Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/2/q/bon-sent-III-d2-a3-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article III. *On the assumed nature with respect to the necessity of a medium.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the assumed nature as regards the necessity of a medium. And about this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit.

Secondly it is asked, whether [the soul] was assumed by the Word through the medium of a gratuitous habit.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

### Question I. *Whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul.*

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul. And that it was so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Damascene, which the Master adduces in the text: « United to the flesh is the Word of God through the medium of the intellect ».

2. *Likewise*, Gregory: « The deity took up the flesh through the medium of the soul ».

3. *Likewise*, Augustine [says] this same thing to Volusianus: « He fitted to himself a rational soul, and through it a human body ».

4. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Things greatly distant from one another are not united except through some medium; but the created and corruptible corporeal, and the uncreated, incorporeal, and incorruptible, are maximally distant: therefore they are united through some medium, which indeed is created and incorporeal. But such is the rational spirit: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, it is of greater dignity to be united to the divinity than to be glorified; but the body is not fit for glorification except through the medium of a soul: therefore neither for the union.

6. *Likewise*, with the soul set aside, the human body is less noble than the brute spirit is, since a spiritual substance is more worthy than a corporeal one; but a brute animal does not have a fittingness for the union — therefore neither does the human body of itself. If therefore it has a fittingness, this is through the medium of a spirit or intellect.

**On the contrary:** 1. God is most inward to every creature, both corporeal and spiritual: therefore nothing falls as a medium between him and the creature: if therefore he unites a human body to himself, it seems that he does not unite it to himself through the medium of a spirit.

2. *Likewise*, a medium is more united to each of the extremes than the extremes are to one another: therefore if the divinity is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then the divinity is more united to the soul than to the flesh, and the flesh is more united to the soul than to God. But this is false, since the soul was united to the flesh separably, the divinity inseparably, and so that flesh was God's, just as the soul was God's: therefore the same [conclusion] remains as before.

3. *Likewise*, when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved: therefore if God is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then, the separation from the flesh having been made, a separation from the divinity comes about. But this is false, since in death the soul withdrew from the flesh; God, however, never relinquished the flesh which he had assumed: therefore it seems that he did not assume the flesh through the medium of the soul.

4. *Likewise*, God did not organize nor form that flesh through the medium of the soul: therefore if he assumed it by the same power by which he formed it, and thus assumed it immediately, just as he made it immediately; it does not seem that he assumed it through the medium of a rational spirit.

### Conclusio

> The Word was united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit, not as though the soul were a medium of binding-together, but only inasmuch as it is a medium of fittingness.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit, this can be understood in two ways, according as a medium can concur for the joining of certain things under a twofold account. For there is a medium of *binding-together* (*colligantiae*), and there is a medium of *fittingness* (*congruentiae*). A medium of *binding-together* is that through which the extremes are bound to one another, just as two bodies are joined to one another, with glue intervening. But a medium of *fittingness* is so called by reason of which it is fitting that two extremes be brought to some union, just as a noble woman through her nobility has the fittingness to be the bride of a king; yet when the king unites her to himself, he is united [to her] more as a *spouse* than as a *noblewoman*.

If, therefore, it is understood concerning the medium of *binding-together*, then it is asked: is the Word united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit? It must be answered that no, on the ground that the Word is immediately and inseparably united both to the flesh and to the soul; and therefore the soul does not there fall as a medium, like glue or a bond between the body and God. — But if it is understood concerning the medium of *fittingness*, then without doubt it must be conceded that the flesh is united to the Word himself through the medium of a created spirit. For it was not fitting that the Word of God, who is life, should take up a body unless one quickened [with life]; nor was it suitable that he who is an immortal Spirit should be united to a body, unless one quickened by an immortal spirit, whence that body would be apt for incorruption. And this is what is said in the text, that « the immutable and invisible Truth took up, without any defilement of himself, through the *spirit* the soul, and through the *soul* the body, the whole man ». And *spirit* is taken for the higher portion of the soul, as the Master says, which has the greater agreement with God; but *soul* [is taken] for the lower part of the soul, according to which it quickens the body. And by these two things nothing else is given to be understood than that that body is fitting for the union, which indeed it has by being quickened through the *soul* and by being ordered to perpetuity and incorruption through the *spirit*. — And since the reasons which are adduced for the first part proceed

according to the medium of fittingness, therefore they are to be conceded.

*Ad 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God is most inward to the corporeal creature, therefore he is not united through the medium of a spirit; it must be said that that reason proceeds concerning a medium of *distance* or of *binding-together*, which indeed is not to be found here; but it is not opposed to the medium of *fittingness*. For although he is most inward by the mode of being potentially, essentially, and presentially in every creature; nevertheless it is not fitting that he should assume any one whatever into the unity of person, as was seen above, but only that one which is to his image, or which has a composition with his image.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that God is not more united to the soul than to the flesh, but rather is equally immediately united to each; it must be said that this is true of the immediacy according to which it excludes a medium causing *distance*; but it is not true of the immediacy which excludes a medium causing *fittingness*; since a rational substance, which is to his image, is more fitting for the union than a corporeal substance.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this does not hold true of a medium of *fittingness*; as is clear, when someone takes a woman in marriage by reason of her beauty, he is nevertheless not separated from her when the beauty fades; and so it is to be understood in the present matter. — Moreover, the soul did not withdraw from the body absolutely, but only for a time; and that body, from its first conjunction to the soul, had a disposition toward incorruption; and therefore on account of the separation of the soul it did not lose its fittingness for the union; and therefore, although the soul was separated from the flesh, it was not necessary that the divinity be separated from the flesh.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that God did not form that flesh through the medium of the soul; it must be said that, even if this holds of a medium by the mode of a *cause*, it nevertheless does not hold of a medium by the mode of *fittingness*. For although the soul was not the effective cause of the body, nevertheless from the communication of the body with the soul there could be some *fittingness* for the union with the divine nature.