Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/2/q/bon-sent-III-d2-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the fittingness for union is greater in human nature than in an angel, or conversely.*

Secondly it is asked whether the fittingness for union is greater in human nature than in an angel, or conversely. And that it is greater in the angel, it seems.

1. God is a spirit, as is said in John, chapter four: therefore the creature that has more of the character of spirituality is more in agreement with God; and what is more in agreement with God is more uniteable to him in unity of person: since therefore the angelic nature is more spiritual than the human, it seems, and so forth.

2. Likewise, the assumed nature, by the very fact that it is assumed, is exalted above the other creatures; but the more excellent a creature is, the more fit it is to be exalted: therefore since the angelic nature is by right set before the rest — according to what Richard of Saint Victor says: *It is the head of the whole universe* — it seems that it would have been more becoming for it to be united than human nature.

3. Likewise, the angelic nature suffered a fall both into the evil of fault and into the evil of punishment: therefore if the divine mercy condescends to misery, since a greater abundance of misery happens to be found in the angelic nature than in the human; it seems that there is in it a greater fittingness for union than in the human.

4. Likewise, the assumed nature is the principle of our reparation: if therefore it is fitting that reparation be made through those things by which the destruction came about; since the angel was the principle of the whole transgression, it seems that the Angel ought to have been assumed for the completing of the mystery of redemption: and so the fittingness was greater in the angelic nature than in the human.

**Sed contra:**

1. Assumption is the act of a person having distinction according to origin, of which kind is the distinction in the divine persons: therefore that nature in which there is distinction of person according to origin has a greater fittingness for personal union than that which lacks such a distinction; but in men there is such a distinction, whereas in angels there is not: therefore, and so forth.

2. Likewise, the assumption of a creature to the Creator in unity of person was for the commending of humility; but a greater condescension of humility appears in the assumption of a mortal man than of an immortal spirit: therefore it seems that human nature was more suitable for union than the angelic.

3. Likewise, assumption is principally on account of the reparation of the assumed kind; but the angels who fell sinned with an irremediable sin, as was shown above in the Second Book, whereas men sinned with a remediable sin: therefore it was more fitting to assume human nature than the angelic.

4. Likewise, God, whatever he does, he does most fittingly; but God nowhere takes hold of the Angels, in Hebrews, chapter two: therefore the fittingness for union was greater in human nature than in the angelic.

### Conclusion

> The fittingness for union was greater in the human creature than in the angelic.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that without doubt the fittingness for union was greater in the human creature than in the angelic. And this indeed the divine working sufficiently shows. For God nowhere takes hold of the Angels, but takes hold of the seed of Abraham.

Now the ground of the greater fittingness is taken in two ways, namely according to the institution of human nature and according to its reparation.

For according to the institution of human nature the fittingness is greater in human nature than in the angelic; and this for a threefold cause. — The first is on account of the personal distinction, which indeed is found in the human nature according to origin, and not in the angelic; and therefore it was more fitting that the person of the Son, who is distinguished from the person of the Father according to origin, should take that nature in which he would retain the property of sonship; and this indeed was done in the assumption of human nature. For the very same one who from eternity was the Son of the Father, in time became the son of the Virgin mother.

The second ground is on account of the greater representation of the divine exemplar, by reason of which man is called a lesser world. For the rational soul represents God not only as it is considered in itself, but inasmuch as it is united to the body, which it rules and in the whole of which it dwells, as God in the greater world; and this Augustine says many times. By reason of this greater conformity there was a greater ground of uniteability.

The third ground is on account of the manifold composition of man. For since man is composed of a corporeal and a spiritual nature, and in a certain way communicates with every creature, as Gregory says; hence it is that when human nature is assumed and deified, in a certain way every nature is exalted in it, while in its like it is united to the Deity. And hence it is that the assumption of human nature does more for the perfection of the whole universe than that of the angelic. — And therefore the fittingness for union is greater in it even according to its institution.

Likewise also according to reparation a greater fittingness is found in it for union, from a threefold cause, namely because man had more need, and was less unworthy, and it profited him more, that the Son of God should assume his nature. — He had more need, because he had wholly fallen; he was less unworthy, because he had been corrupted through another; it profited him more, because he was not yet obstinate in evil. — Since therefore the divine mercy weighs these three things in the benefits which it bestows; hence it is that God, who is rich in mercy, on account of the exceeding charity with which he loved us, assumed human nature rather than the angelic, because there was found in it a greater fittingness for receiving so great a benefit of the divine mercy, that through it he might be relieved from misery. — Now this ground, which is taken from the reparation of the human race, is more efficacious and more principal than the preceding, because, as was shown above, the chief ground of the incarnation was the reparation of the human race.

*To the 1.* To that, then, which is objected first, that the Angel by reason of spirituality is more in agreement with God than man; it must be said that although it is more in agreement intensively, nevertheless it is not more in agreement extensively. For man agrees in spirituality by reason of the soul, and the superadded body makes for a greater conformity; and thus by both, namely spirit and body, a greater representation of the divine exemplarity comes about. Moreover, the chief ground of fittingness in respect of union is not regarded in respect of greater agreement in spirituality, but rather by reason of greater suitability for receiving the benefit of the divine mercy.

*To the 2.* To that which is objected concerning the exaltation of the assumed nature, it must be said that although the Angel is higher in nature than man, nevertheless by the grace of union it was becoming that man rather than the Angel be exalted, both for the confounding of the pride of Lucifer, who wished to be made equal to God, and for the commending of the grace of God, that it might appear that elevation into glory is not from nature, but rather from divine grace. — And this is also the reason why our Lord Jesus Christ chose rather the poor and ignoble than the powerful, that he might confound the high and strong things, and that no creature might glory in his sight, because to the King of ages, immortal and invisible, to God alone, ought to be honor and glory.

*To the 3.* To that which is objected, that the Angel had more need than man; it must be said that it is false. For man had wholly need, because he had wholly fallen: but the Angel had not. And if you object that the fallen angel had more need than fallen man; it must be said that although he had more need, nevertheless he was less worthy, since he had sinned out of greater pride. Hence Bernard on the Canticle: « Who so needs mercy as the wretched? and who is so unworthy of mercy as the proud wretch »? Moreover, the assumption itself of the angelic nature would not profit the fallen angel, because, since they are universally obstinate in malice, they would not be kindled to humility nor to charity by the showing of so great a benefit and example. And this we see today in many sinners, to whom on account of their perversity the incarnation of Christ profits very little.

*To the 4.* To that which is objected, that the transgression took its beginning from the Angel, therefore the reparation likewise ought to begin from him; it must be said that the transgression of the human race took its beginning from the demon and from man; but from man as from the principal author, from the demon as from the suggester; and since Christ is the author of our redemption, therefore man ought to be assumed rather than the angel, so that the reparation may directly correspond to the fall. And just as in the fall the devil deceived Eve, so in the reparation Gabriel instructed Mary. And just as in the first Adam the consummation of our transgression came about, so through the second Adam the perfection of our redemption came about. — And thus the answer to the things that were objected is clear.