Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/18/q/bon-sent-III-d18-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether Christ merited anything after his conception.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ merited anything after his conception. And that he did, it seems thus.

1. To the Philippians, chapter two: *He humbled himself unto death; and afterward: Wherefore God also hath exalted him* etc. But humility is not a cause of exaltation except by way of merit: if therefore

this came about after the conception, therefore Christ after his conception merited something.

2. Likewise, Augustine, treating the aforesaid word: « The humility of brightness is the merit, the brightness of humility is the reward »: if therefore humiliation in Christ followed his conception itself, it necessarily also follows that he merited after he had been conceived.

3. Likewise, in the book *On the Rules of Faith* meriting is defined thus: « He is said to merit before God who, compelled by no necessity, does that which he ought to do »; but Christ did this after his conception: therefore he merited before God.

4. Likewise, Christ's works were far nobler than are the merits of the other Saints: if therefore the works of the other Saints are worthy of recompense, it seems that much more are Christ's works: therefore it seems that Christ merited before God.

5. Likewise, if he did not merit before God after he had been conceived: therefore it seems that he served God in vain and that he did in vain whatever he did after his conception. If therefore it is impious to say this, it is necessary that Christ merited something after his conception.

**On the contrary:** 1. To merit is to do a work of the kind that is praiseworthy; but a power determined to one thing only has no praise in the act of it, as is plain in all natural powers; but the free choice of Christ was from his very conception determined to the good: therefore it could not go forth into a work of the praiseworthy kind, therefore neither into a meritorious work.

2. Likewise, to merit is to do a work worthy of recompense; but free choice, already existing in the state of recompense, no longer does a work worthy of further recompense, as is plain in the Blessed; but such was the free choice of Christ, since he was in the state of a comprehensor: therefore it seems that after his conception he could merit nothing at all.

3. Likewise, whoever merits advances in the goods of the soul, namely in grace and glory; but Christ could not advance beyond what he received from the conception: therefore it does not seem that he could merit after his conception.

4. Likewise, whoever merits anything makes his own out of what is not his own through work and service, and out of what is not owed to him makes what is owed; but Christ could not make out of the not-owed the owed, or out of the not-his-own his own — for all things were his own through the grace of the conception, as he himself testifies: *All thine are mine* — therefore it does not seem that he merited anything after his conception.

5. Likewise, that which is in the same condition now and before is apt to produce like operations; but free choice in Christ is in the same condition after his conception and after his resurrection, and grace likewise, and these two are the principles of meriting: if therefore after the resurrection he did not merit, therefore neither after the conception. If you say that it is in one condition and another, as far as concerns the flesh; this does not solve it, because merit does not regard the state of the flesh, but the state of charity: therefore if Christ after his conception had the charity of the homeland as noble and perfect as he now has, nor is his charity varied; if he now does not have the use of meriting, it seems that neither then did he have it.

### Conclusion.

> Christ after his conception merited in act: for us indeed he merited the infusion of grace, the advancement of grace, and the multiplication of good works; but for himself, what was already owed to him he made owed in another manner.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that meriting comes about in three ways: in one way *simply improperly*, in another way *partly properly and partly improperly*, in a third way *simply properly*. — He is said to merit *simply improperly* who does some work of the good kind, yet does it in a bad manner, that is with a bad intention, like one who gives alms with grumbling; for such works are sometimes recompensed by God out of his immense bounty, as is intimated of Nabuchodonosor in Jeremiah. — But he merits *partly properly, partly improperly* who does a work of the good kind and with good intention, yet not out of charity; as some sinner does works of the good kind and for God's sake, in which he disposes himself by congruity for grace. — But he merits *simply properly* who does a good work and with good intention and out of charity. And the first kind of merit is called *interpretative* merit; the second is called merit of *congruity*; the third is called merit of *condignity*.

