Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/16/q/bon-sent-III-d16-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason. And that it did, it seems thus.

1. Christ "assumed the whole man, that he might heal the whole"; but he healed all of us, both as to the superior portion of reason and as to the inferior, and this indeed through his passion: therefore he suffered as to every part of reason.

2. Likewise, where there is fault, there ought to be punishment; but the fault of Adam was in the superior part of reason on account of a complete aversion: if therefore Christ sustained punishment for the fault of Adam, then he felt punishment in the supreme part of reason.

3. Likewise, the superior reason is more joined to the inferior than the inferior is joined to sensuality; but the inferior reason suffers when sensuality suffers: therefore the superior reason suffers when the inferior suffers.

4. Likewise, the superior reason has a union with the deity and has a union with the flesh; but on account of its union with the deity, in which there is the storehouse of delight, it is necessary that it be delighted: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of its union with the suffering flesh it was necessary that it suffer.

**On the contrary:** 1. Paul in his rapture, on account of the full conversion of his reason to God, was withdrawn entirely from the passions and delights of the flesh, as he himself says: *I know not, whether in the body or out of the body*; but the superior portion of reason in Christ was entirely turned to God: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of the affliction of the flesh.

2. Likewise, "contraries cannot be in the same thing and according to the same"; but joy and sorrow are contrary affections: therefore if Christ continually rejoiced according to the superior portion of reason, then it seems that according to it he did not experience nor feel sorrow.

3. Likewise, "that is whiter which is more unmixed with black"; therefore where there is the highest joy, there is no

sorrow; but in the superior portion of Christ's reason there was the highest joy, because he comprehended God most perfectly: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of sorrow according to that part.

4. Likewise, just as fault is opposed to grace, so beatitude is opposed to misery; but fault cannot stand in the same thing and according to the same together with grace: therefore neither beatitude and misery according to the same portion of the soul. But beatitude was in Christ according to the superior portion of the soul: therefore it was impossible that according to that part any sorrow be in Christ.

5. Likewise, that power was simple, therefore to whatever it turned itself according to the same part, it was wholly borne: if therefore as to the superior portion he was always turned to God, from whom he drew joy; it seems that according to that portion he felt no torment.

6. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is distinguished from the inferior in this, that the superior looks to higher things, the latter to lower: if therefore Christ had no matter of sorrow from the superior, but only from the lowest; it seems that the superior portion of reason in no way suffered in him.

### Conclusion

> Christ suffered also according to the superior portion of reason, insofar as that portion is considered after the manner of nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the common opinion of the masters, the passion of Christ did not stand only in sensuality, nor only reach the inferior reason, but extended itself even to the superior portion. For just as our soul, from its conjunction to an infected body, is wholly corrupted and wholly infected according to all its power and according to every part, namely both superior and inferior; so the soul of Christ, from its conjunction to the suffering and afflicted body, wholly suffered and was afflicted, that through that passion and that sorrow the whole sinful soul might be healed. And thus sorrow and passion were in Christ according to the supreme part of reason, although in it there was the joy of fruition. — But although this is held as true, it is nonetheless difficult to understand how in the soul of Christ, according to the same power and according to the same state of the power, there could be sorrow and joy, and the supervening sorrow not interrupt the joy; rather they were simultaneous; nor again, what is greater, the very intense sorrow had made the joy be less perfect.

But for these things to be understood, three things must be supposed, which are true and probable, namely that the joy of fruition and the sorrow of passion are not contrary affections, because they are not in respect of the same thing nor are altogether present in the same way in the same subject, but the one is present per se, the other per accidens: because joy is present on account of the gratuitous conjunction of [the soul] with the Deity, but sorrow on account of the natural conjunction of it with the flesh; and because they are not contrary affections, they can be in the soul according to the same part.

The second supposition is that not only are sorrow and joy of this kind not contrary, but the one is material in respect of the other; and therefore they could be present in the same thing at once, as we see in a penitent man, who at once grieves and rejoices over his grief. So too the soul of Christ, according to its nature, suffered-with the suffering body, yet rejoiced over that passion and compassion.

The third supposition is that Christ was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, in such a way that the cognition of the wayfarer did not impede the cognition of the comprehensor, nor affection [impede] affection; and this was singular in Christ on account of the office of mediator, by which he had to experience both things divine and human. Hence just as he could at once and at the same time be turned perfectly to God and be turned to us, in such a way that one of those conversions did not impede nor retard the other; so he could, according to the same part of the soul, at once and at the same time rejoice in God and suffer-with his body, in such a way that neither did sorrow suffer any diminution or remission from joy, nor joy from sorrow. — It must therefore be granted that Christ grieved according to the superior portion in the passion, insofar however as that reason is considered after the manner of nature. And the reasons adduced for this side are to be granted. But to the reasons for the opposite it is easy to reply through the things that have been said.

1. For to that which is first objected concerning the rapture of Paul, it must be said that it is not similar, because Paul could not have the use of wayfarer and comprehensor in the way that Christ could, who was man and God.

2. To that which is objected, that contraries cannot be present in the same subject; it must be said, as has been said, that sorrow and joy in Christ did not have contrariety, but rather the one was material in respect of the other, because by this very fact Christ rejoiced in the Lord, by which he perceived that he was suffering and grieving for the Lord.

3. To that which is objected, that joy unmixed with sorrow is more intense; it must be said

that this is true of sorrow opposed to joy; but of sorrow which gives occasion for rejoicing, it is not necessary that this hold true; and therefore in the present case that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected, that beatitude is opposed to misery, in the way that grace [is opposed] to fault; it must be said that it is true that beatitude is opposed to misery according to the common law, and glory together with misery is not found in anyone at once. And the reason for this is that each one is in one state, not in two; but since Christ was in a twofold state, or held as it were the standing of a twofold person; just as in Christ a state is compossible with a state without repugnance, so beatitude with misery. Nor is it altogether similar in the case of grace and fault, because they do not regard different states, but directly have opposition and incompossibility; unless perhaps one understands it of venial fault, which can be found in the same thing at once with grace, since it does not have direct opposition; but venial fault would be entirely expelled when grace is perfected; so too from Christ the misery of the passion was taken away, when his glory was consummated.

5. To that which is objected, that that power is simple; it must be said that, although by nature a simple power cannot be turned to diverse things, nevertheless through the deiformity of glory it is possible for it to be so enlarged that it can at once both be turned to diverse things and be affected about diverse things; and thus it will be sometime in the fatherland, and it is to be understood that it was so also in Christ.

6. To that which is objected, that the superior reason is not so called except insofar as it is turned to higher things; it must be said that this is not true, because to the superior portion of reason belongs the governing of the inferior, and within it resides the rule and command over all the powers of the soul, which are in some way obedient to reason; and thus after the manner of nature it is bound together with the other powers and with the human body itself as with something perfectible; and therefore it has to suffer when the body suffers. But as to what is said, that the superior reason is attended to according to its regard for higher things; this is said as to its principal act, not that there be excluded its conversion and conjunction to lower things.

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