Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/16/q/bon-sent-III-d16-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the passibility and pain of Christ's soul in particular.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the passibility and pain of Christ's soul itself in particular. And concerning this three things are asked.

*First* it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. — *Second*, granted that he suffered according to the reason, it is asked whether he suffered according to the inferior part and the superior. — *Third*, granted that [he suffered] according to both, it is asked whether he suffered more penally according to the reason than according to the sensual part.

### Question I. *Whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or according to the sensuality.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. And that he suffered according to the reason, it seems.

1. The soul suffered while the body was suffering, because it is united to the body as a perfection; but the rational soul is the perfection of the body not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reason: therefore it suffered in both ways while the body was suffering.

2. Likewise, the conjunction of the powers of the soul to one another is greater than is that of the soul to the body; but when the body suffers, the soul suffers: therefore when one power suffers, another suffers: therefore, pain existing in the sensuality, it must be also in the reason.

3. Likewise, the union of the powers of the soul within the soul itself is greater than is that of the members of the body within the body itself; but when one member suffers, the rest suffer along with it: therefore if the sensual power suffers, it is necessary that the rational also suffer along with it.

4. Likewise, what is in the soul according to its substance and essence consequently redounds into all the powers; but Christ's soul was suffering while the body was suffering, on account of the essential union of it to the body: therefore it was necessary that it suffer according to its whole self: therefore according to the sensual part and the rational.

5. Likewise, Christ by his passion freed us not only from the passion by which the conjoined [soul] suffers, but also from the passion by which the separated soul suffers; but the separated soul suffers not only according to the sensuality, but also suffers according to its whole self, especially according to the intellectual part, of which it has use and operation. If therefore Christ for our liberation took upon himself such passions, it seems that he suffered not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reason.

**On the contrary:** 1. That which is the act of no part of the body does not suffer while the body suffers; « the soul according to the part of reason is the act of no part of the body », as the Philosopher says: therefore it never suffers while the body suffers: therefore the soul in Christ, if it suffered, did not suffer except only according to the sensuality.

2. Likewise, that which is not corrupted unto the corruption of another does not suffer unto the passion of another, because passion is the way to corruption; but Christ's soul according to the reason could not be corrupted unto the corruption of the body: therefore neither could it suffer while the body suffered.

3. Likewise, that which in no way has anything contrary nor has anything superior cannot suffer from any agent nor be harmed; but Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything created superior to itself: therefore in no way according to the reason could it suffer or be afflicted.

4. Likewise, nothing one and the same and according to the same rejoices and grieves over the same thing; but Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the pains and passions which the body bore, otherwise it would not merit: therefore while the body suffered, it did not suffer nor was it afflicted.

5. Likewise, when passion reaches all the way to the reason, it is not only a pre-passion, but rather it is a complete and perfect passion, which cannot fall upon a wise man, according to what Seneca proves and Jerome says. Either therefore Christ was not wise, or, if he was, his soul according to the reason did not suffer along with the flesh.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's soul suffered both with the pain which is in the soul according to itself, and with that which is in it from the flesh, insofar as the reason is considered as a nature.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as Augustine says *On the City of God*, there is a twofold pain in the soul: one which is in the soul according to itself; another which is in the soul from the flesh. And it is settled that both pains were in Christ's soul; and concerning that pain indeed which is in the soul according to itself, there is no doubt that Christ suffered according to the reason. For he suffered along with and grieved for our sins; and that pain in the rational will was proceeding from the consideration of reason, namely from the recognition of our sins.

But concerning the other pain, which is in the soul from the flesh, it is not altogether evident. Yet our masters commonly distinguish that the reason can be considered in two ways, namely as *reason* and as *nature*. If it be considered as reason, then the passions which are attributed to it are consequent upon deliberation itself; and in this way Christ's soul did not suffer along with the suffering body, but rather rejoiced and was glad exceedingly; for it pleased him vehemently to suffer for the salvation of the human race. — But if the reason be considered as nature; then, since it has a natural appetite and inclination toward the body, as a perfection toward the perfectible, it was suffering while the body was suffering. For the rational soul is the perfection of the human body not only according to the sensible powers, since the human body is ordered to a nobler perfection than is the brute body; but according to its whole self, that is, according to the completeness of its essence and the totality of its powers, it is the perfection of the body and has toward it a natural appetite and inclination and conjunction, and through this delight and compassion. — It must therefore be granted that Christ's soul suffered along with the body according to the reason, insofar as the reason is considered as nature, since the passion of the body was most bitter, as was shown above.

— Hence the reasons which are for this part are to be granted.

1. To that, indeed, which is objected first to the contrary, that the soul according to the reason is the act of no part of the body; it must be said that the Philosopher in that statement does not wish to deny the natural conjunction of the intellect itself to the body, but he wishes to say this, that the intellect does not determine an organ for itself, insofar as it goes forth into its proper act. And from this it cannot be inferred that it does not suffer along with the body; for that compassion does not take its origin from the determination of an organ, but rather from the natural conjunction or union.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing suffers along with another suffering thing which is not corrupted together with it; it must be said that Augustine denies that in the twenty-first [book] *On the City of God* as false; for he has an instance in the rational spirit. Hence that statement does not hold true except concerning that passion which « more, once made, casts [the thing] away from the substance » that suffers, or suffers along [with it].

3. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything superior; it must be said that to have something contrary or superior is twofold, namely *in itself*, or *by accident*. But although nothing is opposed and contrary to Christ's soul according to itself, yet it is opposed and contrary by reason of the body united [to it]; for what harms the perfectible harms also, and consequently, the perfection itself.

4. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the passions of the body; it must be said that nothing hinders the reason from rejoicing over something as reason, and grieving as nature, for the reason that something can be repugnant to the will according to the natural appetite, and consonant with the will according to the deliberative appetite. For frequently by the will of free choice we flee what nature seeks, and we seek what nature flees; so too it must be understood in the matter proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that the passion which reaches the reason does not fall upon a wise man; it must be said that the reason's being reached by the mode of reason

is repugnant to the perfection of wisdom, but not its being reached by the mode of nature. For this is what makes a man fall from the state and perfection of wisdom, namely that his reason yield and succumb to the passions, but not that he feel the passions; and thus to suffer by the mode of nature does not take away the character of a pre-passion. For it is one thing to experience a passion, another to be disturbed by the passions. For to be disturbed is to be subjected, but one can experience passions and be borne above them. And so it was in Christ's soul, which according to the reason as nature experienced the passions of the body with most acute pain, [and] according to the reason as deliberative was borne above the passions of the body with virtuous joy.