Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/20/q/bon-sent-III-d20-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself.*

Fourthly it is asked whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself. And that he could, it seems:

1. Because there are three parts of penance: contrition, confession, and satisfaction; but a man, aided by grace, can be contrite for his sin and confess it: therefore he can satisfy for himself. If you say that he can for actual [sin] but not for original; on the contrary: the actual is greater than the original, because there the wickedness of the will is greater, and one is also punished more gravely for the actual than for the original: if therefore by the help of grace he can satisfy for his actual [sin], much more strongly does it seem that he can for his original.

2. Likewise, "to satisfy, according to what Anselm says, is to render to God the honor owed"; but every man, aided by grace, can render to God the honor owed: therefore everyone can satisfy God for his sin. If you say that he cannot render the honor which he owes for the injury previously done; on the contrary: no just authority demands of a man more than he can [do] — "for let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible" — therefore he owes God no honor that he cannot [render].

3. Likewise, a man existing in grace can merit the highest good, which is God: therefore, since it is much greater to merit the highest good than to be reconciled to him and joined in covenant with him, it seems that much more can he satisfy for any sin of his, not only actual but also original.

4. Likewise, one existing in grace was either not deserving of any punishment, or only of temporal [punishment]: if therefore one who is a debtor of temporal punishment can pay that punishment, it seems that a man can satisfy for any sin he has: therefore for the original.

5. Likewise, grace coming into the soul blots out original guilt just as well as actual; but as grace stands according to its essence in relation to the blotting out of guilt, so it stands according to its works in relation to satisfaction; but grace, coming into the soul, frees it from all guilt, both original and actual: therefore, moving the soul, it can satisfy for every guilt previously blotted out: therefore every man can satisfy for himself.

**On the contrary:** 1. If every man could satisfy for himself, then Christ would have died in vain: if therefore this is unfitting and absurd, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.

2. Likewise, just as the injury of the sin of the whole human race is infinite by reason of him against whom it is, so too is that which is in any single sin: therefore if some mere man could not satisfy for the whole human race, by like reasoning too it seems that he cannot satisfy for himself.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone satisfy for guilt so long as the root and cause of the guilt remains in him — "for to satisfy, as Augustine says, is to cut off the causes of sins" — but the vice of human origin is never separated from the flesh of sin: therefore it seems that no man who has had original sin can satisfy for the original. The major is manifest through Augustine, but the minor is made manifest through the fact that everyone begets a son having original sin.

4. Likewise, for satisfaction to be made, it is necessary that a recompense for the loss be made; but on account of original sin everyone has the necessity of dying, and the body is dead on account of sin, as the Apostle says: therefore if anyone is to satisfy for original sin, he is bound to render soul for soul. But everyone is a debtor of death for original sin: therefore it does not seem that anyone who has contracted original sin can ever satisfy for it.

5. Likewise, that original sin is guilt, it has this because it proceeded from the will of Adam: if therefore satisfaction for it is required, insofar as it is guilt, no one can satisfy for the original unless he satisfies for the guilt of Adam. But for the guilt of Adam no one can satisfy, insofar as it is original, unless he satisfies for the whole human race: therefore, from the first, no one can satisfy for the original sin of any man unless he satisfies for the whole human race. But this no mere man can do: therefore no one can satisfy for his own original [sin].

> **Conclusion.** No one, however much aided by grace, could satisfy for original guilt, not even half-fully; nor for his own proper sin fully, but only half-fully.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is full satisfaction, and there is half-full satisfaction. Full satisfaction is when satisfaction is made at once both for the injury and for the loss; but half-full satisfaction is when, the offense having been remitted, satisfaction is made for the loss. It is to be understood, then, that for no sin in which there is an aversion from God can any mere man satisfy with full satisfaction, neither for himself nor for others, because that offense and injury exceeds a mere creature. — But if we speak of half-full satisfaction, namely that in which, the offense having been remitted, amends for the loss is required; thus it must be said that a man can satisfy for his actual [sin], but not for the original.

