Dist. 18, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/18/q/bon-sent-III-d18-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: *He merited from his conception not only the glory of the impassibility* *of the body, but also the impassibility of the soul; since «where one [is granted] on account of another, there is but one [thing]»*; but immortality is not in the body except through the soul, just as neither is life; passibility also is not in the soul except through the body, since the soul is an incorporeal substance: it remains, therefore, that it is altogether the same thing to merit the impassibility of the body and the impassibility of the soul. — Moreover, the body being impassible, it is necessary that the soul be impassible: therefore it does not seem that the impassibility of the body ought to be reckoned together with the impassibility of the soul.

In keeping with this it is asked: in which does impassibility inhere first? And that it is in the flesh seems [the case], since impassibility is an endowment of the body; but that it is in the soul seems [the case], since the glory is through the influence of the soul into the flesh.

*I respond:* It must be said that in the passible soul there is a twofold kind of passion: one, which it suffers in itself through the affections; another, by which it suffers along with the body on account of injuries to the body. But for the soul to be made perfectly impassible, it is necessary that it be made perfectly immune from each passion; and so a twofold impassibility is found in the soul: one, which is properly of the soul itself; the other, which it shares with the body. And the Master intends to reckon these two together in the text. And thus the response to the first thing asked is evident.

But as to that which is asked in the second place, in which impassibility inheres
first; it must be said that it inheres first in the soul, just as passibility also does as regards the first cause, as for instance in the first man, in whom through the corruption of the soul the corruption of the body came about; although in others the soul is made passible on account of its conjunction with the corrupted flesh; whereas, on the contrary, the glory of impassibility is from above, and inheres rather in the body by reason of the soul than the reverse. — As to what he therefore objects, that impassibility is an endowment of the body; it must be said that it is an endowment of the body, but it is not so precisely of the body that it is not of the soul; yet it is said to be rather an endowment of the body, because the soul has endowments in itself far more excellent.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *He merited also that there be given to him a name which is above every name.* For this seems to be false, since that name which is above every name he had from eternity. If you say that he merited the manifestation of that name in human nature; this seems to be false, since the demons in the Gospel frequently said that he was the Son of God, as is gathered from many places: therefore his name was already manifested before the passion. — Likewise, in the Law the Son of God had been promised, as Isaiah says in the ninth [chapter]: *He shall be called wonderful, counsellor, God, mighty.* — Likewise, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the second [chapter]: *If they had known;* the Gloss says that the chief among the Jews knew that he was the Christ: therefore it seems that his name was manifested before the passion. — But against this is what is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the second [chapter]: *If they had known, they would never have crucified the Son of God;* and Anselm in the book *Why God [Became] Man* says that so great a crime as the killing of the Son of God they would never have expiated by penance, had ignorance not excused them.

*I respond:* It must be said that without doubt Christ by his passion merited the glorification of his name. But the glorification of the name of Christ himself consists in this, that men commonly come to know that he who appeared in human nature is the Son of God and the redeemer of the world.

But as to that which is objected, that it was already known; it must be said that there is a *certain* knowledge, and there is a knowledge through a kind of *conjecture;* and Christ before the passion was known to have a name which is above every name by conjectural knowledge, but by certain knowledge not until after the passion. And by this the reasons and authorities on either side can be resolved. — Or otherwise: there is a *universal* knowledge, and there is a *particular* knowledge; for although Christ was known to some to be truly the Christ, yet he was not universally known until after the passion. — Or otherwise: the knowledge of the name is twofold, as to the word and as to the ground of its imposition: as to the word, when it is known that someone is so called; and thus many knew that Christ was called Jesus before the passion; but the ground for which he was so called, namely because he had come to save *the people from their sins*, they did not know until after the passion.

And thus the glorification of the name of Christ is the manifestation of the knowledge possessed concerning Christ, by which he is known to be Son of God and Christ and Jesus; and any of these is a name above every name. For *Son of God* names the person in *one* nature: but *Christ* and *Jesus* name the person in *two* natures; yet *Christ* names the person in the human nature related to the divine, since he is called *anointed.* But *Jesus* names the person in the divine nature related to the human, since *Jesus* is said to be *Saviour;* and therefore at the name of Jesus Christ every knee must bow, just as at the name of the Son of God.