Therefore when it is asked whether Christ merited, the question is not about the first and second mode, but about the third. To this then it must be answered that meriting by condignity comes about in three ways. In one way *to merit* is from the *not-owed* to make the *owed*, as one merits in the infusion of grace and the motion of free choice. In another way *to merit* is out of the *owed* to make *more owed*, as happens in advancing from progress to progress, from virtue to virtue. In a third way *to merit* is out of the *owed in one manner* to make it *owed in another manner*, as out of the owed by *habit* to make it owed by *use*, and out of the owed by *another* act to make it owed by *one* equally good.

In all these ways Christ merited *for us*. For he merited *for us* the *infusion* of grace, and he merited the *advancement* of grace, and he merited the *multiplication of good works*. But *for himself* he merited only in the third way after his conception. For he could not make for himself the owed out of the not-owed, since he was worthy of every good. He could not make of the owed the more-owed, since he was full of every grace from the very conception, but what was owed *in one manner* he made owed *in several manners*; and so he merited only according to the third manner of speaking of merit, not on account of imperfection on the part of the merit, but on account of perfection on the part of the one meriting. And this is what is said in the text: « Christ did not advance according to *merit as regards the virtue of the merit*, yet he advanced as regards the *number of merits*. For he had more merits in his passion than in his conception ». — Therefore the reasonings must be granted which show that Christ after his conception had the use and exercise of merit.

*To 1.* As to the objection that a power determined to one thing does not do a work of the praiseworthy kind; it must be said that the determination of a power to one thing can be in two ways, namely by *necessity of nature* and by *confirmation of grace*. If it is by *necessity of nature*, then it takes away the liberty of choice, and thereby takes away the dignity of merit. But if the determination is by *confirmation of grace*, since such confirmation stands together with a free will, then it does not take away from the work itself the goodness of morals, since it is voluntary, and thereby neither the quality of merit. In Christ, however, the free choice was determined to one thing not by *necessity of nature*, but by *confirmation of grace*.

*To 2.* As to the objection that one having the gift of glory does not do a remunerable work; it must be said that this is true when someone is simply in the state of the *homeland*; but when he is not only in the state of a *comprehensor*, but also in the state of a *wayfarer*, then his work can be remunerable on account of the state of *the way*; and so it is to be found in Christ according to the divine dispensation. For just as the soul of Christ, on account of its conjunction with the Divinity, has the state of the *homeland*, so on account of its conjunction with the flesh it has the state of *the way* and of misery for that time. And therefore, just as he could be in the state of a *wayfarer* and a *comprehensor* at once, so he had glory for comprehending and grace for meriting. — And there is a likeness in the case of the Angels, in whom we posit an administrative and a contemplative power, according to one of which they merit, and according to the other they enjoy and are rewarded.

*To 3.* As to the objection that whoever merits advances by meriting; it must be said that to advance is in two ways: either by the *increase* of a *habit*, or in the *multitude of acts*; or in other words: to advance is as regards the virtue of meriting and as regards the number of merits. Taking advancement in the first way, it does not belong to the third manner of speaking of merit, according to which third manner Christ is said to have merited. Taking advancement in the other way, it belongs to him, as is plain through the distinction set forth above.

*To 4.* As to the objection that to merit is to make of the not-owed the owed; it must be said that this is true as regards some mode of meriting, but not as regards all, as was said before; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand.

*To 5.* As to the objection that free choice is in the same condition now and before; it must be said that this is true by comparison to what is *above*, namely to God; yet it is not true by comparison to what is *below*, namely to the passible flesh, from whose conjunction both the free choice and the grace perfecting it belong to the state of the way. Hence the objection about the flesh, that it is not a principle of meriting, does not hold; for this is true, speaking per se, yet it contributes to merit, while it contributes to the state of merit, as is plain in the conjunction of the soul to the flesh and in their separation. For our soul, as soon as it is separated from the flesh, no longer has the state of meriting or demeriting.

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