence, and of fallen nature; or on the part of the modes of knowing, namely in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus. And thus it is clear that Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, had another knowledge from the Word. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. *To that* which is first objected concerning the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not intend to assign a likeness as to all things, but as to this, that just as Christ's flesh would not be life-giving unless it had been united to the Word itself, so Christ's soul would be ignorant and imperfect unless it had been united with perfect wisdom; but on account of that union it has the perfection of all knowledge.

2. *To that* which is objected second, that of one thing there is one perfection; it must be said that this is true according to one mode and state and power; but because in Christ's soul there is a diversity of powers and states and modes of knowing to consider, therefore nothing prevents that, according to the diversity of these, it should have diverse perfecting kinds of knowledge.

3. *To that* which is objected, that it is superfluous to do through more what can [be done through fewer] etc.; it must be said that this is true if it be done equally well and equally sufficiently; but this would not be so in the case at hand, because Christ's soul would not thus have the completion of knowledge according to every mode and every state, but would have only one of these kinds of knowledge.

4. *To that* which is objected, that it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser; it must be said that this has truth somewhere, that is, of lights which are of the same nature, and which irradiate in the same way and according to the same part; but it is not so to be found in the case at hand, as was shown in the distinguishing of these kinds of knowledge. Moreover, what is said, that the greater light absorbs the lesser, is not said as to existence, but as to appearance; and although this is true in corporeal light, it is nevertheless not true in spiritual light, on account of the greater unmixedness which is found in spiritual light than in corporeal.

5. *To that* which is objected, that knowledge in part does not remain together with perfect knowledge; it must be said that this is true when knowledge in part has imperfection annexed to it, such as is enigmatic knowledge; and of this it is true that it was not in Christ's soul. But if it be called knowledge in part because it is less perfect than the knowledge of glory, it is not necessary that it be done away with, especially in that case in which the state of the way is together with the state of the homeland.