Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/2/q/bon-sent-III-d2-a1-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether the fittingness toward union is greater in the whole species than in one individual.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the fittingness is greater in the whole species than in one individual. And that it is greater in the whole human species seems to be the case:

1. Because the whole [nature] was in need of healing. And Damascene says that "what was unassumable was incurable": therefore, if God assumed the nature for the healing of the human race, it seems that it would have been more fitting to assume the whole species than one singular nature.

2. Likewise, the repairer ought to have been of greater power than the first transgressor; but in the first transgressor God placed the whole human species, in such a way that nothing was outside Adam himself, but all were in him: therefore it seems that it would have been more fitting for the Son of God to assume the whole mass which Adam had corrupted, than some part of it.

3. Likewise, "the good is diffusive of itself," therefore the greater good is more diffusive, therefore in the greatest effect of goodness God ought most to diffuse himself; but the greatest effect of divine goodness was the redemption of the human race: therefore it was fitting that he should diffuse himself most; therefore it was more fitting that he should assume the species than some particular nature.

4. Likewise, the Son is sent into the *mind*, and is sent into the *flesh*; but the sending of the Son of God into the *mind* does not regard only one singular soul, but every soul of the sons of God by adoption: therefore by parity of reasoning the sending into the *flesh* ought not to be into one singular body, but into all human bodies, or at least into some, which are conjoined to souls, to which the divine wisdom is sent.

**On the contrary:** 1. "Nature does not do through many things what it can do through fewer" — and it does this for its own commendation — therefore likewise God, who is the institutor of nature: but the human race could be sufficiently repaired through one man: therefore it was more fitting that he should assume one [nature] than many.

2. Likewise, it is fitting that the assumed human nature be held in the highest honor; but if he had assumed all, one would not be more honorable than another; this indeed would derogate from the honor and dignity of the mediator, and nothing of the sort is fitting to be done: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if he had assumed all, then he would have assumed sinners; but if it in no way befits the mediator to be a sinner, then it does not befit the Son of God to assume every man.

4. Likewise, if he had assumed all men or many, either there would be among them some *kinship* of consanguinity, or *none*. If *none*, it does not seem that this would befit, since among the divine persons the highest kinship is regarded, as Richard says. But if there were *kinship*, such that one were father and another son, there would now be a confusion of properties. And therefore, if this is not seemly nor fitting, namely that the properties be confounded in the Trinity, it seems that a multitude of men would not have a fittingness toward union, as does a singular nature.

### Conclusion.

> It is not so fitting that the whole species, or the multitude of individuals, be assumed by the Son of God, as it is fitting that it be assumed in a singular nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt it is not so fitting that the whole species, or the multitude of individuals, be assumed by the Son of God, as it befits him to assume it in a singular nature; and this both by reason of the union in itself, and by reason of our reparation, and by reason of the exaltation of the assumed nature. — By reason of the union in itself it was more fitting that he should assume one nature than many, just as it was seemly that one be united to one, and that the Only-begotten of the Father become the Only-begotten of the mother, so that thus through the union of nature there be neither a withdrawal from unity, nor a confusion in the personal property.

But by reason of our reparation it was more fitting, because the union came about for the sake of the mediator. But the mediator is one, that he may lead back to unity and

concord God and man. For if there were many, either one would *suffice*, or *not*. If he *sufficed*, then the others would be superfluous. If he did *not suffice*, then he would now be an imperfect mediator. Hence, just as Christ died once for sins, because *by one offering he has consummated for ever those who are sanctified*; so once and in a single nature he ought to have been incarnate.

But by reason of *the exaltation of the assumed nature* it was more fitting, because it was seemly that that man, who was God, be so exalted that there be given to him *a name which is above every name*. And since that "which is said by way of superabundance befits one alone"; just as God is one, who has no other nature equal to him, but is highest among all things, so the assumed nature is unique, to which no creature is equal, but it itself excels among all created things, as one to whom *all power in heaven and on earth has been given*. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that it was more seemly to assume one singular nature than the whole species.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that the whole [nature] was in need of healing; it must be said that the whole was in need of healing, and the whole could be healed through one man, just as the whole body can be healed through a cautery which is applied around one member; therefore it was not necessary that the whole human race be assumed. — Nor does that avail which is objected from Damascene: "What was unassumable was incurable"; for he speaks of the assumable in itself, or in its like; thus the whole human nature was assumed in Christ, as will be made clear below. And nothing in man was in need of healing which has not been assumed by God in unity of person.

2. To that which is opposed, that the whole human species was in the transgressor; it must be said that it is not similar, because the transgressor corrupted and transmitted the corruption by means of carnal generation; but Christ heals through grace and by means of spiritual regeneration; and therefore it is not necessary that those who are to be healed be in the flesh of Christ, as they were in the nature of the first man. For it suffices to be reborn in the Church through its Sacraments, in which Christ regenerates sons with virginity intact.

3. To that which is objected, that the good is diffusive of itself in the chief effect of goodness; it must be said that the magnitude of diffusion can be understood *intensively* or *extensively*; but in the chief effect of goodness there need not be a diffusion of goodness through *extension*, but through *intension*. Hence the greater the gifts, the fewer they are communicated to. And because the grace of union is greatest at the terminus, so that there cannot be a greater nor can a greater be conceived; hence it is that it ought to be communicated to one singular nature.

4. To that which is objected, that the sending into the mind does not regard one person only; it must be said that it is not similar, because the sending *into the mind* is regarded according to the indwelling effect of grace, which is common to all the just; but the sending of the Son *into the flesh* is according to the grace of union, which makes man to be God. But although it is fitting that he communicate to many the goodness of justice, nevertheless it does not befit that he communicate to many the name and dignity of divinity. For it befits God to have many servants and adoptive sons, but it does not befit that many men be natural sons of God, that is, gods, or, to speak more properly, that they be God or the Only-begotten Son of God.

---