Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/17/q/bon-sent-III-d17-a1-q3
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### Article I. *On the plurality of wills in Christ.*
### Question III. *Whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the conformity and concord of those wills, and it is asked whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict. And that they are in conflict seems to be the case:

1. From the Lord's prayer itself, in which he said: *Not as I will, but as you will*: therefore Christ willed one thing insofar as he was man, and the opposite insofar as he was God: therefore the human will was not conformed to the divine.

2. Likewise, Augustine, on the thirty-second Psalm: « As far as God is distant from man, so far is the will of God distant from the will of man; whence, bearing man, Christ showed a certain private will of man »: therefore if a private will is a will in conflict with the divine will, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, Christ wept over the destruction of Jerusalem, therefore he willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed; and according to the divine justice he willed it to be destroyed: therefore the human will was opposed to the divine.

4. Likewise, it seems that the will of reason and that of sensuality are opposed to each other, because, according to what Augustine says *On the Trinity*, those wills are contrary which are of contrary things-willed; but the will of reason willed to die, the will of sensuality willed to live: therefore the wills of sensuality and of reason were contrary.

5. Likewise, fear and security are contrary affections; but in the will of reason there was security, in the will of sensuality there was timidity: therefore the rational will and the sensual will were affected in a contrary manner. But such wills are mutually opposed to each other: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, either reason assented to sensuality refusing death, or it resisted. If it assented: then it assented to what was contrary to the divine will: therefore it sinned mortally. If it resisted: then the will of reason and that of sensuality were in conflict in Christ.

**On the contrary:** 1. The human will according to right order ought to be subject to the divine: therefore if in Christ it was in conflict, it seems that in Christ there was disorder and fault.

2. Likewise, every motion which is opposed to the divine will is a motion toward the illicit, and every such motion is sin: therefore if Christ according to his human will willed something contrary to the divine will, then in Christ there was sin. But this is false: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either the will of sensuality in Christ was wholly subject to reason, or it was opposed. If it was wholly subject: then there was no conflict there. If it was opposed in anything: then the flesh in Christ lusted against the spirit. But « it is no small fault, when the flesh lusts against the spirit »: therefore in Christ there would have been fault and sin.

4. Likewise, Christ was equally well-ordered, or better ordered, in himself, as was Adam in the state of innocence; but in the state of innocence there was in Adam no conflict of wills: therefore neither in Christ was there any conflict of the will of sensuality toward the rational, nor of reason toward the divine: therefore none.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ there was concord of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that conformity of one will to another consists in two things, namely in the thing-willed and in the ground of willing. I call conformity in the thing-willed when diverse wills will one and the same thing. I call conformity in the ground of willing when they will the same thing in the same manner, or when one of them wills that thing in the same manner in which the superior wills it to will. Since therefore for perfect conformity these two concur, one of them is of the necessity of conformity, namely conformity in manner, while the other is sometimes of necessity, sometimes of congruity, sometimes beyond necessity and congruity, namely conformity in the thing-willed. For it is possible that wills be conformed, such that one is subordinate to the other; and yet they do not will the same, because the superior will does not will the inferior to will what it itself wills, but rather to will the contrary.

Since therefore conformity in the ground of willing was in all the wills of Christ, because sensuality so willed as reason willed it to will; so also the reason of Christ willed as the divine will willed it to will: therefore it must be granted that in Christ there was concord and consonance of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity, because each will willed what was its own. — And this is what master Hugh says: « According to the divine will he willed what was just; according to the will of reason he consented to justice and approved justice; but according to the will of piety he intimately grieved without hatred at the misery, just as according to the will of the flesh he did not accuse justice, but refused the punishment. Each will worked what was its own, and followed what pertained to itself: the divine will justice, the rational will obedience, the will of humanity mercy, the will of the flesh nature; nor

was one contrary to the other. For just as it belonged to the Deity not to abandon justice, so it pertained to the flesh to preserve nature, and to piety not to love another's misery. It was therefore just for the flesh that he did not will his own passion, because this was according to nature; and it was just for God that he willed that passion, because this was according to justice ». And so it is clear that, although the things-willed were diverse, the wills nevertheless in Christ had consonance. — Therefore the arguments showing that the wills in Christ were not in conflict, neither the human will to the divine, nor the sensual to the rational, are to be granted; otherwise it would follow that in Christ there was the sin of transgression and the fault of corruption, as was objected; both of which are foreign to Christ, in whom all rational motions were upright, and all motions of sensuality were peaceful, according to what Augustine says was signified by the animals which were quiet and peaceful in Noah's ark.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the Lord's prayer: *Not as I will, but as you will*; some respond that from this it is not concluded that there was contrariety of wills in Christ, for the reason that one manner of willing and another do not induce contrariety, except insofar as they are considered according to the same thing. Whence, because one manner of willing and another is considered with regard to one will and another, therefore they do not induce contrariety nor conflict. — But this manner of responding does not suffice, since, if any two men, who have diverse wills, behave in a contrary manner with regard to some thing-willed, they are said to have contrary wills.

And therefore it can be said otherwise, that conformity of one will to another is regarded in two ways, either according to assimilation, or according to subjection. But the Lord did not require of the will of sensuality conformity of assimilation, that it should will the same thing which he willed; but conformity of subjection, that it should will what God ordained it to will; and the Lord in the aforesaid petition removes conformity of assimilation, when he says: *Not as I [will]*, and

posits conformity of subjection in this, that he shows that he wills to be subject to the divine will. Whence in the aforesaid word a twofold will in Christ is intimated, one namely of reason, which was similar to and subject to the divine will; the other indeed of sensuality, which reason subjected to the divine will, although sensuality itself sought the contrary; and so, although it was not similar, it was nevertheless subject, and thereby it was not contrary.

2. To that of Augustine by which it is said that the human will in Christ was distant from the divine will; it must be said that Augustine there intends to posit distance with respect to the diversity of the wills and with respect to the distance of the things-willed, but not with respect to the order of subjection in willing; and therefore that distance does not posit controversy.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed by his human will; it must be said, as Hugh says, that this was the will of piety, which therefore wept because it loved mercy; and because God so willed it to will, therefore it was not in conflict with the divine will; for there was there conformity in the ground of willing, although there was not in the thing-willed. For that it should so will, this it had from God, and God willed it so to will.

4. To that which is objected, that the will of sensuality was in conflict with reason, because it willed the contrary; it must be said that contrariety on the part of the thing-willed does not bespeak contrariety in the will, unless they be such wills as are born to be conformed not only by subjection, but also by identity on the part of the thing-willed.

5. To that which is objected, that they were disposed by contrary affections, namely security, fear, joy and sadness; it must be said that one of those affections was subject to the other and in a certain manner material; just as was said above, that joy in Christ was not contrary to sorrow, because he rejoiced over the sorrow itself; so also it must be understood in the present matter.

6. To that which is objected, that reason consented to sensuality, or dissented; it must be said that

in a certain manner it consented, in a certain manner it dissented, according as one can consent to another in two ways, either by willing the *same* thing which he himself wills, or by willing *him* to will. Now reason consented to sensuality by willing that it should be so moved, and this same thing was licit for sensuality, whence it willed nothing but the licit; but it did not consent by willing the same thing as sensuality, for this would be illicit to the will of reason. And this did not posit the flesh's lusting against the spirit, or the rebellion of sensuality against reason; for that rebellion posits each kind of dissent.