Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/16/q/bon-sent-III-d16-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Hebrews, ninth chapter: *As it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment, so Christ was once offered*; Gloss: « By the same necessity and right of nature »: therefore according to this Christ died according to the state of nature; but he who dies thus has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *to Julian*: « If Christ assumed such flesh as Adam had in the first state, not only would Christ's flesh not be flesh of sin, but neither would it be like the flesh of sin »: if therefore Christ was like the flesh of sin, it is clear that he did not

assume flesh according to the state of nature as instituted, but according to the state of fallen nature. But this flesh has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and the one person of Christ* says that Christ from the state of innocence assumed immunity from sin, but from the state of fallen nature assumed passibility; but passibility, which is according to the state of fallen nature, is the necessity of suffering: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, by whose power that body was fashioned from the womb of the Virgin, although it purified it from the foulness of corruption, did not however purify it from the defect of passibility: therefore it had passibility through that mode through which the Virgin who bore him had it, except for the guilt of sin. But the Virgin had the necessity of dying and suffering: therefore also the flesh of Christ: therefore also Christ.

5. Likewise, Christ's body was passible just as it was animal and earthly; but Christ's body, on account of its animality and earthliness, had a natural necessity of taking food and tending downward, for otherwise it could not have stood except by a miracle: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of passibility, it had a necessity of suffering and dying.

6. Likewise, Christ assumed all natural and general defects, except those which are ordered to sin; but the necessity of suffering is a defect in us natural and general, and yet it is not ordered to sin: therefore Christ assumed it.

**On the contrary:**

1. John, tenth chapter: *I have power to lay down my soul and to take it up again*; and a little before: *No man takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself*: therefore to suffer and to die was in the freedom of Christ's will: therefore it does not seem that Christ had any necessity for this.

2. Likewise, Augustine on that text of John, third chapter: *He that comes from above is above all*: « He comes from above, because from the height of human nature before sin the Word of God took human nature »; but in that state human nature did not have a necessity of dying: therefore neither as it was assumed by Christ.

3. Likewise, Anselm in the book *Why God Became Man*: « Since the will of God does nothing by any necessity, but by power alone; and the will of Christ was the will of God: by no necessity therefore did he die, but by power alone ».

4. Likewise, he shows the same thing by another reasoning of this kind: « Every necessity is either compulsion or prohibition, which two necessities are converted into one another as contraries, just as the *necessary* and the *impossible*; but in Christ there was no compulsion to die, or prohibition against not dying: therefore in Christ there was no necessity of dying », and so neither of suffering.

5. Likewise, whenever some property necessarily inheres in some subject, it is related to it as to a cause and subject; but the passion had no cause in Christ: therefore it was not necessary that Christ suffer: therefore Christ did not assume the necessity of suffering.

6. Likewise, what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not: therefore if in Christ there was a necessity for suffering, he would have suffered whether he willed or not; but nothing of this sort is fully voluntary and meritorious: therefore Christ in suffering would not have had full merit. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is true, namely that Christ had a necessity for suffering.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ there was a necessity of suffering, but assumed, not contracted.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that to this some have wished to respond by distinguishing necessity according to the four genera of causes. For there is a necessity according to the *formal* cause, according to which it is said: it is necessary that what is hot be hot. There is also a necessity according to the material cause, according to which it is said that it is necessary that what is hot in the highest degree be converted into fire. There is also a necessity according to the efficient cause, which is called necessity according to violence and compulsion; and according to this we say that a stone strongly impelled must necessarily be moved. And there is a necessity according to the final cause, according to which we say that a saw must necessarily be toothed, because it is for dividing solid and hard things. According to this, since necessity is said in four ways, only in the *fourth*

way was there a necessity of suffering in Christ, namely on account of our redemption. For as far as it lay in himself, he did not have a necessity for suffering, because there was in him neither corruption of the human condition, nor could there be compulsion; and therefore necessity according to the other three genera of causes cannot belong to him. — But this mode of distinguishing is reasonable enough in itself and is reasonably applied to the question proposed, if however it be asked about the necessity of suffering in Christ, inasmuch as the necessity of suffering in Christ includes not only the time *after* the assumption, but also *before* the assumption; that is, if it be asked whether it was necessary that Christ assume our penalties; for then it is true to say that it was not necessary except by the necessity of the *end*. And in this way blessed Anselm treats this question.

But the Master treats this question otherwise in the text. For he asks whether this defect, which is the necessity of suffering, since it is in us through *contraction*, was in Christ through *voluntary assumption*. And to this question it cannot be resolved by the aforesaid distinction. And therefore it must be said otherwise, not because the aforesaid mode of speaking is bad, but because it does not avail for our purpose.

