Dist. 15, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/15/q/bon-sent-III-d15-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the defects assumed by Christ in general.*
### Question I. *Whether it was fitting that such defects be found in Christ.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether it was fitting that such defects be found in Christ. And that it was so, seems [to be the case].

*Fundamenta.* 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two: *He had in all things to be made like his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest toward God:* if, therefore, it was becoming that Christ have in himself those things which make for fidelity and mercy, and these are the things in which he is made like us according to the state of misery, of which kind are defects and penalties: therefore such things ought to be found in Christ.

2. Likewise, to the Hebrews, chapter four: *We have not a high priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, tempted in all things by way of likeness, without sin.* From this word one argues thus: a good high priest ought to have compassion on those *who are ignorant and err;* but Christ assumed human nature, that he might become our high priest: therefore he ought to assume in himself those things which make for compassion. But such are the defects and penalties of our nature: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ assumed human nature for this, that in it he might merit eternal life for us, which the first parent had taken away from us; but the chief merit consists in the bearing of human sufferings and defects: if, therefore, it was becoming that Christ merit by a chief merit, it was becoming consequently that such defects and sufferings be found in him.

4. Likewise, for this Christ assumed human nature, that he might heal it by making satisfaction, and that in healing he might satisfy; but the chief thing that makes for the healing of fault and for satisfaction is penal humiliation: therefore it seems that it was becoming that such things be found in Christ.

*To the opposite.* **On the contrary:** 1. Just as the defect of fault is repugnant to the highest justice, so the defect of frailty and impotence is repugnant to the highest power; but it was not becoming for God, supremely just, to have the defect of fault, neither in himself nor in the assumed nature: therefore by parity of reasoning neither the defect of penalty and impotence.

2. Likewise, just as fault without a penalty following is disordered, so [is] penalty without a fault preceding; but it is not becoming for God to do anything disordered concerning himself or concerning the nature united to himself: therefore if he had no fault, neither in himself nor in the nature united to himself; it seems that he ought to assume no defects nor passibilities consequent upon fault, according to right order.

3. Likewise, Christ assumed human nature to heal it not only from fault, but also from the defects and passions consequent upon fault; but contraries are healed by contraries, both in bodily and in spiritual matters: therefore he ought rather to assume fortitude and impassibility to heal our weakness and infirmity than our natural defects. And this is what the Prophet seems to ask, Isaiah fifty-one: *Arise, arise; put on strength, O arm of the Lord.*

4. Likewise, Christ came to fight and utterly conquer the adversary; but such defects are more ordered to failing than to conquering, especially when one fights against a strong adversary: therefore it seems that Christ ought rather to cast off such defects than to assume them in himself.

### Conclusio.

> It was fitting that Christ assume our nature with defects and passibilities.

*Conclusion.* **I respond:** It must be said that without doubt it was fitting that Christ assume our nature with defects and passibilities; and this for a threefold cause, *A threefold reason,* principally namely on account of the *price* of our salvation, on account of the *example* of virtue, and on account of the *support* of our frailty.

*First.* On account of the *price* of our salvation, because he had purposed to redeem us *not with corruptible gold and silver, but with his own precious blood*, and to lay down his soul for our souls. But for this he would not be fit, unless he had assumed a deficient and passible nature; and therefore he had to have our defects and penalties in himself.

*Second.* — From another cause too this same thing was fitting, namely on account of the *example* of virtue, and especially of humility, patience, and piety, by means of which one comes to heaven, and in which Christ willed us to imitate himself, according to that [word] of Matthew, chapter eleven: *Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart.* —

*Third.* The third reason is on account of the *support* of our frailty, by reason of which the rational nature has in itself a difficulty toward *believing true things,* and the irascible toward *hoping for arduous things,* and the concupiscible toward *loving good things.* And therefore Christ willed not only to be made like us in nature, but also in defects and penalties, so that, by manifesting in himself the *truth* of human nature, he might furnish a support to our reason for *believing;* by showing nonetheless the immensity of his mercy through the taking up of our misery, he might furnish to the irascible a support for *hoping;* by showing the greatness of his benevolence, he might furnish to the concupiscible an incitement for *loving himself.* — And therefore although it seems unfitting that such defects be found in Christ, if they be considered in themselves; yet, if they be referred to their end, a great seemliness of fittingness is found. — And therefore the reasons that are for this side are to be granted.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that just as iniquity ill-befits the highest justice, so infirmity ill-befits the highest power; it must be said that such a likeness holds, if infirmity and fault be compared to the *divine* nature; for in the divine nature, just as there can be no injustice, so there can be no impotence. *Note.* But if they be compared to the *assumed* nature, then it does not hold true, for the reason that infirmity itself can be the matter of exercising virtue; for the virtue of *fortitude* is exercised most of all in the enduring of terrible things, and most of all of those which bring on death. But fault and iniquity are wholly opposed to justice and render blameworthy the subject in which they are; whereas infirmity renders [the subject] more praiseworthy, when it is joined to the interior virtue of the soul according to the state of merit. And therefore the two cases are not alike.

2. To that which is objected, that penalty without fault is disordered; it must be said that there is a penalty *inflicted by necessity,* and there is a penalty *assumed by will.* *Penalty twofold.* The first penalty, then, is disordered, unless fault has preceded in the one who is punished; but the second has order, whether fault has preceded in the one who is punished, or in the one for whom he himself wills to be punished; and so it is in the matter at hand. For Christ willed to have such defects and penalties in himself for the repairing of human nature.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ assumed human nature to heal it; it must be said that this is true. — As to what it *objects,* that contraries are healed by contraries; it must be said that this holds true if the comparison be made of the medicine to the cause and principle of the sickness; and so it has no force against the matter at hand, because the principle of the corruption of the whole of human nature was the disordered delight in eating of the forbidden tree. And therefore the defects and penalties are contrary and opposed to our sickness, its cause and origin being weighed. *Otherwise.* — Otherwise it can be said that when it is said: contraries are healed by contraries, this is understood as to the *first* healing agents, such as is grace, which heals fault; but as to the *proximate* [agents] it does not hold true, because pain is the medicine of pain. So too is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected, that defects avail more for failing than for conquering; it must be said that there is a *natural* virtue and there is a *moral* virtue; and according to this, the fight is twofold, and the *victory* is twofold: one which regards *natural* virtue, the other which [regards] *moral* virtue. *Virtue twofold.* The fight, therefore, and the victory against sin pertains to moral virtue. But Christ, when he came to conquer the adversary, came to vanquish and utterly conquer sin; and therefore moral virtue was suited to him, that he might be able to overcome. But natural virtue contributed nothing to this victory, but rather its opposite; for both the devil and sin are most of all conquered in humility and patience. *Note.* On account of which it is said: *Virtue is made perfect in infirmity,* second to the Corinthians, chapter twelve. — When, therefore, it is said that defects avail more for succumbing than for conquering; it must be said that this does not hold true, unless it be understood of the fight and victory in the same genus in which those defects are; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand, where there is victory through the fortitude of justice, not through the fortitude of power. And of this fortitude the Prophet was speaking: *Put on strength, O arm of the Lord.* — *Otherwise.* It could nonetheless be understood of the fortitude of power. For upon the fortitude of justice in the present life, in merit, there follows the fortitude of power in the reward, as is plain in Christ, because, although *he suffered from infirmity, yet he rose from power*.