Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/20/q/bon-sent-III-d20-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ. And that he ought, it seems.

1. The debt of death is in no way better discharged than through a freely-undertaken death; but we were all debtors of death: therefore satisfaction was best made to God through the death of him who was not a debtor of death.

2. Likewise, in no way is a sin better made amends for, which was committed through pleasantness, than through the harshness of punishment: if therefore the sin of the human race was committed through the taste and pleasantness of the forbidden tree, it seems that the most fitting mode of satisfaction was through the punishment of the cross.

3. Likewise, the most suitable mode of satisfaction is through difficulty for a sin which one committed with much ease; but it was most easy for the first man to abstain from sin: therefore the most difficult mode of satisfaction was the most suitable for that sin. But this is by enduring evils even unto death: therefore in this way too Christ made satisfaction: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the most fitting mode of satisfaction for pride is through abasement and humiliation; but there was no greater humiliation than that which was in the bearing of the reproach of the cross: therefore such a mode of satisfaction was most suited to our infirmity: therefore it was fitting that it be accepted by the supreme physician.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is of the greatest cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; but Christ was most just: therefore it was most cruel to hand him over to death for any cause whatever: therefore such a mode of satisfaction ought in no way to have been accepted by God. If you say that he did not hand him over to death; *on the contrary* there is what is said to the Philippians, chapter two: *He became obedient even unto death;* and in many other places the same thing is said.

2. Likewise, it is of the greatest perversity and injustice to condemn the innocent in order that the guilty be absolved; but *we all like sheep have gone astray, while he did no sin:* therefore it seems that the Lord acted unjustly, *when he laid on him the iniquities of us all*.

3. Likewise, *God made not death, neither delighteth in the destruction of the living*: if therefore God delights in satisfaction and does not delight in anyone's death, it does not seem that he ought to have accepted the death of Christ for satisfaction.

4. Likewise, the life of Christ was much better than his death would be: therefore if the death of Christ could satisfy God for us, much more ought his life to satisfy: therefore he ought rather to have accepted his life for making satisfaction than his death.

5. Likewise, that is not an ordered mode of satisfaction in which *sin is added upon sin*; but Christ could not be slain without a most grave sin: therefore the mode of satisfaction through the death of Christ seems disordered.

6. Likewise, the sin of those killing Christ was graver than the sin of Adam would be: therefore if satisfaction for the sin of Adam could not be made unless Christ died once, it seems that satisfaction could not be made for the sin of those killing Christ unless Christ were killed a second time; by parity of reasoning, nor for that killing unless he were killed a third time, and so on to infinity: therefore it does not seem that such a mode of satisfaction is complete, nor to be accepted by God.

### Conclusion.

> The mode of our satisfaction, made through Christ, was most suitable and most to be accepted by God.

**I respond:** It must be said that God ought to have accepted this mode beyond all others, because it is the noblest among all that could be or be devised. For it was most acceptable for appeasing God, most suitable for curing the disease,
most efficacious for drawing the human race, most prudent for vanquishing the enemy of the human race.

*First,* indeed, it was most acceptable for appeasing God; on account of which Anselm says in the second book of *Cur Deus homo,* chapter eleven: « Nothing harsher and more difficult can a man suffer for the honor of God, of his own accord and not out of debt, than death. And in no way can a man give himself more to God than when he hands himself over to death for his honor ». And this is what is said to the Ephesians, chapter five: *He delivered himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.*

*Secondly,* too, it was most suitable for curing the disease. For the first man had sinned through pride and gluttony and disobedience, as Gregory says, and it was shown in the second book; for he willed to be made like to God through the sublimity of knowledge, to taste the pleasantness of the tree, and to transgress the limit of the divine precept. And since healing must be done through the contrary, therefore the most suitable mode of satisfaction was through abasement, humiliation, and the fulfillment of the divine will. And all these things shine forth sufficiently in the passion itself; and of these the Apostle says to the Philippians, chapter two: *He humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, even the death of the cross.*

