Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/22/q/bon-sent-III-d22-a1-q1
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### Article, Single. *On the things that follow upon the death of Christ.*
### Question I. *Whether Christ in the three days was a man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ was a man in the three days. And that he was, it seems.

1. Augustine: «Such was that assumption, which would make God man and man God»; but the assumption remained unchanged in the three days, as was shown before: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, master Hugh of St. Victor: «What is more foolish than that a man should then cease to be, when he truly begins to be»! From this he argues thus: since therefore a holy man begins to be blessed, which is to be most truly, it is most foolish to say that he then ceases to be: therefore of any man whatever after death it is true to say that he is a man: therefore much more must this be conceded and said of Christ.

3. Likewise, everything having a human nature is a man; but Christ in the three days was having a human nature: therefore Christ in the three days was a man. The major and the minor are manifest of themselves.

4. Likewise, whenever soul and body are united into one hypostasis, they make a man; but in the three days soul and body were united into one hypostasis in Christ: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

5. Likewise, this is true: Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; therefore either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; but not insofar as he is God: therefore insofar as he is man: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

6. Likewise, Christ in the three days did not cease to be a priest: therefore Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man. The first is clear from what is said in the Psalm: *Thou art a priest forever;* and in Hebrews, the seventh chapter: *Christ has an everlasting priesthood.* The necessity of the inference is shown in this, that he was a priest insofar as he was man.

7. Likewise, Christ, on account of the assumption of a rational soul, was rational by a created rationality; but Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself: therefore Christ in the three days was rational by a created rationality: therefore he was an angel, or a soul, or a man. But he was not an angel, or a soul: therefore he was a man.

**On the contrary:** 1. «The dead man is diminished in respect to the account of man»: therefore whoever is a dead man is deficient from the complete account of man; but the complete is not predicated of the diminished: therefore if Christ in the three days was a dead man, this is false: Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, according to the natural philosopher, man is a composite of rational soul and flesh; but Christ in the three days was not a composite of rational soul and flesh: therefore Christ in the three days was not truly a man.

3. Likewise, no form is predicated of the whole because it is a form, but because it is a form following upon the whole composite: if therefore man is predicated of Christ, it is necessary that it name a form following upon the whole composite; but in Christ the composition was dissolved in the three days: therefore in the three days he could not be called a man. The major proposition is manifest by induction and by the authority of Avicenna, who posits it, and by the authority of Boethius, who says that «the species is the whole being of the individual».

4. Likewise, the higher essential thing being corrupted, the lower must of necessity be corrupted; but living-being is higher than being-a-man and is essential to it, because «to live is the being of the living thing»: therefore if Christ in the three days ceased to be living, Christ in the three days ceased to be a man: therefore Christ in the three days was not a man.

5. Likewise, Christ in the three days could neither see nor hear nor speak: therefore if he was a man, he was a blind, deaf, and mute man; but it is absurd to say this of Christ: therefore it is false to say that Christ in the three days was a man.

6. Likewise, just as the union of the divine nature and the human makes God to be man, so the union of soul to flesh makes [a thing] to be animate: therefore, the union of soul to flesh ceasing, the being-animate ceases; and if the being-animate ceases, the being-an-animal ceases; and if the being-an-animal ceases, of necessity the being-a-man ceases: therefore, from the first, since in Christ there was a separation of soul from flesh in the three days, Christ ceased to be a man in the three days: therefore he was not a man in the three days.

7. Likewise, to this same point are the reasons of the Master in the text, which are founded upon this: every man is either mortal or immortal, every man also is a man somewhere; but Christ in the three days was neither mortal nor immortal nor a man anywhere — because not in the tomb, since there was nothing there but the body; not in the underworld, since there was nothing there but the soul — therefore Christ was not a man in the three days.

### Conclusion.

> Christ in the three days was not a man, if we speak of predication simply actual.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold manner of speaking. — The first is that not only can Christ truly be called a man in the three days, but this can also be said of any dead man whatever. — The second manner of speaking is that this must not be conceded of others; it can nevertheless be conceded of Christ. — The third manner of speaking is that it must not be conceded of Christ nor of other men. And the first manner of speaking master Hugh of St. Victor held; the second manner the Master of the Sentences held; the third the common opinion of the Parisian doctors holds.

But if anyone should wish to consider diligently, each of the aforesaid manners has something of truth. For when this is predicated of this, it can be said in three ways: either according to actual being, or according to aptitudinal being, or partly according to actual being, partly according to aptitudinal. For the predicate either states the essence of the subject, or the act of the subject. Then predication is according to actual being when the subject is a being in act, and the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject and is its act; as, a man existing, it is said: man is an animal. — But predication is according to aptitudinal being when neither the subject is in act, nor the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject, but there is a necessary ordering of one to the other, founded upon the principles of nature; as, no rose existing, it is conceded that the rose is a flower. — But predication is partly according to aptitudinal being, partly according to actual being, when the supposit is in act, but the form of the predicate is not in it according to act, but according to a necessary ordering, founded upon the principles of nature.

When therefore it is asked whether Christ is a man in the three days; if we speak of predication according to aptitudinal being, it is true not only of him, but also of every dead man, because according to the truth of our faith and the science of theology, when a man dies, his principles remain, in which the ordering is preserved not only with respect to the form of man, but also of this man; otherwise there would not be a true resurrection. — But if we speak of predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal; thus it can be conceded of Christ that he was a man in the three days, because he was a person in act, although the form of humanity was preserved in the aptitude of the conjunction of soul and flesh; but this cannot be said of any other man. — But if we speak of predication simply actual, neither of Christ, nor of another man is it true to say that he is a man, so long as the soul is separated from the flesh. For nothing makes a man to be in act except the actual conjunction of soul with flesh.

