Dist. 20, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/20/q/bon-sent-III-d20-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part are the doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: *Justly, when He abandoned [him], the author of sin straightway invaded the sinner.* For this seems unfittingly said. For just as Adam sinned in consenting, so the devil sinned in seducing: therefore just as it was just that the man be handed over into the power of the devil, so it was just that the devil be handed over into the power of the man. — Likewise, the author of sin sinned more gravely than the one consenting to sin: therefore much more strongly ought the devil to have been handed over into the power of the man, than the man into the power of the devil.

But against this is, that He is supremely just and supremely powerful: therefore He can do nothing except justly and powerfully. — Likewise, suppose that God had used power in the liberation of man; since the devil had no right in him, He would have done no injury to the devil.

**I respond:** It must be said to this, that the sentence of the condemning judge invaded both the devil and Adam; for each was punished, as is written in the third [chapter] of Genesis; but nevertheless it more befitted, according to the order of divine justice, that the man be subjugated, rather than the converse, on account of the fact that the man of his own accord subjected himself to him by consenting.

It must be said that in the aforesaid authority justice is not separated from power, such that the one would be without the other in the divine operation; but in this it is implied, that there is some work, in which justice is manifested by excellence; some, in which power is manifested by excellence; and God chose that mode, in which justice is manifested, so that He might give us a form to imitate. — To that which is asked, whether, if He had liberated by power, justice would have been there; it must be said that yes; but nevertheless it would not have been so manifest.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *The remission of sins, given through the blood of Christ, snatched [man] from the devil, so that thus the devil is conquered by justice, not by power.* For according to this it seems, that God could do something by justice and not by power, and conversely.

**I respond:** [Cf. above, Doubt I, at the end.]

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *It is read, that Christ was handed over by the Father, and that He handed Himself over.* For this seems false. For if God handed Him over to death, it seems, that the Jews killed Him by the authority of God: therefore God was a participant in that homicide. If you say, that He handed Him over, because He permitted Him to be killed; likewise it could be said of anyone, who is killed, since God permits anyone, who is killed, to be killed. — Likewise, he who can liberate another from being killed, and does not liberate, is said to kill him interpretatively: therefore since God the Father could have liberated the Son, that He not be killed; it seems, that at least interpretatively He must be said to have killed Him.

**I respond:** It must be said, that death is the privation of life, and this has a relation to the one inflicting [it], and to him who undergoes [it]. And according to this someone can hand another over to death in two ways: either because he brings it about, that others inflict death on him, or because he brings it about, that he himself undergoes death. Since therefore the undergoing of death was from God the Father and was from Christ, because God the Father willed, that He undergo death, and He of His own will underwent [it]; hence it is, that He is said to be handed over by the Father, He is also said to be handed over by Himself. Again, because Judas and the Jews procured, that others inflict death on Him; hence it is, that He is said to be handed over by Judas and by the Jews. And since the undergoing of death was praiseworthy, but the infliction was blameworthy; hence it is, that the handing over of God and of Christ is praised, [but] the handing over of Judas and of the Jews is blamed. And thus it is clear, that death on the part of the one undergoing it was pleasing and acceptable to God, but on the part of those inflicting it was only permitted. — And by this the response to the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that one who permits another to be killed, when he could prohibit [it], is a participant in homicide; it must be said, that this fails in [the case of] God, who can prohibit all sins, and does not prohibit [them]; for this pertains to the governance of His providence, as was shown in the first and in the second book.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *The acts of Judas and of the Jews [were] evil, by which they wrought the passion, which is a good.* For this seems to imply two opposites. For if an act receives its denomination from its terminus; and the passion of Christ was good: it seems therefore, that their acts were good. — Likewise, death and life are opposed; but the life and generation of Christ was good: therefore death and corruption was evil. — Likewise, along with this it is asked, whether it must be said without qualification, that the passion of Christ was good, or evil. For since it has an author good and evil, as was said above; there is no greater reason, why it should be denominated more from the one than from the other. — It is also asked, granted that the passion is good, whether it must be conceded, that the Jews wrought a good.

**I respond:** It must be said, that when we ask concerning the goodness of the passion, we are not asking concerning goodness or malice in the genus of nature, but in the genus of morals. Concerning this goodness, therefore, it is without doubt to be conceded, that the passion of Christ was without qualification good. For if precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saints, much more was the death of Christ most precious. — Now from a threefold cause the death of Christ must be called without qualification good: one is the strenuousness of virtue on the part of the one undergoing it. For He underwent that passion most virtuously, because most patiently and most constantly. — The second is the usefulness of the redemption on the part of the human race, because through it the whole human race was liberated. — The third is the honorableness of the cause of dying. For He died for the truth to be spoken; whence Pilate wrote over Him the cause: *Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews*. — But although the passion of Christ is good without qualification, nevertheless the action of the Jews was evil without qualification, because it proceeded from an evil will and root; nor on account of the goodness of the passion, which followed from it, is it to be called good; for this was beyond their intention, through the divine operation, by which God draws many goods out of many evils.

And by this the response to the objections is clear. For the first is clear, that there is no implication of incompossibles there, as has already been shown. — The second also is clear, that death and life are not opposed in the genus of morals, but in the genus of nature. — The third also is clear, why the passion of Christ is called good without qualification. For it is called a passion, as it is in the one suffering; and therefore the passion is rather called to be good, as it is from the good will of the one suffering, than evil, as it is from the evil will of the one inflicting.

To that which is asked last, whether it must be conceded, that the Jews wrought a good, it must be said, that there is the work as operating and there is the work as operated. When therefore it is asked, whether the Jews wrought a good; "good" can signify goodness with respect to the work as operating, or with respect to the work as operated. If with respect to the work as operating, it must be denied without qualification, because such a work in the Jews was without qualification evil. — If with respect to the work as operated, which indeed was the death and passion of Christ, this can be understood in two ways: either firstly and per se; and thus it is false, that the Jews wrought a good.

For that work as operated did not have goodness from the intention of the Jews. But if it is understood per accidens and consequently, thus it has truth. For the Jews wrought the passion of Christ, which indeed was the greatest good and most healthful to the whole world.

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