Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/2/q/bon-sent-III-d2-a3-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether the Word was united to human nature through the medium of the Holy Spirit.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the Word was united to human nature through the medium of the Holy Spirit. And that it was, seems to be the case:

*To the contrary.*

1. Because the union of the uncreated Word to flesh is similar to the union of the intelligible word to the voice; but the intelligible word is not united to the voice except through the medium of breath or of exhaled spirit, which is the vehicle of the word, as Damascene says: therefore neither is the Word united to flesh except through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, every voluntary union is through the medium of love, as Dionysius says, because "love is nothing other than a unitive power"; but the union of the Word to human nature is voluntary: therefore it is through the medium of love; either therefore through the medium of created or of uncreated love. Not through the medium of created love, because created love could not effect that union; therefore through the medium of uncreated love; but that love is the Holy Spirit: therefore the union in human nature was made through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, the union of the divine persons to one another is greater than that of the assuming nature and the assumed; but the person of the Father and of the Son are bound together by the Holy Spirit: therefore much more strongly is human nature united to the divine through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

4. Likewise, things more remote are joined through things nearer; but among the three persons the person of the Holy Spirit is nearer to us, as Hilary and Augustine hold — for every gift and every use of a gift is from the Giver — therefore it seems that the person of the Son is not united to human nature except through the medium of the person of the Holy Spirit.

**Sed contra:**

*The foundations.*

1. If the person of the Word is united to human nature through the medium of the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit is united to human nature: therefore just as the Son is incarnate, so too is the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, the medium is more united to an extreme than one extreme to the other: therefore if the union of the Word to human nature is through the medium of the Holy Spirit, the union is made more in the person of the Holy Spirit than in the person of the Word; but this is false: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in the union of the divine nature with the human there cannot be a unity of essence, but of person: therefore it is necessary that that union be made through the medium of one person; but the Son and the Holy Spirit do not coincide in person: therefore it is impossible that the Son be united to human nature through the medium of the Holy Spirit in unity of person.

4. Likewise, the distance in the person of the Holy Spirit is infinite, just as in the person of the Son; but whenever some things are at an equal distance with respect to the same thing, the one is not a medium for uniting the other, on the ground that a medium approaches the extremes more than the extremes approach one another: therefore it seems that the person of the Word is not to be united through the medium of the person of the Holy Spirit.

### Conclusio

> The Word is not united to the human soul through the medium of the Holy Spirit as an intervening bond, but as an efficient principle and by way of appropriation.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that when it is asked whether the person of the Word is to be united to human nature through the medium of the Holy Spirit, this can be understood in two ways *(a twofold sense)*: either so that that union is made through the medium of the Holy Spirit as an intervening bond; or so that it is made as an efficient principle. If it be understood in the first way *(conclusion 1)*, thus it does not hold true, on the ground that the person of the Word is united to human nature by itself, and not through the medium of any person. For in no way does the person of the Holy Spirit fall in between, as a medium, between the person of the Word and the assumed nature. — But if that union be understood to be made through the medium of the Holy Spirit as an efficient principle *(conclusion 2)*, by way of a certain sub-authority and appropriation: thus it holds true; for the incarnation of the Word was from the Father and from the Son through the medium of the Holy Spirit. — But in this way the question is not here at issue, but *(of this it is not asked)* it will be in its place below, when it will be asked whether the work of the incarnation ought to be appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Now, however, the question is whether the union of the Word is made through the medium of the Holy Spirit as an intervening bond. To this question it must be answered *(conclusion 3)* that this is false and unintelligible, as the reasons adduced for it show.

*(The solution of the opposing arguments.)*

*Ad 1.* To that indeed which is objected to the contrary, that the intelligible word is united to the voice through the medium of breath; it must be said that there is a likeness between creature and Creator, yet in such a way that a greater unlikeness is found; whence in a certain way it is similar and in a certain way not *(note)*. In this, I say, it is similar, that just as the mind forms the exterior voice through the medium of breath; so God the Father formed the assumed flesh through the medium of the Holy Spirit. In this it is unlike, because breath is the vehicle of the word; not so is the Holy Spirit of the person of the Son. For nowhere is the person of the Holy Spirit where there is not the person of the Word; and therefore in this respect the likeness cannot and ought not to be pressed.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that a voluntary union is through the medium of love; it must be said that a voluntary union is so called in two ways *(a twofold voluntary union)*: either because it is from the will, or because it is according to the will. That union which is voluntary as from the will is through the medium of love as an efficient cause; but that which is voluntary according to the will, that has to be made through the medium of love as a conjoining glue. I say therefore that the union of the Word to human nature is voluntary, because it is from the will; but it is not voluntary in that it is made according to a conformity of wills, but rather according to a conjunction of natures in one person. And therefore it does not follow that such a union is made through the medium of the Holy Spirit as an intervening bond, but rather as an efficient principle.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the divine persons are bound together through the medium of the Holy Spirit; it must be said that it is not similar: because the binding of two persons is regarded according to the production of one person through the fecundity of the will, in such a way that between those persons and their binding there is a distinction of persons. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because two natures concur into the unity of person.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that the person of the Holy Spirit is nearer to us; it must be said that it has been said by appropriation *(note)*, not because the person of the Holy Spirit approaches a created nature more than the person of the Word, but because it merely proceeds, in such a way that it does not produce another person; and it proceeds by way of the fecundity of the will. And since all creatures have been produced voluntarily and out of the divine liberality; hence it is that the person of the Holy Spirit is said to approach us more nearly. And therefore, according to a certain appropriation, it can be granted that that union is made through the medium of the Holy Spirit, since it is gratuitous — the Holy Spirit, I say, being the efficient cause according to appropriation, yet not intervening according to personal distinction.

---