*Thirdly,* moreover, it was most efficacious for drawing the human race. For the passion availed unto salvation only for those who clung to God by a pure will through love. For God decreed to save the human race in no other way than by the free choice of the will; and in no other way, the choice of the will being preserved, could God more draw man to his love than by enduring for him the gibbet of the cross: on account of which it is said in John, chapter twelve: *I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself.* And Hugh, *On the Pledge of the Bride:* « To show you how much he loved you, he freed you from death only by dying, that he might not only bestow the benefit of compassion, but might also show the affection of charity ».

*Fourthly,* too, it was most prudent for conquering the adversary. For it was fitting that Christ should overcome the devil by his prudence, just as the devil by his cunning deceived the first man. On account of which it is said in Job, chapter twenty-six: *His prudence has struck the proud one;* and in chapter forty: *Canst thou take leviathan with a hook?* On account of which it is said in the preceding distinction, chapter one: « The Redeemer came, and the deceiver was conquered; he stretched out for him as a snare his cross, he set before him as a bait his blood ».

From these four reasons it appears sufficiently that this mode of satisfaction for us was most suitable and most to be accepted by God. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that it was of great cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; it must be said that God did not hand him over by *inflicting* death, or by *commanding* others that they should hand him over, but by *permitting* and by *accepting* his will; and therefore there was no cruelty in God, because he did not thirst for the blood of Christ, but accepted his most excellent will; this is the sum of Anselm's response in the book *Cur Deus homo*. Whence if it is sometimes said that the Father handed him over to death, or that he suffered by the will of the Father, or anything similar, it must be understood in the aforesaid manner: not that the Father compelled him unwilling, but that he received him as willing and devoted.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that it is impious to condemn the innocent and to absolve the guilty; it must be said that this is true if the innocent one is condemned unwilling; but if the innocent one is willing to offer and expose himself for the salvation of the guilty, nothing prevents his oblation from deserving to be accepted. And in this way it must be understood to have been in the matter at hand, because Christ endured the passion not by compulsion, but voluntarily, for our salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that God does not delight in anyone's destruction; it must be said that it is true that God does not delight in punishment, insofar as it is afflictive and corruptive of nature; nevertheless he delights, and the most excellent will pleases him, through which the punishment is endured and is ordered to the honor of God and to the absolution of the guilty man.

4. To that which is objected, that the life of Christ was better than his death; it must be said that without doubt it is true; yet it does not follow that he ought not rather to have made satisfaction through death than through life, for two reasons: first indeed, because satisfaction ought to be penal, and the greatest satisfaction most penal; secondly, because it is of greater perfection to will to die for the honor of God than to will to live, and it proceeds from greater charity and exceeds the limits of nature more; and therefore that reason does not compel.

5. To that which is objected, that it is not an ordered mode of satisfaction where sin is added upon sin; it must be said that it is true, when sin is added upon sin on the part of him who ought to make satisfaction; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For Christ in dying did not sin, but as far as in him lay, he wiped out all sins. And if you say that he ought to have chosen such a mode in which neither he himself nor another would sin; it must be said that this is not necessary. For in this is manifested the supreme wisdom of God, that he knows how to draw from evils not only goods, but even the best; which he did most of all in the most precious death of Christ.

6. To that which is objected last, that the sin of those killing Christ was graver etc.; it must be said that, whatever may be the case as to the gravity—since concerning this there is at present no question—nevertheless, granted that it had been graver, it was not necessary on this account for Christ to suffer a second time. For the single passion of Christ not only sufficed to make satisfaction for the sin of Adam, but also for the whole multitude of sins. Whence the death of Christ availed for those very ones killing him, if they were willing to be converted to Christ; for the merit of the suffering Christ was infinitely greater than the offense of the betraying Judas, the inciting Jew, and the crucifying gentile would be, inasmuch as Christ had more of goodness than they would have of malice. Moreover, as Anselm says, ignorance excused them in some way, as was said above; and therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer again for their sins, but, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter ten: *by one oblation he has perfected forever them that are sanctified.*

