Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/17/q/bon-sent-III-d17-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the prayer by which Christ prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed, was from the reason or from the sensuality.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether that prayer by which he prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed from him, was from the reason or from the sensuality. And that it was from the sensuality seems so:

*Arguments for the first part.*

1. By the authority of the Master in the text: «According to the affect of the sensuality Christ did not wish to die, nor did he obtain what he asked according to that affect»: therefore it seems that that petition proceeded from the will of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the order of the words, when he says: *Not as I will, but as thou wilt*; either he says this by reason of the sensual will, or of the will of reason. As to the will of reason he does not say it, because that was in all things conformed to the divine will: therefore he says this as to the will of the sensuality: from that will, therefore, proceeded the request of the prayer proposed.

3. Likewise, no wise man asks or prays for the contrary of what he wills; but reason willed to die: therefore the petition about escaping death was not a petition of reason; and it was either of reason or of the sensuality: therefore of the sensuality.

4. Likewise, it is a sin for someone to ask what it is a sin to desire; but to desire not to die would be a sin for the rational will itself: therefore if he had asked that, he would have sinned. But he did not sin: therefore he did not ask: therefore that petition was from the sensual will.

**On the contrary:**

*For the second part.*

1. Prayer is defined thus: «Prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God»; but it does not belong to the sensuality to ascend into God: therefore it does not belong to the sensuality to pray: therefore the aforesaid prayer could not be of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, prayer is defined in another way: «Prayer is a pious affect of the mind directed into God»; but

the sensuality cannot be borne into God: therefore as to the act of the sensuality the use of prayer does not consist.

3. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to deliberate; but the aforesaid prayer was with a certain deliberation, as is clear, when it is said: *Not as I will, but as thou wilt*: therefore it did not proceed from the sensuality, but from the reason.

4. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to foreknow future things; but that prayer, by which it was asked that the coming cup be removed, was from a foreknowledge of future things: therefore it was not of the sensuality, but of the reason.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's prayer in the garden to the Father, as to its matter, was of the sensuality, but as to its form was of the reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid prayer is to be spoken of in two ways: either as to its matter, or as to its form. If we speak of it as to its matter; since the matter of prayer regards the desire of the one petitioning, such a petition was a petition of the sensuality, whose desire was for not dying. But if we speak of the aforesaid prayer as to its form; thus, since the form of the petition regards the discretion of the one proposing, and such a manner of proposing belongs to the discretion of the reason, it must be granted that such a prayer was of the rational will.

And by this is clear the response to the proposed question and also to the objections; to the proposed question, because it is not to be granted absolutely that such a prayer was absolutely of the reason, or absolutely of the sensuality, but in one manner of this, in another manner of that: of the sensuality as to its matter, but of the reason as to its form; likewise, of the sensuality as moving, but of the reason as proposing; likewise, of the sensuality as that-for-which, but of the reason as that-from-which. Hence it has rightly and well been wont to be said that reason was the advocate of the sensuality. — According to this, the reasons on either side can be resolved, since they proceed by these two ways, as is clear to one looking [at it].

*Incidental question.* But then a question remains: since reason knew that the sensuality in this petition was neither to be heard nor worthy to be heard, inasmuch as it asked the contrary of the divine plan; how did it propose this petition and plead for it? — And it must be said to this that *A threefold reason.* the reason was threefold. The first, for the manifestation of the truth of the assumed nature, which naturally refused the passion; and in this he instructed our faith. — But the second, for the confirming of our weakness, that we should not despair if we shrink from the perils of sufferings; and in this he raised up our hope. — Thirdly, that he might show that our will is to be subjected in all things to the divine will, which he showed in the condition added, *not as I will, but as thou wilt*; and in this he ordered charity in us, which strives to subject our affect in all things to the divine will. Hence he prayed more for us in that prayer than he would pray for himself. — *A noteworthy observation.* And it must be noted that the reason in that petition kept the form of a prudent and faithful advocate, who proposes the desire of the sensuality, yet keeping the form of the law. For the divine law dictates that every appetite ought to be subject to God. — And by this is clear the determination of the objections, and also clear is the end and usefulness of the aforesaid prayer.

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