Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/18/q/bon-sent-III-d18-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether Christ merited anything in the passion.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether Christ merited anything in the passion. And that he did, it seems:

1. *First*, by the text of the Apostle: *He humbled himself even unto death, on account of which God also exalted him* etc.; treating which word the Master says: « The Apostle plainly says that Christ was exalted through the glory of impassibility for this reason, because he was humbled through the obedience of the passion »: therefore he merited in the passion.

2. Likewise, Augustine, expounding the aforesaid word: « That Christ might be glorified in the resurrection, he was first humbled in the passion »: therefore it seems that through the merit of the passion he attained to the glory of the resurrection.

3. Likewise, nothing is more meritorious than the work of patience, on account of which it is said in James, chapter one: *Patience has a perfect work;* but patience consists in the endurance of suffering: therefore it seems that Christ merited much in the passion.

4. Likewise, nothing is satisfactory unless it is meritorious; but the passion of Christ was satisfactory, as the Saints say: therefore it was meritorious: therefore Christ merited by suffering.

5. Likewise, everyone who suffers either has earned the suffering [as punishment] or merits through the suffering, otherwise he would suffer without justice, and would also suffer in vain; but Christ did not earn the suffering, because he was free from all fault: therefore he merited through the suffering, otherwise he would have suffered unjustly and in vain, which would be of great impiety and insanity.

**On the contrary:** 1. « By sufferings, as the Philosopher says, we are neither praised nor blamed »; but by everything through which we merit, we are praised: therefore by sufferings we do not merit: therefore Christ by suffering did not merit.

2. Likewise, « suffering is the effect and the consequence of an action »; but as the cause is, so is the effect: if therefore the action inflicting the suffering was not meritorious, it seems that the suffering itself was not meritorious either: therefore Christ in the passion did not merit.

3. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary; but nothing is voluntary unless it is from an intrinsic principle, as is clear from the definition of the voluntary which the Philosopher gives in the *Ethics*: « The voluntary is that whose principle is in [the agent] himself »; but the passion of Christ was from without, as is clear: therefore it was not meritorious.

4. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is according to nature; but « suffering is a motion against nature », as Damascene says: therefore it is impossible to merit by suffering: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, all merit takes its origin from some virtue; but all virtue consists in reason, as *reason* is: therefore all merit consists about reason, as reason is. But the passion of Christ was only about sensuality and about reason in the manner of *nature:* therefore it does not seem that Christ merited anything in the passion.

### Conclusion.

> Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion. For he did not suffer in vain, but from a reasonable cause; nor did he suffer on account of the demerit of fault, but for the love of truth and justice.

And therefore it is to be noted that in the passion there are two things to consider, namely the *cause* of the suffering and the *endurance* of the suffering. The *cause* of the suffering is from the violence of the agent, but the *endurance* of the suffering is from the will of the one suffering. As regards the first, the suffering is neither *meritorious* nor *demeritorious*, because it is from without; as regards the second, it can be *meritorious* and *demeritorious:* *meritorious*, if one endures it from a good will; *demeritorious*, if one bears it impatiently and from a wicked will. Since therefore Christ bore the passion not only from a good will, but indeed from a most excellent will; hence it is that his passion was meritorious, not only as the sufferings of the Saints, but it held the chief place among all merits. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that by sufferings we are neither praised nor blamed; it must be said that this is true insofar as they are *pure* sufferings; but inasmuch as a good or evil will is joined to them, thus they come to take on the character of merit and demerit, of praise and blame. And so it was in the passion of Christ, who *was offered because he himself willed it*, and willingly and patiently endured the passion, since *he prayed for the transgressors*.

2. To that which is objected, that suffering is the effect of an action; it must be said that this is true as regards efficacy in the genus of *nature*, yet it can nonetheless be an effect of the internal will as regards the will's complacency, and through this it comes to be placed in the genus of *morals.* And since the will accepting the passion was good, although the will inflicting the passion was evil; and hence it is that, although the action was displeasing, the passion nevertheless was pleasing: therefore it does not follow that, if the action was demeritorious, the passion was so on that account. For the action was not the cause of the passion in the genus of *morals.*

3. To that which is objected, that the passion was involuntary; it must be said that, although this is true as regards the *violence* which is from without; nevertheless it is not true as regards the *endurance*, which is from within. And therefore that argument does not conclude that the passion of Christ was in no way meritorious; for it was not only from *without*, but also in a certain way from *within* through complacency and endurance.

4. To that which is objected, that suffering is against nature; it must be said that *to be against nature* is twofold: either because it is against the natural dictate of *reason*, or because it is against the natural appetite for *well-being.* Taking *natural* in the first way, that which is against nature is a vice, unless perhaps it be *above* nature, as is the case in the assent of faith. Taking *natural* in the second way, that which is against nature can be meritorious, although it be penal; and it is in this way that Damascene takes it when he says that « suffering is against nature ».

5. To that which is objected, that all merit consists about the act of reason; it must be said that this is true. But for something to consist about the act of reason happens in a threefold way: either in the manner of one *eliciting*, or in the manner of one *commanding*, or in the manner of one *accepting.* Now although the passion of Christ was not in reason in the manner of one *eliciting*, or in the manner of one *commanding*, it was nevertheless [there] in the manner of one *accepting;* and this gave to the passion itself the character of merit, and gives it also to our sufferings by a like account. — And by these things which have been said, that question can be resolved which asks whether it can happen that one merit, or demerit, by sufferings.