Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/21/q/bon-sent-III-d21-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the separation, made in death, by comparison to the bond of union.*
### Question I. *Whether in death the soul of Christ was separated from the Deity.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether in death the soul was separated from the Deity. And that it was, seems [to be the case]:

1. John the tenth: *I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again;* but to lay down the soul there is nothing other than to put it off: therefore if that saying belongs to the person of the Son of God, it seems that the Son of God put off the soul in death: therefore in death the soul was separated from the Word.

2. Likewise, union makes a communication of idioms; but in death the idioms of God were not communicated to the soul: therefore in death the union of the soul to the Deity did not remain.

3. Likewise, in death those things are divided which are joined together in nativity; but the Divinity was joined to the very soul of Christ in his conception and nativity in the womb: therefore it was separated from it in death.

4. Likewise, the Divinity could not be united to the soul without the soul itself enjoying and delighting in it; but in death the delight which it had in the Divinity itself was withdrawn from the soul: therefore it was separated altogether from the soul. The major proposition is manifest of itself; the minor is proved by that which is said in Matthew the twenty-sixth: *My soul is sorrowful even unto death;* the Gloss: «The delight of the eternal Divinity being withdrawn, it is afflicted by the weariness of human calamity»: therefore according to that Gloss the delight was withdrawn: therefore the union was dissolved.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine and the Damascene [say]: «Let him be anathema who says that the Word put off what it once assumed»: if therefore it assumed the soul, it never put off the soul.

2. Likewise, the Son of God is said to have descended to the lower regions after death; but it is established that this cannot be said according to the Divinity nor according to the flesh: therefore it must be said according to the soul: therefore after death the soul was united to him, therefore in death it was not separated.

3. Likewise, if the soul was separated in death from the Word; since it would not have the glory of fruition except through its union to the Divinity, then the soul of Christ ceased to be blessed; and if it ceased to be blessed, it was never blessed, since blessedness is a good which can never be lost: if therefore this is unfitting, the soul was not separated from the Divinity.

4. Likewise, if it was separated, [it was] either *willing* or *unwilling.* If *unwilling;* since it did not deserve this, an injury was done to it. If *willing;* but a man cannot will to be separated from God except unjustly: therefore that soul was unjust: since therefore this is false and impious, it remains etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The soul of Christ in death was not separated from the Word.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in death the soul was not separated from the Word. And the reason for this is: because it neither *befitted God,* nor *was expedient for us,* nor *was suitable for that soul.* — *It did not befit God,* because he had joined it to himself in indissoluble matrimony. Hence just as it is not fitting for a husband to abandon his wife, so it did not befit the Word of God to be separated from the soul. — *It was not expedient for us,* because, if a separation had been made, that soul would have had neither the *power* to rescue the captive race nor the *office of mediatrix* for reconciling; and neither was expedient for us, but rather the opposite of it. — Likewise it *was not suitable* for that *soul,* both because it was *most innocent* and also because it was *most blessed.* Because it was *most blessed,* it could not *will* to be separated from the Word; because it was *most innocent,* it could not *against its will* be separated from him. — And therefore it must be granted that in death the soul was not separated from the Word. For if anyone were to say the contrary, he would do injury to the *Deity* and to *us* and to the *soul of Christ,* and therefore he would deserve to be anathematized. And therefore the Damascene says this, that whoever shall have said this, let him be anathema. — Therefore the reasons which are on this side must be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that, as Augustine says, that saying belongs to the person of the Son of God by reason of the assumed flesh. And *if you object* that it does not belong to the flesh to lay down the soul, since it does not have *power* over it; it must be said that this is attributed to the flesh itself by reason of «the Deity remaining in it». Hence it must be observed that there is a *one who lays down,* and a *that from which he lays down*; the *one who lays down* is the divine power; the *that from which he lays down* is the assumed flesh. For Christ willed his soul to be separated not from himself, but from his flesh; and as has been said of the laying-down, so it must be understood of the resumption.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that union makes the idioms be communicated not to the *parts* of the unitable thing, but rather to the *thing's nature* itself, which names the whole nature, as in a supposit; hence the idioms of the Son of God are not communicated to the *soul* itself, but are communicated to the *man* himself; and since the soul is united to the Word as a *part* of the human nature, therefore the idioms need not be communicated to it.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that those things are divided in death which are joined together in nativity; it must be said that there is a *natural* conjunction and a *supernatural* conjunction. When therefore it is said that those things are divided in death which are joined together in nativity, this is understood of the *natural* union. But the union of the Divinity to the soul was not *natural,* but *supernatural;* and therefore that saying is not to be understood of this union.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the delight was withdrawn from the soul in death; it must be said that just as *light* can be darkened in two ways: either *in itself,* or *in its irradiation;* so too *delight* can be removed from the rational soul in two ways: either because it itself ceases to delight in itself, or because it ceases to overflow into the lower part. When therefore it is said that the delight of the Deity was withdrawn in death from the soul of Christ, this is not understood in the sense that his mind ceased to enjoy the Divinity, but that by dispensation the overflow into the sensible part was withdrawn and it was exposed to the most bitter passion. On account of which he cries out in the passion: *My God, my God! why hast thou forsaken me*? which is not understood [to mean] that he forsook [it] by dissolving the bond of union, but by exposing [it] to the torment of the passion.