Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/18/q/bon-sent-III-d18-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the merit of Christ as to the fruit or reward.*

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning the merit of Christ as to the fruit, that is, as to the reward. And concerning this three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God.

Second it is asked, whether he merited the glorification of [his] body.

Third it is asked, whether he merited for us the opening of the gate.

### Question I. *Whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God, that is, the substantial reward.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks, whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God, that is, the substantial reward. And that he did, it seems:

1. Because, as grace stands to glory, so merit stands to reward; but Christ had grace ordered to glory: therefore he had merit ordered to reward. But glory consists in the fruition of God, which is the substantial reward: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, he who merits from charity merits something the greater, the greater the charity he has; but the charity of Christ was the greatest: therefore the greatest reward was due to him. But the greatest reward is none other than the substantial reward, which is God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is more glorious to have a reward through merits than without merits; but Christ in glory excels all the Saints: therefore if the other Saints had the substantial reward through merits, much more strongly [does this seem] concerning Christ.

4. Likewise, the holy Angels had the substantial reward through merits, according to the common opinion of all; but the Angels had grace and glory simultaneously, as was shown in the second book: therefore if the grace in Christ was not of lesser efficacy than in the Angels, it seems that Christ merited the substantial reward, although the merit did not precede the reward in time.

5. Likewise, when God induces some form suddenly, which a creature acquires through succession, God omits nothing of those dispositions which nature would introduce successively; as is clear, if God were suddenly to make fire from water, he would introduce into the nature of water rarity and dryness and heat: therefore if a creature is born to attain the reward of glory through the merits of grace, it seems that merits were not lacking to Christ, although glory was conferred on him from the very beginning of his conception.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the thirteenth book *On the Trinity*: « Among things that arise through time, that is the highest grace, by which a man is joined to God in unity of person »; and in the *Enchiridion* he says, that « with no preceding merits that man was united to God »; but that union could not be without the fruition of God,

which is the substantial reward: therefore it does not seem, that Christ had the substantial reward through any merit.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « In a certain way that grace became natural to that man, by which he could admit no sin »; but such grace is consummated grace, which is nothing other than glory, that is, the substantial reward: therefore the substantial reward was in a certain way natural to Christ. But nothing of the sort is acquired through merits: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, merit naturally precedes the reward; but the use or act of virtue naturally follows the habit: since therefore the habit of grace and of glory were simultaneously in Christ, it seems that merits followed upon the substantial reward: therefore they are not ordered in Christ to meriting the substantial reward.

4. Likewise, a natural disposition precedes that to which it disposes; but the deiformity of glory disposed the soul of Christ to union with the Divinity, by a disposition, I say, of congruity: therefore the deiformity of glory in Christ naturally preceded the personal union, although it was simultaneous in time. But the personal union in Christ naturally preceded merit and the use of free choice: therefore in Christ merits followed upon the substantial reward according to the order of nature: therefore the same returns as before.

5. Likewise, the merit of the substantial reward consists chiefly in the act and affection of charity, according to which the soul is moved toward God; but according to that affection Christ was not in the state of a wayfarer, but in the state of a comprehensor: if therefore he did not merit insofar as a comprehensor, but insofar as a wayfarer, he did not merit according to that affection of charity, in which the merit of the substantial reward consists: therefore it seems, that he did not merit the substantial reward.

### Conclusion.

> Christ, properly speaking, did not merit for himself the substantial reward.

**I respond:** It must be said, that it is not commonly granted, that Christ merited for himself the substantial reward; and this the Master intimates in the text quite expressly.

But the reason for this is: for merit signifies an ordering to the reward, as a disposition to the completion, as a way to the terminus; and therefore it is necessary that merit precede the reward either in time, or according to the order of nature. But in neither way did it have to precede in Christ, nor did it precede, on account of this, that the soul of Christ would not be fit for the union, unless it were most blessed and most deiform, which indeed comes about through the influence of glory. If therefore it was necessary that all merits precede that union according to the order of nature, it was also necessary that the deiformity of glory in Christ precede every use of grace; and therefore glory in Christ preceded all merits on account of the supreme dignity which was in the soul of Christ from its creation, namely on account of its union with the Word. — And therefore it must be granted, that Christ, properly speaking, did not merit for himself the substantial reward. And the reasons which have been adduced for this are to be granted.

**To the opposing [arguments]:**

1. To that which is objected, that as grace is ordered to glory, so merit to reward; it must be said, that in one respect it is similar, in another not. For it is similar as to the condition of disposing, but it is not similar as to its origin, in that both grace and glory are a habit infused divinely, not from us; but merit is a use proceeding from free choice informed by grace. Therefore in Christ there could be an order of grace to glory, the order of both to the union being preserved; but it is not so concerning the order of merit to reward, as was shown before.

2. To that which is objected, that the greatest charity merits the greatest reward; it must be said, that this is true, if charity holds the character of meriting, insofar as [it is] greatest; but the charity of Christ, according to its movement into God, which was greatest and most intense, held the character of reward rather than of merit, nay, was itself the reward; therefore since it was the reward itself, he did not merit the substantial reward.

3. To that which is objected, that it is more glorious to have a reward through merits; it must be said, that this holds true in those who only have to be united to God through a conformity of affection — for in these grace and glory are as it were accidental and by way of acquisition — and by their nature they are born to be indifferently good and evil. But it is otherwise concerning the man assumed by the Word, who is not only united to God through a conformity of affection, but also by a personal union, so that he is called not divine, but God; and for so much « to this man grace is in a certain way natural », and it is much more glorious for him to have glory from his first

creation, than to have it through acquisition; just as it is much more glorious to be God, than to be a servant of God. And therefore that authority has no place concerning Christ.

4. To that which is objected, that the Angels had grace and glory, merit and reward, simultaneously; it must be said, that it is not similar, because in the Angels the use of free choice preceded the infusion of grace, and therefore in the very infusion of grace the movement of free choice informed by grace, in which merit consists, could precede the reward itself in the order of nature, although it was simultaneous in time. But it is otherwise in Christ, who prior in the order of nature had the deiformity of glory rather than the use of deliberative will, as was shown before.

5. To that which is objected, that God in acting suddenly omits nothing of those things which successively concur in the operation of a creature; it must be said, that when a creature induces some perfection or form, there are two things to be considered there, namely the qualities and dispositions on the part of the recipient, and the operations on the part of the agent and the one preparing. When therefore it is said, that God omits nothing in acting suddenly of those things which nature introduces; this is true of the qualities and dispositions informing the receivable [subject], but it is not true of the works preliminary to those dispositions. And therefore from this reasoning it cannot be concluded, that merits in Christ preceded the reward, since merit consists in a work proceeding from the will; but this can be concluded, that in Christ there was a perfection of virtues and habits, which render the soul fit for glory, that is, for the substantial reward.