Dist. 15, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/15/q/bon-sent-III-d15-dubia
----------------------------------------
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *He took up a single oldness, that he might consume our double oldness.* For this seems to be said unfittingly, since like is not consumed by its like, but rather is increased: therefore our oldness is not consumed by the oldness assumed by Christ. — Furthermore, that which consumes another thing is more powerful than it: therefore if Christ's oldness consumed ours, it ought rather to have been double with respect to ours, than ours double with respect to his.

— Furthermore, Christ's oldness did not consume ours except by way of merit; but merit ought to be commensurate with the reward: therefore it ought to have been neither single nor double with respect to ours, but equal.

**I respond:** It must be said that both punishment and fault pertain to the old man, because in his primary condition man was created without fault and punishment, and according to these two there is in us a double oldness; but in Christ there was punishment without fault, and therefore a single oldness; for it was punishment together with grace. And therefore through Christ's punishment together with grace we merited to be freed from fault and from punishment, so that the oldness of punishment, joined to the newness of grace, consumes the double oldness, the opposition being preserved, and the due proportion being nonetheless preserved. Therefore the saying of Augustine in the text is true and reasonable.

To that, then, which is objected, that oldness is not opposed to oldness; it must be said that this is true by reason of itself, yet it is opposed by reason of the newness of grace joined to it. — And by this what follows is plain, that by reason of the joined grace that single oldness exceeds our double one. For on account of this, that Christ had grace not by measure, he perfectly merited for us liberation from punishment and from fault.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *He assumed these defects for the showing forth of true humanity*, because, if these defects are not *of the truth* of human nature, they do not make for the showing forth of true humanity. But that they are not *of the truth* of human nature, Anselm shows by such a reasoning: human nature is *true* in one way according to the state of corruption and of incorruption; but these defects do not belong to it according to the state of incorruption: therefore they are not of the truth of human nature. — Likewise, after the resurrection Christ showed forth *true* humanity, and yet to the Apostles themselves he did not show forth defects and penalties: therefore it does not seem that defects of this kind would make for the showing forth of the *truth* of human nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a showing forth of the *truth* of human nature *simply*, or *according to a state*; I say therefore that defects of this kind, assumed, made for the showing forth of true humanity *according to the state* of the animal body, and this Christ wished to show; for he wished to conform himself to us: for *he was made in the likeness of men*, as the Apostle says, *and in habit was found as a man.*

To that, then, which is objected, that what is not *of the truth* of human nature does not make for the showing forth of *true* humanity; it must be said that this is false. For something annexed to some state of human nature can be a manifestation of the truth. «For accidents contribute a great part toward knowing *what a thing is*», although they are not of the essence of the thing. — To the last point the response is plain through the things that have been said.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about the understanding of the truth of those authorities which he adduces in that chapter: *Yet certain things are found in the treatises of the Saints* etc. For it seems that those authorities speak the truth which say that Christ did not fear. For it is written in the first [Epistle] of John, chapter four: *Perfect charity casts fear out of doors*; but Christ had the most perfect charity: therefore no fear seems to have been in him. — Likewise, Augustine, in the book of the Eighty-three Questions: «The sign of perfection is no fear»; but in Christ there was the highest perfection: therefore there was in him no fear at all. — Likewise, no one fears what he can escape; but Christ was certain that he could escape every punishment: therefore it seems that he feared nothing.

**I respond:** It must be said that fear is of a threefold difference: for one is *gratuitous*, one *libidinous*, one *natural*, as it were a mean between the two. — Now *gratuitous* fear is of a threefold difference: for one is the fear of *punishment*, one is the fear of *offense*, one of *reverence*. The first and the second were not in Christ, because perfect charity casts both out of doors; but according to the third difference it was in Christ, because thus it is not expelled by perfect charity, but rather is consummated, according to that of Isaiah, chapter eleven: *The spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him*; and according to that of the Psalm: *The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.* — And by this the response to the first objection is plain.

There is also another fear, the *libidinous*, and this likewise is of a manifold difference: for there is a *worldly* fear, and there is a *human* fear; and none of these was

in Christ nor even in the perfect man; and thus is understood the saying of Augustine, that «the sign of perfection is no fear». — And by this the response to the second is plain.

Again there is fear in the third difference, namely *natural* fear, and this is of a threefold difference: one is of *the sensuality going before reason*, one of *the sensuality lying subject to reason*, and one indeed is of *the rational part* itself. The first fear is of corrupted and in some way *disordered* nature, and likewise the third; but the second is of corrupted, yet *ordered*, nature. Since therefore in Christ, although there was a defect of passibility, yet there was no defect of disorder and viciousness; hence it is that there was in him fear in the middle way, not the first nor the third. — And by this the third objection is plain. The authorities also which are said in the text are plain. For all those authorities which say that Christ did not fear, say this, not because they wish to remove all fear from Christ, since the authority of Isaiah says the contrary; but because there was not in him a fear that would go before his reason, or that would disturb his reason; for it was most secure and knew well that nothing could happen or be inflicted upon it which it did not first desire and will.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *He was truly made sorrowful, but his passion does not dominate the soul; it is rather a propassion.* For by this he wishes to say that in Christ there was a propassion. **On the contrary**; upon the fifth [chapter] of Matthew the Gloss says that «a propassion is a sudden motion, to which it is not consented from reason»; but such a motion is a venial sin, according to what is there intimated, and this was not in Christ: therefore there was no propassion in him. — Likewise, the sudden is that which goes before the judgment of reason and which is from a stealthy seizure; but Christ did nothing through stealthy seizure: therefore he had in himself no sudden motion, therefore neither a propassion. — Likewise, Christ feared death for no other reason than because he foresaw it; but he did not foresee it except according to reason: therefore he feared with that fear which is according to reason; and this fear is a passion, not a propassion: therefore the Master's response is null.

**I respond:** It must be said that a propassion, according to the general acceptation of its name, is said to be a diminished passion; and this is that which stops short of reason, insofar as it is reason, and so a propassion means a passion of the sensual part, or of the natural power; and in this way the Master and Jerome wish to say that passions of this kind were in Christ. For they were from the horror of the sensuality, not of the rational part insofar as it is rational.

To that, then, which is objected, that a propassion is defined as a sudden motion; it must be said that there a propassion is defined according to what it is in us, in whom the sensuality is moved apart from the judgment of reason; but in Christ this was not so. And therefore the response to the two points which are first objected is plain.

To that, then, which is objected, that the fear of death could not be except in reason; it must be said that reason, foreseeing imminent death, made an imagination of death in the sensual part itself; and this being made, the sensuality was moved and struck with the horror of death. — And if you say that here there is no order of cognition, such that one might come from reason into the sensuality; it must be said that this is true in us, in whom there is knowledge through acquisition from what is lower. But in Christ it could be otherwise, who was full of knowledge, and in whom there was perfect obedience of the lower powers with respect to the higher. Furthermore, we ourselves can *imagine* what we will, although we cannot, when we will, *sense* outwardly. And so the fear of future death could be in Christ in the sensual part, so that deservedly, according to Jerome and the Master, it can and ought to be called a propassion.

---