And by this the response to the question proposed is evident, since the name of the Son of God is said to be glorified in a threefold way according to his threefold name, whether as to *certification,* or as to *diffusion,* or as to *the expression of the ground of naming,* so that *certification* regards the knowledge of the name of the Son of God, *diffusion* the knowledge of the name of Christ, *the expression of the ground of naming* the knowledge of the name of Jesus. — Evident also is the response to the objections, since Christ according to these three names was known in a certain way, and was also in a certain way unknown. According to that manner in which he was unknown, he merited that his name be glorified through the passion.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *For in the form in which he was crucified, in that form he was exalted;* since the exaltation of Christ is to equality with the Father, as it is said in the Psalm: *The Lord said to my Lord: sit at my right hand;* but he is not equal to the Father according to the form of a servant, but according to the form of the Godhead: therefore according to it he was exalted. — Likewise, exaltation belongs to him to whom every knee is bent, *of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth*; but this is the divine nature: therefore etc. — But against this is the fact that his it is to be exalted whose it is to be humbled; but «the divine nature could not be humbled», as Anselm says in the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*: therefore neither [could it] be exalted. — Moreover, that which is highest, how can it be exalted? If therefore the divine nature is of this kind, it seems etc.

*I respond:* It must be said that just as naming is owed to the person by reason of some nature, so also is exaltation. But it must be noted that *exaltation* has to be understood in a twofold way concerning Christ: either according to the *thing,* or according to *our knowledge.* The exaltation of Christ according to the *thing* is the elevation of Christ from the state of the present life to the right hand of the Father; and this indeed took place at the ascension, and this exaltation belongs to him according to the human nature, which was lifted up into heaven; and thus *to be exalted to the right hand of the Father* is to be elevated to the higher goods of the Father. — In another way there is *exaltation* according to *our knowledge;* and thus Christ is said to be exalted in our hearts, when we believe him to be equal to the Father; and thus *to be exalted to the right hand of the Father* is to be exalted to equality with the Father; and in this way exaltation belongs to Christ according to that nature according to which he can be made equal to the Father himself.

And according to this distinction the determination of the controversy apparently existing between Augustine and Ambrose is evident, and the response to the objections is also evident. For Augustine speaks of *real* exaltation, and so the reasons run to the second side; but Ambrose [speaks] of exaltation according to *our knowledge,* and so the reasons run to the first side.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *For other men were debtors, and his own virtue scarcely sufficed for each one.* For it is objected against this by what Anselm says in the book *Why God [Became] Man*: «In no way can a man give greater honour to God than when he hands himself over to death for his honour». If therefore services, the more they are owed, the less are they pleasing; it seems that men are not debtors of death. — Likewise, everyone is a debtor of all that he is and that he can do, since he received the whole from God: therefore it seems that no one can merit anything before God, neither by dying nor by doing anything. — Likewise, Christ was bound to obey the Father: but the Father commanded that he die for the salvation of the human race: therefore it seems that Christ was a debtor of death.

*I respond:* It must be said that there is a debt from *charity,* and there is a debt from *necessity.* A debt from *charity* does not take away the perfection of merit; but a debt from *necessity* in a certain way diminishes it. Since therefore all other men were debtors to death by the debt of *necessity,* which indeed arises from the guilt and obligation of fault; therefore the Master says that no one
could *propitiate* God, although by voluntarily enduring death he could be *pleasing* to God. But Christ, because he endured death without the debt of death, could both be pleasing and propitiate: be *pleasing,* because [it was] from a good will; *propitiate,* because [it was] beyond necessity.

But as to that which is objected first about Anselm, it must be said that, as is evident from the very tenor of the text, Anselm there speaks of Christ; nevertheless, granted that it were understood of others, it does not follow on that account that man is not a debtor of death, since a man can make of necessity a virtue through a good will. — Moreover, there is a manner of dying to which we are not necessarily obligated.

And by this the following [point] is evident, that a *debt* does not take away merit *simply,* but the merit of that *perfect* propitiation by which God was reconciled to the whole human race.

To that which is objected about obedience, the response is already evident through the things that have been said.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which Ambrose says: *We could not be saved unless the only-begotten Son of God should die for us, the debtors of death.* On the contrary: no debtor of death is worthy of life: therefore if Abraham was a debtor of death, he was therefore not worthy of life. — Likewise it is asked: of what death is it understood?
either of *corporal* death, or of *spiritual* death. If of *spiritual* death, it is false, since just men are not worthy of spiritual death; if of *corporal* death: either *natural,* or *violent.* Of *violent* death it is not true, since not all of us are debtors of such a death. If of *natural* death, then it seems that it contributes nothing to the point, since that natural death does not impede merit, nor is anyone delivered from it through Christ; for all die.

*I respond:* It must be said that *death* is said in many ways. For there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the body; and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from God on account of sin; and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the vision of God *forever;* and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the vision of God *for a time*. When therefore Ambrose says that «Christ died for the debtors of death»; death is taken in the first and fourth way. For we are all debtors of death in the first way; and all were debtors of death in the fourth way; and we ourselves would be debtors, had the price not been paid.

And by this the response to the things that are objected is evident, since the debt of such a death is not opposed to the dignity of eternal life. Evident also is of what death we are debtors. And if one objects that natural death does not take away the perfection of merit; it must be said, as was said before, that it does not take away the perfection of any merit whatever, but [only] the merit of *perfect* satisfaction for the salvation of the human race.

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