Now the reason for this is that actual sin denotes a depravity of the will, but original denotes a depravity of nature. And in this the depravity of nature differs from the depravity of the will, that the corruption of the will regards the person itself, as it is an individual, but the corruption of nature, as it is the principle of another. — Likewise, because the will is changeable, and the corruption existing in it is easily moved; but because nature is moved in one way, the corruption existing in it is moved with difficulty. Since therefore the disorder of the will, introduced through the actual [sin], is of a single person and easily moved, it can be recompensed through the use of grace that makes pleasing, which regards the single person; but because the depravity of nature is one that regards propagation, and so the common nature, and further cannot be eradicated altogether: therefore for the loss inflicted no one can satisfy through the grace

of a single person. For it does not altogether remove the root of original sin [from him in whom it is, neither by itself nor by] its use; and therefore it cannot altogether remove the liability and the obligation. It was therefore impossible that anyone should satisfy for the original sin of any man unless he were altogether clean of original sin, unless he also had common grace, that is, the grace of the head, whose fullness is born to overflow into others. But such a one could not be except one who was man and God, who should be the head of others, as was shown in the preceding [questions], because no one but God can flow into others motion and sense.

And thus it is clear that for the least original sin, neither as to full satisfaction nor as to half-full satisfaction, none could satisfy except Christ, that is, man and God. But for the actual a mere man, aided by grace, can indeed satisfy, but with half-full satisfaction, which receives its supplement and completion from the passion of Christ. For Christ, satisfying for every offense, obtained for all grace as to its sufficiency: and by the merit of that satisfaction a man receiving grace afterward satisfies God for the injury which actual guilt inflicted upon him.

And from this it is clear how the passion of Christ flows into the Sacraments, and why it flows more into the Sacrament of baptism, which is the remedy against original [sin], than into the Sacrament of penance. And this is the foundation of many things which are determined in the fourth book and are presupposed by this book. — It is therefore to be conceded that no one, aided by grace, could satisfy for himself. The reasons too which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that satisfaction is a part of penance; it must be said that penance itself, as has been shown, has its efficacy from the passion of Christ, not only after the passion but even before; because Christ through his passion obtained for all penitential grace, and God gave to the preceding Fathers grace on account of the satisfaction of the passion promised, but to those following on account of the satisfaction paid. And just as we are justified in faith in the past passion, so they were justified in faith in the future passion. Hence both those who went before and those who followed cried: Hosanna to the son of David. Hence from this it is not had that anyone can sufficiently satisfy for himself. — Moreover, that reasoning does not conclude concerning the original, but only concerning the actual. For penance is not against the original, but against the actual. — Nor is that valid which objects that the actual is graver than the original; for it must be said that, although the original in descendants is less than the actual, nevertheless as to its own origin original sin was very grave, since it infected the whole human nature. But the satisfaction of original sin regards the very origin; and therefore I say that it was more difficult to satisfy for the original than for the actual, because satisfaction cannot be made for one original [sin] without its being made for all; but it is not so in actual sins.

2. To that which is objected, that to satisfy is to render to God the honor owed; it must be said that there is a debt by which we are bound to God by the right of [our] condition, and there is a debt by which we are obligated to God by the liability of transgression. I say therefore that the debt which falls under the notion of satisfaction is the debt spoken of in the second way, and this indeed [a man] cannot pay by himself; for he himself made himself powerless, and therefore, unless the divine mercy came to his aid, he could not be saved. And therefore he is not obligated to the impossible; for although it is impossible for him by himself, yet it is possible for him through divine help.

3. To that which is objected, that a man existing in grace can merit the highest good; it must be said that it is not alike, because singular grace indeed has an ordination toward this, that it make a man merit the highest beatitude, but not toward this, that it make a man satisfy for original guilt, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that one existing in grace would merit only temporal punishment; it must be said that it is true; but nevertheless to no sinner is grace given except by the merit of the satisfaction and passion of Christ. Hence the conferral of grace does not make the satisfaction of the original, but presupposes it; therefore it does not follow that anyone can through grace satisfy for original guilt.

5. To that which is objected, that grace equally blots out every guilt, therefore it equally satisfies for every guilt blotted out; it must be said that it is not alike, because the blotting out of guilt is regarded in the reformation of the image and in conversion to God; and because through conversion to God every aversion is blotted out, one grace blots out every guilt; but satisfaction regards the obligation to punishment, and it is possible that one obligation to punishment be paid while another remains. Therefore grace is not compared indifferently to satisfying for every guilt in the same way as to blotting out every guilt.