Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/21/q/bon-sent-III-d21-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the effect of that separation.*

Next it is asked about the effect of that separation. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible. Second, whether from that very separation the flesh was made dead. Third it is asked whether, on account of the death of the flesh, death is to be attributed to the very person of the Word.

### Question I. *Whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether after the instant of separation the soul of Christ was made impassible. And that it was, seems [to be the case].

1. The soul of Christ was not passible except on account of its union to the body: therefore at once, when it was separated, it lost passibility: therefore it was made impassible.

2. Likewise, nothing suffers except according to the order of nature, as a contrary suffers from a contrary; or according to the order of divine justice, as a sinner suffers affliction from someone; or according to the dispensation of divine mercy, as the Redeemer suffered for the healing of our disease; but in none of these ways could suffering be present in the soul of Christ after the separation — for it had no *contrary,* nor did it have *sin,* and the mystery of our redemption was *consummated,* as it is said in John, chapter nineteen: *It is consummated* — therefore in no way could it suffer: it remains, therefore, that it was at once made impassible.

3. Likewise, the souls of the Saints, when they have no guilt, are at once made impassible: therefore if the soul of Christ was much more swiftly worthy of all glorification than every other soul, it seems that it was at once made impassible.

4. Likewise, no suffering could be in Christ that was void of merit; but the soul of Christ at once after the separation lost the power or the state of meriting: therefore it at once lost the power of suffering: therefore it was at once made impassible.

**On the contrary:** 1. Just as passibility was in the soul of Christ apart from any debt of sin, so also in the flesh: therefore just as impassibility was swiftly conferred on the soul, so swiftly ought it to have been conferred on the body itself; but impassibility was not conferred on the body until the three days, in which he rose again: therefore likewise it seems that neither [was it conferred] on the soul before that time.

2. Likewise, let it be posited that the soul were again united to that body according to the state in which it deserted it; then it is argued thus: if the soul were united to a passible body, it would be passible; but the soul of Christ could be united to that body before glorification, because nothing impeded it: therefore it could still suffer: therefore it was not impassible.

3. Likewise, nothing new was conferred on the soul in the very instant of separation from the body: therefore if previously it did not have impassibility, it seems that neither did it then have it before the day of resurrection.

4. Likewise, a soul that has impassibility, at once when it withdraws from the body, flies away; but the soul of Christ did not at once fly away, nor did it at once ascend to the heavens, but it descended to the lower regions: therefore it was not at once after the instant of separation made impassible.

### Conclusion.

> It is highly probable that the soul of Christ was at once after the separation from the body made impassible.

**I respond:** It must be said that, from the certitude of authority, it is not entirely determined for us whether the soul of Christ was at once after the separation made impassible, as the Master touches upon above, in the eighteenth distinction. Hence, without peril to faith, anyone may hold either of these, namely either that it was made impassible at once after the separation, or in the very glorification of the body. Nevertheless it seems more consonant with the probability of reason that it had impassibility at once after the separation. For if the soul of Christ did not suffer except dispensatively and for our salvation; if there was now no time and place for meriting, then now the soul of Christ neither ought nor was able to suffer. — Hence not only concerning the soul of Christ is it probable that it was at once after the separation from the body made impassible, but also concerning any soul of a holy man in which the guilt of no sin is found. — Therefore the reasons that are for this side can be quite reasonably conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:** 1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that the body was not at once endowed with impassibility: it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold cause: first indeed, because the soul was nearer to glory than the flesh; for it was blessed according to some part of itself; second truly, because the delay of impassibility in the flesh served for the confirmation of our faith, namely so that it might be shown that Christ truly suffered and died; not so the delay of impassibility in the soul: therefore the impassibility of the body was more delayed than the impassibility of the soul, by divine dispensation.

2. To that which is objected, that that soul could again be united to a passible body; it must be said that certain souls are separated from the body by a definitive or final separation, while certain ones are separated from the body for a time on account of the manifestation of God's glory; as is the case in those who are raised again to the state of a past life, as was the case in Lazarus and in others miraculously raised up. Those that are separated in the first way enter a new state; those that are separated in the second way are, according to the divine disposition, still held back from their state. Hence the first, unless the guilt of sin stands in the way, are at once made impassible and are not unible to a passible body, although the second sometimes have to be conjoined [to it] through a divine miracle. And in the first way the soul of Christ was separated, since God had not decreed that it should be further united to passible flesh; and therefore that supposition is null. For it could not be united to passible flesh, not because anything created impeded it, but because divine justice would not permit it.

3. To that which is objected, that nothing was conferred on the soul; it must be said that this is not established, although it is not read; nor indeed does it compel [the conclusion]. For the soul of Christ, through that which it had from the separation alone from passible flesh, already lacked the aptitude for suffering, and thus was rendered impassible; nor is it necessary, on account of this, that anything new be conferred on it; for it sufficed well enough that the cause of suffering and of passibility be taken away from it.

4. To that which is objected, that the souls which are at once after separation made impassible at once fly away; it must be said that this holds true now after Christ's ascension, but before it did not hold true. For the flying-away of certain souls, namely of the holy Fathers, was deferred on account of the obligation of the first sin; but for the soul of Christ it was deferred on account of the instruction of men and the confirmation and rectification of our faith and the near glorification of the flesh.