Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/20/q/bon-sent-III-d20-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.*

Thirdly it is asked whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race. And that it could, is shown thus.

1. One mere creature was able to infect the whole human race through its own fault: therefore if grace is the principle of making satisfaction, just as fault is the principle of infecting; it seems that some mere creature could, through its own grace, make satisfaction for the whole human race.

2. Likewise, no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault: if therefore the human race fell through the transgression of a mere creature, it seems that a mere creature could make satisfaction for the human race.

3. Likewise, the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against an innocent one: therefore if there could be some mere creature wholly innocent, who would expose itself for the salvation of the human race, and the devil should stretch out his hand against it; it seems that some mere creature could have redeemed the human race from the devil's power, and thus made satisfaction for it.

4. Likewise, God weighs the life and soul of one just man more than the life and soul of innumerable sinners: if therefore some mere creature, innocent and holy, should offer itself to God and the Father as a sacrifice for sinners, a just recompense would be made, and therefore a due satisfaction.

5. Likewise, suppose that Christ had been a mere creature and had died on the cross, as he did die; I ask then: either he would have been detained in limbo, or not. It is established that he would not have been detained in limbo, because he had no guilt of original sin: therefore heaven would have been opened to him: Christ would therefore have merited the opening of the gate. If then the gate could not be opened except through sufficient satisfaction, it seems that a mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.

**On the contrary:** 1. If it were a mere creature, it would be either a man or a non-man. If it were a mere man, then it would be a sinner and a debtor: therefore it could not be mediator and reconciler, since it itself would need reconciliation. If it were a non-man; but for man none ought to make satisfaction except a man, because satisfaction pertains to him in whom there was the transgression: therefore if neither a mere man nor a non-man could make satisfaction for the whole human race, it seems that no mere creature could.

2. Likewise, satisfaction ought to be proportioned to the offense and the injury; but the offense and injury is as great as is the one to whom it is done: since therefore God is infinite, the offense and injury done to God is infinite. But no creature, nor its operation, is infinite: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the offense and injury done to God. But such was the injury of Adam and his posterity, because he despised God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, no one makes satisfaction unless he restores as much and more than he took away; but no mere creature is able to restore the whole human race, which through the sin of Adam was taken away from God: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for it.

4. Likewise, no one can make satisfaction for every man, unless he could pour justice into every man, just as the first parent transmitted fault; but no mere creature can pour justice into others or give grace, as was shown in the first book: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the whole human race.

5. Likewise, we are obligated to God no less for the benefit of re-creation than for the benefit of creation: if therefore a mere creature had redeemed the human race, we would be as obligated to it as to our Creator: therefore we would be bound to love a creature as much as the Creator. If then it is impossible that we be obligated to this; it was impossible for a mere creature to make satisfaction for the whole human race.

> ### Conclusion.
>
> No mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race, neither with respect to the injury nor with respect to the damage; nor would it have been fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed by God for this.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is wont to be made and required for two things, namely for the injury and for the damage. If therefore God requires satisfaction from the human race; either he requires it for both, or for one of these. If for both, it is plain that it is impossible for any mere creature to make satisfaction to God for the human race, for the reason that the injury which is done to God on account of his most excellent dignity is so grave that no mere creature can recompense anything equal to it. But if he should require satisfaction only for the damage, condoning the injury; not even thus can any mere creature make satisfaction for the whole human race. For either that creature would be a man, or it would not be a man. If it were a man, since one mere man cannot be equivalent to the whole human race, such a man, by offering himself to God, would never recompense the damage which Adam inflicted by corrupting the whole human race. If it were a non-man; not even thus could it yet recompense the damage, if it were a mere creature; or if it could, it would still not make satisfaction, because satisfaction belongs to that kind to which the transgression belonged. Or if it could do this, it still would not be fitting, because it would not restore human nature to its former state; for it would by this be made subject to another kind of creature.

And from this it is held that not only could a mere creature not make satisfaction to God, if it were of another kind, but also, even if it were assumed by God, it would not be fitting that it make satisfaction for the human race. — And therefore, since a mere creature could not make satisfaction for the whole human race, nor would it be fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed for this; it was necessary that the person of the one making satisfaction be God and man. — Therefore the reasons showing that no mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race must be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that a mere creature was able to infect the whole human race; it must be said that it is not similar: because some mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to carnal propagation, through which the human race is corrupted and infected; but no mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to spiritual regeneration.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault; it must be said that the fault is aggravated not only on the part of the condition of the one sinning, but also on the part of him against whom the sin is committed; and although the one sinning was a mere creature, yet he against whom he sinned was the Creator. Therefore, when it is required that the one making satisfaction not be a mere creature, this is not beyond that which was committed in the fault; for it is necessary that the person making satisfaction make satisfaction for the gravity of the sin according to all the conditions according to which it has to be aggravated.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against one over whom he had no right; it must be said that in this is not expressed the sufficient ground of satisfaction, but the mode of conquering the devil. And it is quite true that some mere innocent creature could have conquered the devil; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that it could make satisfaction to God. For it is far more to recompense to God the injury done than to conquer the devil's fraud.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that God weighs the soul of a just man more than the souls of innumerable sinners; it must be said that God in satisfaction does not seek recompense for the human race according as it is in the state of sin, but according as it would have been if it had not sinned; and in this manner God does not value the life of any mere man as much as the whole human generation.

*Ad 5.* To that which is asked, if Christ had been a mere creature, whether dying he would have entered into heaven; it must be said that he would; yet from this it does not follow that he would have merited the opening of the gate, because heaven had never been closed to him, on this supposition, that he had no guilt of original sin. But the others, who had the guilt of original sin, on account of this would not have been led into heaven; and so the gate would still have remained closed, for the reason that no sufficient satisfaction had been paid.