### Scholion.

**I.** This question properly treats of the *suitability of the mode* by which Christ, suffering for us, made satisfaction; but at the same time, especially in the solution to the sixth objection, there is touched the controversy over the *value* of that satisfaction, which without doubt was not only sufficient, copious, and condign, but even superabundant. But this being supposed, there were still agitated among the later Scholastics, concerning *three* points, controversies which it is helpful to refer to briefly, so that the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor concerning Christ's *grace* (above, d. 13.), his *merit* (d. 18.), and his *satisfaction* (in this d. 20.) may be better perceived. The disagreement, then, concerning the *value of the satisfaction* of Christ (and the same is to be judged concerning his *merit*) was on these points: 1. Whether and how this value depends on the *acceptation* of God. 2. Whether and by what account it is *infinite.* 3. Whether the satisfaction of Christ is according to the *rigor of commutative justice.* And from the same root that threefold difference of opinions took its origin.

**II.** With respect to the first question, the Nominalists and most Scotists taught that the *value* of satisfactory works depends *solely* on the acceptation of God. For the Nominalists generally proclaimed this principle: « Any merit can be accepted *passively* for as much and for as many as the whole Trinity wills *actively* » (so Gabriel Biel, III. Sent. d. 19. note 3.). A few others held that such acceptation contributes *nothing* to the account of satisfaction. But the more common opinion, proceeding by a middle way, holds that this acceptation is required not indeed for the *essence* of merit and satisfaction, but for its *complement,* inasmuch namely as in it is implied a certain *obligation of justice,* which surely can in no way be conceived on the part of God who rewards, except on the supposition of his own spontaneous promise. But although the opinion of the Nominalists is commonly imposed on Scotus and even by his own disciples; nevertheless others of the same school, such as Mastrius, Hauzeur, Frassenius, Henno, more rightly interpret certain of his equivocal words from other places (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. n. 9.), and say that his mind is that this satisfaction, antecedently to the divine acceptation, is already of itself condign in *first act,* yet from the *acceptation of God,* who by his promise binds himself to remit the debt, becomes condign in *second act.* Concerning this interpretation of Scotus, the disciple of St. Thomas, Gotti (Theol. scholastico-dogmat. t. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dub. 4. § 3. n. 17.), says: « If these things are so, we shall easily agree with Scotus and the Scotists ».

That St. Bonaventure favors the more common opinion is gathered from what he generally teaches concerning *condign merit* and the *acceptation* of God in II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. and following (cfr. also IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in the body), where he distinguishes a twofold divine acceptation, of which the one (habitual and intrinsic) is founded in the very grace of adoption, which dignifies the one who works and his work, while the other (as it were extrinsic) arises from the divine promise, and itself falls upon the meritorious act itself. This doctrine can, as to its substance, be applied also to the merit and satisfaction of *Christ* with respect to each acceptation. Yet it must be observed that the acceptation differs greatly in each case. For the foundation of the acceptation of works done by a pure creature is the *grace of adoption,* which is in an *extraneous* person; but in Christ it is the *grace of the hypostatic union,* and he himself, even as *this man,* is the natural Son of God, true God, and to the accepting God not at all extraneous (cfr. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. and the scholion). The hypostatic union itself, therefore, in a most eminent manner already contains the most perfect acceptation of the satisfaction.