If therefore these three manners of speaking are understood according to the three aforesaid modes of predication, thus in all of them truth is found, and there is no

contrariety among them; and Hugh of St. Victor thought truly, and the Master spoke truly, if they understood according to the modes assigned beforehand, and the common opinion holds truly. And by this the response can sufficiently be clear to all the reasons adduced for either side.

Nevertheless, if we wish to consider further the words of Hugh, we find that he held that Christ was a man in the three days, and any other dead man whatever, not only as to aptitudinal being, but also as to actual being. For he posited that after death the being of man is preserved; and that the separated soul is a person; and that again much more ought the soul to be called man than the body, if usage admitted this. Hence he argues in this manner: since man is composed of soul and body, yet on account of the one part, which is body, the man is called body, much more therefore on account of that part, which is soul, ought he to be called soul. — And in this saying master Hugh is not commonly upheld. For neither is the separated soul a person, as was shown above; nor is a man his soul; nor is he more truly a man when he dies than when he lives, as to the being of nature, though perhaps the being of grace can be increased in him; nor is the body, insofar as it is an integral part of man, predicated of man: and therefore not without cause does the common opinion not approve the opinion of master Hugh in this part.

But the Master of the Sentences not only wished to say that Christ in the three days was a man by a predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal, but rather truly and actually. And some wish to impute to him that he said this because he was of the third opinion, which said that Christ was man according to habit. Hence he wished to say that he was a man in act, because he actually had a human nature. — But this must not be imputed to the Master, because it is an error, as was shown in what precedes; nor can it be expressly gathered from the words of the Master, but for another reason he said this. For he understood that in Christ there were two unions, and truly so, namely the union of soul to flesh, and the union of the divine nature and the human. And the union of the divine nature and the human made Christ to be man, according to that which Augustine says: «Such was that assumption, that it would make God man». But the union of soul to flesh made that man to live. Since therefore in the three days the union of the Divinity to the humanity remained, and the union of soul to flesh was dissolved; hence it is that the Master posited that Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man, but ceased to live; therefore it is true according to him to say of Christ that he was a man in the three days, and that he was a dead man, although it cannot be said of any other. — And in this also the Master failed, because for someone to be a man there is necessarily prerequired and co-required the union of soul to flesh, since man names the form of the whole, or that which follows upon the whole composite. Hence in no way would that assumption have made God man and man God, unless God had assumed body and soul, as joined to one another. — And on account of this the position of the Master is not commonly upheld in this part, nor the position of master Hugh either, not because the aforesaid expression: Christ in the three days was a man, is in every way false, but because it has falsity in being understood of predication according to actual being, according to which predication the inquiry turns concerning the aforesaid expression; and in this way master Hugh and the Master of the Sentences and the common opinion of the masters seem to have treated it, and according to this mode the present inquiry runs. — Therefore the reasons showing the aforesaid expression to be false are to be conceded; for they proceed according to this way.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that such was that assumption etc.; it must be said that this was so, not because he assumed body and soul only, but also because he assumed body and soul united; and therefore he ceased to be a man, not because the union of the Divinity to the flesh was changed, but because the union of soul and flesh to one another was dissolved.

2. To that authority of Hugh, by which it is said that no one ceases to be when he more truly begins to be; it must be said that nothing prevents the truth of moral being from being increased with the diminution of the truth of natural being; as we see that in the weakening of natural power moral virtue is frequently strengthened. And therefore it does not follow that, if a man begins to be blessed according to the soul, on account of this he does not cease to be a man.

3. To that which is objected, that what has a human nature is a man; it must be said that by the name of human nature are sometimes understood the principles constituting man; sometimes is understood the completive form of man, which gives to the supposit itself the complement and operation due to that species, according to that which Boethius says: «Nature is the specific difference informing each single thing». If therefore nature be taken in the first way, the expression is false; if in the second way, the expression is true; but in this way Christ did not have a human nature in the three days: and therefore it does not follow that he was a man.

4. To that which is objected, that when soul and body are united into the same hypostasis, they make a man; it must be said that for soul and body to be united into the same hypostasis can be twofold: either thus, that that hypostasis be constituted out of them, and thus such a hypostasis as is here and now; and in this way they cannot be united into the same hypostasis without being united to one another, and thereby without making a man. In another way they can be united into the same hypostasis, yet so that that hypostasis is not constituted out of them, but rather is united to them even when they are locally separated; and in this way to be united into the same hypostasis does not necessarily make a man, because there is not there a union through the constitution of a third nature, such as is the union of matter and form, such as is also required for the being of man. And because in this way soul and body were united in Christ in the three days, not in the manner set forth before; therefore it does not follow that Christ in the three days was a man.

5. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; it must be said that such an expression is true by synecdoche. For Christ is said to have lain in the tomb because a part of his humanity lay in the tomb. Hence he lay there neither insofar as he is man nor insofar as he is God, but according to something of man. As therefore it does not follow: Peter is in the grave, therefore Peter is a man; so also it must be understood in the matter at hand.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ was a priest forever; it must be said that the priesthood of Christ is said to have been everlasting, not because he was always a priest in act, but because no other succeeded to that priesthood.

7. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself, therefore he was rational; it must be said that this does not follow, unless it be understood by synecdoche, inasmuch as the idioms of the parts of man are not communicated to the hypostasis of the Word except through the mediation of the whole conjoined [nature], by a proper communication. And since Christ then was not a man, therefore he could not be called white by reason of the body, nor rational by reason of the soul, except by synecdoche, namely that he had a white body and a reasoning soul. As to what it says, then: that he has a rational soul united to himself, [therefore he] is rational; it must be said that this has truth, if it be understood of the union which is of form to matter; but in this way the soul of Christ was not united to Christ in the three days. Hence it does not follow that he was a man in the three days.