Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/21/q/bon-sent-III-d21-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether in the death of Christ the Divinity was separated from the flesh.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in death the Divinity was separated from the flesh. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. When the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; but «the Word is united to the flesh by the mediation of the intellect», as Damascene says, and as was held above in the second distinction: if therefore in death the soul was separated from the flesh, it remains that the Divinity was separated from the same.

2. Likewise, when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyed; but the union of the flesh to the soul is by nature prior to the union of the flesh to the Divinity, because the first is *natural,* the second *gratuitous,* and nature is prior to grace: therefore, the union of the soul to the flesh being dissolved, the unity of the flesh to the Deity must necessarily be dissolved.

3. Likewise, the Divinity cannot be united to a nature insensible and irrational; but the flesh, after the separation of the soul, became insensible: therefore it does not seem to have been fit at that time to be united to the Divinity: it seems therefore that in death that union was dissolved which was of the Divinity to the assumed flesh.

4. Likewise, every union terminates at some one [thing]: if therefore the flesh was united to the Deity, then either this union made one in *nature,* or one in *person.* It did not [make one] in *nature*—this is established; nor in *person,* as it seems, because one cannot say that the Son was the person of the flesh: therefore it does not seem that by any kind of union the Divinity was united to the flesh in death.

**On the contrary:**
1. Leo the Pope: «So great is the union of God and man, that it could be sundered neither by punishment nor disjoined by death»; but to the integrity of human nature belongs not only the soul, but also the flesh: therefore in death the flesh was not separated from the Word. This same thing Augustine says against Felician, whose authority is had in the text [of the Master].

2. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason.* Christ is said to have lain in the sepulchre during the three days; but this is not said except by reason of the flesh conjoined [to him]: therefore during the three days the flesh was conjoined to the Divinity.

3. Likewise, whenever any two united things are separated, they are removed apart either according to *dissimilarity,* or according to *position;* but the flesh of Christ was not removed apart from the Word according to dissimilarity—for such a removal is [the removal] of sin—nor was it removed apart according to position, because the Word of God is everywhere: therefore in death the union of the Divinity to the flesh was not dissolved.

4. Likewise, nothing united to the flesh through the passion was separated from the flesh which would not suffer, the flesh suffering; but the Deity, the flesh suffering, did not suffer: therefore through the passion and death it was not separated from it.

### Conclusion.

> *In the death of Christ the Deity was not separated from the flesh.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in death the Deity was not separated from the flesh. And the reason for this is threefold, namely *liberality* on the part of the one assuming, *dignity* on the part of what is assumable, *utility* on the part of the assumption. — *Liberality,* I say, on the part of the one assuming, because, since God gives some gift, he does not withdraw it without fault; if therefore no fault intervened, it did not befit the divine liberality to separate from itself the flesh which it had liberally united to itself. — *Dignity* also on the part of what is assumable was a cause why this union ought not to be separated. For that flesh ought not to see corruption, according to that which is said in the Psalm: *Thou shalt not give thy Holy One to see corruption;* as therefore it never befitted that it be reduced to ashes, so it never befitted that it be separated from the Word. — *Utility* moreover on the part of the assumption made for this same [end]. For unto this was that union of the Divinity to human nature and of the flesh to the soul made, that our salvation might be procured. And since the separation of the flesh from the Divinity would in no way make for our salvation, for the reason that satisfaction cannot be made through it, since the Divinity cannot feel pain and punishment in its separation from the flesh; hence it is that it was not fitting for the flesh to be separated from the Divinity. Whence neither did the passion have any ordering to this. — Therefore the reasons brought forward to this side are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that when the middle is dissolved, the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this holds true of a middle of *necessity*, but not of a middle of *congruity;* now the soul was not a middle of necessity, but of congruity; moreover, it was a middle not only by reason of conjunction according to *act,* but also according to *habit.* And although the soul was not united to the flesh in death, yet it was unitable to it, and through this the flesh too was unitable to the Divinity.

2. To that which is objected, that when the prior is destroyed, the posterior is destroyed; it must be said that this is true where the posterior *depends essentially* on the prior; but where something precedes another as a *congruous disposition,* it need not hold true; and so it is in the case at hand. For the union of the Divinity to the flesh, or of the flesh to the Divinity, does not *depend essentially* or with a dependence of *necessity* upon the union of those two to one another, but if it presupposes it, this is a certain fittingness of *congruity.*

3. To that which is objected, that the Divinity cannot be united to an irrational and insensible nature; it must be said that, although the flesh of Christ then lacked both reason and sense, it nevertheless had an ordering to the soul, which has reason and sense in itself. And if you object that it does not suffice that something be possible for the union of a rational soul, in order that it be congruous to be united with the Divinity; it must be said that, without doubt, this would not have sufficed at the first beginning of the incarnation—indeed it befitted that the Divinity be united at once to the flesh and the soul as conjoined; but it is otherwise in the mystery of our redemption, which indeed had to be consummated through death; and by reason of this it was congruous that those things which before were very much conjoined should be no less congruously divided for a time, namely the flesh and the soul; and for that time the unitability to the soul well sufficed for the flesh itself, in place of a congruity rendering it fit for union with the nature of the Divinity.

4. To that which is objected, that the union terminates at some one [thing]; it must be said that this is true. For such a union terminates at one [thing] in person; for the flesh is united to the divine nature in the unity of the hypostasis and person of the Son of God. But it must be attended to, that the hypostasis is called *of the flesh* and the hypostasis *of the man* in different ways. For the hypostasis *of the man* is said not only in the *oblique,* but also in the *direct;* for there is a hypostasis which *is* the man. But the hypostasis *of the flesh* is understood in the *oblique,* not because it *was* flesh, but because it *had* flesh; whence it could be called the *flesh of the Word.* And this is what Damascene says: «If he died as a man, and that holy soul was divided from his body; the Divinity nevertheless remained inseparable from both, nor was the one hypostasis thus divided into two; for the body and the soul from the beginning had their subsistence in the hypostasis of the Word, and in death remained divided from one another, each of them however having the one hypostasis of the Word. For neither the body nor the soul had its own hypostasis apart from the hypostasis of the Word». And thus that [matter] is clear.

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