Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/17/q/bon-sent-III-d17-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the will of Christ.*
### Question I. *Whether in Christ there were several wills.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether in Christ there was a plurality of wills. And that there was, it seems.

1. John, chapter six: *I came not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me*; therefore the will of Christ himself is one thing, and the will of the one sending is another; but the will of Christ according to Divinity is the same as the will of the one sending: therefore it is necessary that Christ had a will according to humanity and according to Divinity: therefore he had several wills.

2. Likewise, Damascene, in the third book: « We say that he has in two natures, in twofold manner, those things which are the natural properties of the two natures: two natural wills, both divine and human ».

3. Likewise, to every intellectual nature a will corresponds; but in Christ there were several intellectual natures, as was shown in what precedes: therefore several wills.

4. Likewise, Christ merited, but merit is only according to a created will; Christ also created all things, but creation is only from an uncreated will: therefore Christ had an uncreated and a created will: therefore he had several wills.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene, in the third book: « Of those whose substance is the same, the will also is the same; and of those whose will is diverse, the substance is diverse »; but the divine nature and the human are united in Christ in the unity of the hypostasis, which is an individual substance, so that in Christ there are not several hypostases, but one: therefore if several hypostases are not to be found in Christ, neither are several wills.

2. Likewise, the will makes the one willing; therefore several wills make several willing ones; but Christ is a single one willing: therefore he had only a single will.

3. Likewise, the will is that in a man in which resides the governance and dominion of all the things which are done in him and through him; but this in Christ can only be one alone, because there cannot be several ruling things in one and the same without conflict: therefore it is necessary that in Christ there is one will alone.

4. Likewise, in Christ there is only one personality, because personality denotes the noblest condition, which is found in a rational substance; but the will is the noblest and supreme [part] of a rational substance: therefore just as in Christ there is only one personality, so it seems that there is only one will.

### Conclusio

> In Christ there are several wills.

**I respond:** It must be said that since in Christ there are several intellectual natures, namely the divine and the human, it is necessary that in Christ there are several wills. — For just as in one noble corporeal nature these two accompany each other, namely light and heat; so also in a perfect spiritual nature it is necessary that two things be found corresponding to these two, namely cognition and affection; but cognition is an act of reason, and affection of the will. Since therefore in Christ there are several spiritual natures, it is necessary to posit in Christ several intellects and several wills; and the Master makes this manifest in the text through the manifold authorities of the Saints. — Hence the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that of those whose substance is the same the will also is the same; it must be said that *substance* is said in many ways: in one way substance is said as the same as *essence* or *nature*; in another way substance is said as the same as *supposit*. But Damascene in the aforesaid authority takes substance for *essence* or *nature*. The argument adduced to the contrary, however, proceeds concerning *substance-supposit* or substance which is individual; and this is clear through Damascene himself. For he says thus: « We affirm wills that are natural, and not hypostatic, that is, personal »; and he proves this, because in the three persons the will is one, not on account of the unity in the persons, but on account of the unity in nature.

2. To that which is objected, that the will makes the one willing; it must be said that this, speaking per se, is understood of nature, but consequently is understood of person; and since several natures can be in one person: hence it is that to a plurality of wills, even if a plurality of natures follows, nevertheless a plurality of persons does not follow. Therefore it does not follow: there are several wills, therefore several who will; but it does well follow: there are several natures, according to which they are present. And this is what Damascene says: « Because we affirm the two natures of Christ to be his two natural wills and natural acts. But since the one [hypostasis] of the two natures is the hypostasis, we affirm one who both wills and acts naturally according to both ».

3. To that which is objected, that the will denotes that in which resides the governance and command of the things which are in the one willing; it must be said that there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of coercion, and there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of subjection. Taking commanding in the first way, it belongs to the will generally; and in this way it is possible that several commanding things be found in the same [subject], in which several things free from coercion are found, just as in Christ there is to be found free choice according to the divine nature and the human. But if commanding and dominating be understood through the privation of all subjection; then it is well to be conceded that it is necessary for it to be one alone. But such command does not belong to every will; for it does not belong to the human will, which ought to be subject to the divine, but it belongs to that will which has nothing above itself. Therefore from this it cannot be argued that in Christ there are not several wills, but [only] that there are not several divine wills.

4. To that which is objected, that the will is a property pertaining to dignity, just as personality also; it must be said that this property and that are said to pertain to dignity in different ways, according as something is said by superabundance in two ways: either *absolutely*, as one is said to be whitest, that is, very white; or *in comparison*, as one is said to be whitest of all. And what is said by superabundance *absolutely* can belong to several; but what is said by superabundance *in comparison* belongs to one alone. I say therefore that personality is taken according to the dignity of excellence with respect to all the things which are in that person, and therefore in one [person] there can only be one personality; the will, however, is not so, because it denotes a noble and perfect power of a rational substance. And therefore just as several noble natures can be compatible in one person in Christ, so also several wills.