**III.** As to the second controversy, the holy Fathers and certain decrees of the supreme Pontiffs (cfr. the Constitution *Unigenitus* of Clement VI.) proclaim the satisfaction of Christ to be *infinite.* The Nominalists wish to explain this in such a way that the merit of Christ in itself is *finite simply,* yet accepted by God as sufficient for infinite sons of Adam, if there were to be such. Similarly the Scotists are accustomed to say that this merit was not *formally and intrinsically infinite,* but *in a certain respect and extrinsically,* both on account of the holiness of the divine person and on account of the divine acceptation. But the disciples of St. Thomas with very many others say that it was *simply and intrinsically* infinite. This, however, they understand not with respect to the *physical entity* of the meritorious works, which without doubt is created and finite, nor according to the *specific and essential* goodness of the acts, which they take from the *object,* but with respect to the value in the *genus of morals,* inasmuch as in themselves and intrinsically they are infinitely dignified by the person of the Word. For although the meritorious actions proceed immediately from the human nature of Christ, as it is the *principle by which;* this nature nevertheless is united not extrinsically but *intrinsically* with the infinite person, to whom, as it is the *principle which,* those actions are attributed and from whom they intrinsically draw infinite value. Truly there is no parity, as some say, between the *objective* and *extrinsic* infinity, which is commonly attributed to mortal sin by reason of its relation to the object against which it offends (which is certainly *extrinsic* to the action), and the infinity of which the discourse is, since the *relation* of Christ's human nature and of his operation to the person of Christ is altogether singular and utterly differs from that by which a sinful action is referred to, or rather *against,* God.

**IV.** The third controversy, which concerns the question whether Christ made satisfaction according to the *whole rigor of commutative justice,* which the Nominalists, Scotists, and others deny, while the Thomists with not a few affirm it, is in itself of less moment than the preceding, since it is supposed by all that the account of *commutative justice* is not applied to God except according to analogy. Whence in this controversy there arises in some measure a dispute about a word. Yet it is easily conceded that this satisfaction can broadly be called *rigorous,* although there do not belong to it in the strict sense all the conditions which among men are required in acts of commutative justice for such rigor. In this controverted matter the words of St. Bonaventure agree well with the doctrine of St. Thomas, and we are persuaded that his opinion does not diverge from it, whatever Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 10. q. 7.) may say, who strives to draw St. Bonaventure to the opinion of the Scotists. For the holy Doctor not only several times says that the merit of Christ is infinite (cfr. here ad 6, q. 6. ad 4.), but also always traces back this infinity to the infinite dignity of the person of the Word (cfr. above, d. 13. a. 1. q. 2, especially ad 3.); but granted that the dignity of the person who works concurs to give value to the work, and that *greater* dignity gives greater value; surely *infinite* dignity must also increase the value to infinity. But the passages which the aforesaid author urges to the contrary speak only of the created grace of Christ *in itself,* and of the meritorious acts of Christ according to their *physical* or *specific* entity. Alexander of Hales holds the same opinion, when he attributes to any action, even to a single drop of Christ's blood, on account of the dignity of the person, sufficiency for all satisfaction (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. ad 3, cfr. q. 17. m. 3.). Even in the school of Scotus there are some, such as Hauzeur and Vulpes, who attribute to Scotus a mind different from what his words sound, adducing other testimonies of his. Especially Hauzeur (Collatio totius theologiae etc. t. II. q. 12. col. 378 and following), following our distinguished Vega (VII. de Iustificat. c. 7-10.), among other passages brings forward this principle of Scotus (III. Sent. d. 13. ad 2. quaest. n. 9.): « In commending Christ I prefer to exceed rather than to fall short of the praise due to him, if on account of ignorance one must fall into one or the other ». Finally Hauzeur concludes that one should look rather « to that intention of his, which creeps through his literal sense ». The same author (loc. cit. col. 376) well observes that the passion of Christ, by which he offered himself, namely his own body and blood, his soul and life of the divine person, in sacrifice to God, is of infinite value « by a twofold title: of the offerer and of the offered, both infinite; whereas any other action is so only by the title of the agent who is infinite. Nor did he offer these things as finite and separately, but conjointly with the infinite person » etc.

**V.** Besides the passages cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., here a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3, q. 50. a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 46. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1.

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