Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/17/q/bon-sent-III-d17-a1-q2
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### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the wills in Christ.*

Secondly it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the wills; for the Master divides the wills of Christ into three members, of which one is the will of the divinity, another the will of reason, and the third the will of the flesh or sensuality. But that this division is superfluous seems [to be the case]:

**Arguments for part 1:**

1. First by the authority of Damascene in the third book: « We affirm, he says, two natures of Christ, two natural wills of his and natural acts »: therefore if Damascene's division is complete, which is by two members, it seems that the aforesaid division is superfluous.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the third book *On the Soul* and also in the *Topics*, that « will is only in the rational [part] »: therefore no will seems to be of sensuality; and if this is so, the third member of the aforesaid division is superfluous.

3. Likewise, free choice is regarded in respect of the will; but in Christ there are only two free choices: therefore only two wills: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will follows nature; but in Christ there are only two natures: therefore only two wills.

**On the contrary:** That there are not only two, but even more than three, seems [to be the case]:

1. By the authority of Hugh in the little book which he made *On the Wills of Christ*, where he says thus: « There was in Christ the will of the Deity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh »: therefore four differences of will.

2. Likewise, just as Christ had sensuality, so he had synderesis; and just as it belongs to sensuality to desire the good of the flesh, so it belongs to synderesis to desire the good of moral uprightness: therefore just as some will is posited in Christ according to sensuality, so it seems that one ought to be posited according to synderesis, and thus four differences of will.

3. Likewise, the will according to Damascene is divided by the first division into *thelesis* and *bulesis*, that is, into natural and deliberative; it is agreed that these two differences were in Christ, just as the aforesaid ones: therefore it seems that Christ had more than three wills.

4. Likewise, the will follows cognition; but in Christ four kinds of cognitive powers are to be found, for in him the exterior sense knew, the interior sense knew, the human intellect knew, the divine intellect knew: if therefore to every cognition there corresponds an affection, and to every affection a will; it seems that in Christ there was a fourfold difference of will.

There is therefore a question concerning the sufficiency of the aforesaid division.

> ### Conclusion.
> According to the two natures in Christ there are two wills, according to the powers there are three, and according to the act of willing four.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the will can be considered in three ways: either according to nature, or according to the power by which one wills, or according to the mode of willing. And according to this threefold consideration the will in Christ is to be divided in three ways. — For according to comparison with nature it is to be divided by a two-membered division. For twofold is the will in Christ, namely divine and human according to the two natures; and thus Damascene considers the will of Christ, when he divides it into two members.

But if the will be considered according to the powers by which one wills, then it is to be divided by a three-membered division. For in Christ there was a divine power and a created rational power and a sensitive power, by each of which he went forth into the act of willing. And thus the Master divides in the text by three members, in such a way that those three are to be reduced to two two-membered divisions, which are by immediate differences, because the will in Christ was either divine or human; and if human, either following sensitive cognition or following intellective cognition. And thus the sufficiency of the aforesaid division into three members is evident.

But by comparison of the will with the mode of willing, the will in Christ is to be multiplied by a four-membered division; and thus master Hugh considered the will of Christ, when he divided it by four members. For he says thus: « In Christ there was the will of the Divinity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh: the will of the Divinity by justice dictated the sentence, the will of reason by obedience approved the truth, the will of piety by compassion sighed at another's evil, the will of the flesh by passion murmured at its own evil ». — And thus is evident, according to the diverse modes of dividing, the number and sufficiency of the wills of Christ, since according to the diverse considerations they are to be multiplied now by a two-membered division, now by a three-membered division, now by a four-membered division without any contradiction. And in this is the manifest reply to

obiections, especially to the authority of Hugh and Damascene.

**To the arguments for part 1:**

2. But to that which is objected concerning the word of the Philosopher, that the will is only in the rational [part]; it must be said that the Philosopher takes the will strictly, namely for the ratiocinative appetite; but the Master and the Saints take the will broadly for every human affection, whether it proceed from reason or proceed from sense.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice is regarded in respect of the will; in a similar manner it must be responded that this is understood of the will properly so called; and thus it is true that in Christ it has only two differences; but the Master takes the name of will for appetite.

4. To that which is objected, that the will follows nature; it must be said that the will follows nature, just as a power follows substance; and because in one substance there can be several powers, nothing prevents several wills being found in Christ from the part of one nature, namely the human nature, and one from the part of the divine nature, and thus three in all.

**To the arguments for part 2:**

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected, that there ought to be many more by the authority of Hugh and on account of synderesis and *thelesis* and *bulesis*; it must be said that from those authorities it cannot be argued that in Christ there are more than three wills, unless the division of the will be taken according to the modes of willing; by which mode the rational will is to be multiplied into the will of reason and of piety, that is, according to the conditional and the absolute, and it is also to be divided into natural and deliberative. But by this it cannot be argued that the aforesaid division is insufficient, because it was taken according to the powers; for to one power several modes of willing can correspond.

4. To that which is objected, that the cognition in Christ is fourfold, and so the affection ought to be fourfold; it must be said that the exterior sensitive cognition does not have perfection without the interior. For as Augustine holds, vision is not perfect from the concurrence of the organ and the object, unless there be present an interior intention coupling the one with the other, as is said in the eleventh book *On the Trinity*. And that intention Augustine calls sensuality, saying that sensuality is that « by which there is an attending to the senses of the body »; and in respect of this the appetite of the flesh is regarded. And therefore the Master, from the part of sensitive cognition, posits only one will, namely the will of sensuality; for if he were to take it according to the exterior senses, then there would be not one, but five wills according to the five differences of the exterior senses.

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