— Following therefore the opinion of the Master in the text, we can say that Christ assumed this defect, which is the necessity of suffering. For as far as it was of the law of nature, that body was dissoluble and mortal; and unless it had been preserved miraculously, it would at some time have failed through old age. — It must be noted, however, that the necessity of suffering was not in Christ in *every* mode in which it is in us, but in a certain mode thus, in a certain mode otherwise. For the necessity of suffering can be compared to three things, namely to the *cause* and to the *subject* and to the *governing power* of the body. If it is considered by comparison to the *cause*, thus it is in us from a twofold cause, namely on account of the foulness of culpable corruption and on account of the quality of natural composition. For we have a necessity for suffering, because we contract the guilt of original sin, and because we are constituted of contrary agents and patients, so that there is continual dissolution in our body. But Christ had the necessity only from the *other* cause; for he was passible not on account of the *guilt of original sin*, but on account of the *mode of such a composition*. — Likewise, by comparison to the *subject*, the necessity of suffering is in another mode in Christ and in us. For in us there is a necessity of suffering either by comparison to nature, or by comparison to person. But in Christ the necessity for suffering was not by comparison to the *person*, because it could be bound by no necessity, since *all things were subject to him*, but by comparison to the *nature* assumed. — Likewise, by comparison to the *governing power* the necessity of suffering is in us otherwise than in Christ. For there is in us a governing power both on the part of *nature* and on the part of the governing *will*; and with respect to both there is the necessity of suffering in us. For neither nature nor will can prohibit suffering in us; for we suffer whether we will or not. But in Christ the necessity was with respect to the *natural* power, but not with respect to the *will*. For he endured nothing unwillingly, nor could he so endure, because he did not deserve it.

And thus it is clear that the necessity of suffering was assumed by Christ and in Christ it was through *assumption*, yet not in the mode in which it is in us through *contraction*. Therefore Christ holds as it were a middle between us and the state of nature as instituted. For in us nature and will are subject to suffering; but in *Adam* both nature and will were superior to suffering; but in *Christ* nature was subject to suffering, yet the will was superior. And this is what Damascene says, that « in Christ, although the passions came about according to the law of nature, yet not by compulsion, but voluntarily ». — It must therefore be granted that in Christ there was a necessity of suffering and dying, not contracted, but assumed. The reasons and authorities therefore which are for this part are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the tenth chapter of John: *I lay down my soul* etc.; it must be said that this is the word of the person of the Son of God, whose there was no necessity of suffering or dying; for no one could harm him, unless he himself voluntarily permitted it: hence that word does not mean *effectively*, but *permissively*, nor does it exclude necessity with respect to the *nature*, but with respect to the *person*.

2. To that of Augustine which is said, that he assumed flesh from the height of human nature; it must be said that Augustine means this, as Boethius expounds, as regards immunity from sinning, not as regards passibility. For the same Boethius says that « from every state he assumed something: from the state of innocence immunity from sin, from the state of glory the impossibility of sinning, from the state of fallen nature passibility »; hence as regards passibility he is more assimilated to fallen nature than to nature as instituted.

3. 4. To that of Anselm concerning the will of Christ the response is already clear; for it does not exclude necessity absolutely, but necessity with respect to the divine will. — And by this the response is clear to what follows, which is objected, that every necessity is either of prohibition or of compulsion; for it must be said that this is understood of the necessity which is *repugnant* to the will, as the same Anselm says; but of that necessity which is *subject* to the will, it does not hold true. Therefore that reasoning does not prove that there was no necessity of suffering in Christ, but that there was none contrary to his will.

5. To that which is objected, that a property necessarily inhering in something is related to it as to a subject and cause; it can be answered that this is true. But when he assumes that the passion had no cause in Christ; it must be said that the cause of passion can be determined in two ways: either in the genus of *morals*, or in the genus of *nature*. In the genus of *morals* the cause of passion is the merit of sin in us; and this is true, that it was not in Christ. But the cause in the genus of *nature* is composition from contraries according to a state of struggle and mutual action, and this in Christ was from pure will; and for this cause we say that there was in Christ a necessity of suffering. And hence it is that the necessity of suffering in Christ does not exclude the will, but rather includes it.

6. To that which is objected, that what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not; it must be said that this does not hold true except of that necessity which is against the will, not of that which is from the will and is subject to the will; and such necessity does not diminish from the character of merit, as Anselm sets out the example of one who voluntarily bound himself to works of supererogation. And if it be objected that these two cannot stand together, that something be necessary and voluntary, since the voluntary can be thus and otherwise, but the necessary by no means; it must be said that this is true of a will which has annexed to it changeableness, but of an unchangeable will it is not true. For Christ did good voluntarily, and yet it was necessary that he do good; so too he voluntarily assumed our passibility, in such a way that it was impossible for him to repent of this, that he had assumed such a defect.