Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/19/q/bon-sent-III-d19-a2-q2
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the person of the redeemer and mediator.*
### Question II. *According to which nature Christ is the mediator.*

Secondly it is asked, according to which nature Christ is the mediator. And that it is according to the human [nature] is shown:

1. By the authority of Augustine, in the ninth book of *On the City of God*: « The mediator between us and God ought to have a passing mortality and a permanent blessedness »; but both of these befit Christ according to the human nature: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same point is shown by the authority of the Master in the text: « He is called mediator according to humanity, not according to Divinity ».

3. Likewise, a *middle* must be between extremes, therefore the mediator of God and men must be below God and above men; but Christ according to the divine nature is not below God: therefore according to the divine nature he cannot be a mediator: he is therefore a mediator only according to the assumed nature.

4. Likewise, a *middle* must have a difference with the extremes; but Christ according to Divinity is altogether one with the Father: therefore it does not seem that according to Divinity he has the character of a mediator.

5. Likewise, there is one offense against the whole Trinity, just as there is one majesty; but satisfaction is made to him to whom the offense was done: therefore it is necessary that satisfaction be made to the whole Trinity; and if this, then satisfaction is made to the Son just as to the Father. But it is established that it belongs to one nature and to another to *offer* satisfaction and to *receive* satisfaction: if therefore Christ makes satisfaction insofar as he is man, and by that very fact is mediator by which he makes satisfaction; it seems that he is mediator only according to the human nature.

**On the contrary:**

1. But against this is the authority which the Master adduces in the text: « If Christ, according to you, O heretics, has only one nature, whence will he be *middle*. Unless he is so *middle* that he is God by reason of the nature of Divinity, and man by reason of the nature of humanity »: therefore to be mediator befits Christ according to both natures.

2. Likewise, Christ is mediator not by *privation*, but by *position*; but a *middle by position* is a middle by participation in both: therefore Christ cannot be mediator of God and of us except by this, that he is God and man: therefore he is mediator according to both natures.

3. Likewise, a *middle* never joins extremes except by this, that it has a conjunction with each: therefore Christ would never reconcile us to God unless he were God and man: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, nothing holds the character of *middle* according to that by which it holds the character of *extreme*; but Christ holds the character of *extreme* according to the human nature, because the human nature was reconciled to God: therefore he is not mediator precisely according to it.

5. Likewise, if Christ is mediator according to the human nature, this cannot be except because in a certain property he has in common with us, and in a certain [property] with God; but good Angels and bad angels agree with us in some property, and in some with God: therefore they can be called mediators between us and God. If therefore they are not called *mediators*, it seems that mediation does not befit Christ according to the agreement of properties, but according to participation in the two natures: therefore it befits Christ to be mediator according to the divine nature just as according to the human.

### Conclusion.

> Christ is *middle* either by reason of both natures, or by reason of humanity; but he is mediator according to the human nature.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that it differs to say to be a *middle* and to be a *mediator*. For *middle* asserts a sharing-in-common with the extremes. But *mediator* not only asserts a sharing-in-common, but also asserts the *office* of reconciliation. Therefore it must be answered otherwise when it is asked how Christ is a *middle* between the human nature and the divine; otherwise when it is asked how he is a *mediator*.

For if it be asked how he is a *middle*; it can be answered that a middle between two natures can be said to be something in three ways: either thus, that in it two natures concur, as in a *third nature*; or thus, that in it two natures concur, as in a *person*; or thus, that in it concur *properties* conformed to the two natures. — Taking *middle* in the *first* way, nothing can be a middle between the human nature and the divine, neither Christ nor anything else, because there cannot be constituted out of the human nature and the divine any third thing. Taking *middle* in the *second* way, thus Christ is a middle between the human nature and the divine, insofar as he is one person in two natures, not by reason of the human nature alone, nor by reason of the divine, but by reason of both. Taking *middle* in the *third* way, Christ is a middle between God and men according to *humanity*, insofar as he has *mortality* together with *blessedness*: mortality, I say, in which he has in common with men; blessedness, I say, in which he has in common with God.

But if it be asked how and according to which nature Christ is a *mediator*; since *mediator* asserts the office of reconciliation, and a *mediator* must differ from those whom he reconciles, and Christ according to the divine nature is the one to whom reconciliation is made, it must be said that he cannot be mediator according to the divine nature, but according to the human, in which he can reconcile according to the diverse *properties* in which he has in common with God and with man. For he had *justice* and innocence, in which he has in common with God, and *mortality*, in which he has in common with man; and while death is joined to justice, in the same [Christ] sinful and mortal man is confederated with the just and immortal God. For *we are reconciled to God by the death* of an innocent man. — Therefore the reasons showing that Christ is mediator according to the human nature must be granted.

**To the objections to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected, that Christ is *middle* by reason of the nature of Divinity and of humanity; the response is already clear from the things that have been said. For it is not the same to say to be a *mediator* and to be a *middle*; nevertheless he could not be a *mediator* unless he were a *middle*. For that he is at once and simultaneously *blessed* and *mortal*, this he has because he is *man* and *God*; yet both of these two properties befit him according to the *human* nature, so that *mortality* befits the human nature in itself, and *blessedness* belongs to it insofar as it is united to the divine.

2. To that which is objected, that the mediator must participate in the nature of each extreme; it must be said that both *middle* and *mediator* are not said only by *participation in both natures*, as was said before, but also by *agreement in property*. And Christ according to the human nature has properties agreeing with the divine nature equally and with the human.

3. To that which is objected, that the *middle* does not join extremes except by the agreement which it has with them; it must be said that the response is already clear, because the agreement according to *property* is that which can reconcile the extremes, especially when the extremes are to be joined through that middle and led to conformity of *will*, not to conformity of *nature*. For through Christ man is reconciled to God, that he may be *blessed*, and so, that of a mortal he becomes immortal, of a sinner just, of a wretched one blessed, not that the reconciled one becomes *God*, although Christ himself is God.

4. To that which is objected, that Christ is an *extreme* according to the human nature; it must be said that it is false; for the human nature in Christ never needed reconciliation; whence it was not *reconciled*, but *reconciling*, according to what is said in second Corinthians, chapter five: *God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself*. For the human nature was of one condition in other men, of another in Christ; for in others it was sinful, in Christ it was free from all fault.

5. To that which is objected, that if a mediator is said [to be such] on account of agreement in properties, then a demon must be called a mediator; it must be said that it is not alike, because it does not have properties agreeing with a mediator, according to what Augustine expounds in the ninth book of *On the City of God* somewhat at length, but nevertheless usefully. For he speaks thus: « The mediator between God and man ought to have a passing mortality and a permanent blessedness, that by that which passes he might be suited to those about to die, and to that which permanently remains he might transfer them from the dead. Therefore the good Angels cannot be middles between the wretched and mortal and the blessed and immortal, because they too are blessed and immortal; but the bad angels can be middles, because they are immortal with the former and wretched with the latter. Contrary to these is the good mediator, because against their immortality and wretchedness he willed both to exist as mortal for a time and was able to persist as blessed in eternity ». — And that they are contrary, this he himself shows further on consequently: « To this end the immortal and wretched [mediator] interposes himself, that he may not allow [the soul] to pass over to blessed immortality. But to this end the mortal and blessed one interposes himself, that, death being accomplished, he might make immortals from the dead ». — And so it is clear how the agreement of properties in Christ contributes to the office of a good mediator, but in the demon contributes to the contrary. And so the response to the things asked is clear.