Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On faith taken simply, or formed faith.*
### Question I. *Whether faith is a virtue.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether faith is a virtue; and we are speaking here of the faith by which one believes *in God*. And that it is, is shown.

1. That which is the principle of our salvation has the character of a virtue; but faith is of this kind, according to what is often said in the Gospel: *Thy faith hath made thee whole:* therefore faith is a virtue.

2. Likewise, that which is the principle of the purification of the heart has the character of a virtue — for just as the heart is defiled only through vice, so it is purified only through virtue — but faith is the principle of the purification of the heart, according to what is said in the fifteenth of Acts: *Purifying their hearts by faith:* therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every habit which is the principle of divine acceptance has the character of a virtue, especially when it regards a determinate kind of work; but faith is of this kind, according to what is said to the Hebrews, the eleventh: *Without faith it is impossible to please God:* therefore faith contains in itself the full and perfect character of a virtue.

4. Likewise, that which has a direct contrariety to vice and sin is a virtue; but faith is of this kind, since it is directly opposed to heresy and infidelity, which are vices and sins: therefore faith is a virtue properly so called; and this very thing can be proved expressly by the authority of Augustine in the text.

**On the contrary:** 1. «In the same genus are the extremes and the mean», inasmuch as the mean participates in the nature of the extremes; but faith is a mean between opinion and knowledge, as master Hugh says in the book *On the Sacraments*, where he says that «faith is a certitude concerning absent things, set above opinion and below knowledge»: if therefore neither opinion nor knowledge is in the genus of virtue, it necessarily seems to follow that faith too is not contained in the genus of virtue.

2. Likewise, «habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects»; but in this is virtue distinguished from knowledge according to the Philosopher, that «virtue is directed to the good, and knowledge to the true»; but faith is directed to the true under the character of the true: therefore faith is not in the genus of virtue, but rather in the genus of knowledge. And that faith is directed to the true under the character of the true is plain, since it belongs to faith to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things.

3. Likewise, it is blameworthy for a man having the use of reason *to will* something without reason; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will be blameworthy for him *to believe* without reason; but the faith by which we believe in God does not inquire after reason: therefore such faith is blameworthy. But nothing that is blameworthy has the character of a virtue: therefore where there is faith, there cannot be virtue in us.

4. Likewise, the more rational an act is, the nearer it is to virtue; therefore to believe by a compelling reason pertains more to virtue than to believe without reason: if therefore the credulity which one has by the force of reason is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue, much more does it seem that faith itself, which does not follow reason nor rest upon reason, lacks the perfection of virtue.

### Conclusion.

> Faith, by which we believe in God, is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt faith itself, by which we believe in God, is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues, as Bernard says of prudence to Eugenius. — It is indeed a virtue, since in it consists the rectitude of life according to the rule of justice. For it is just that our intellect should be thus held captive and subjected to the highest Truth, just as our affect ought to be subjected to the highest Goodness; nor can the soul be right unless the intellect assents to the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, and the affect cleaves to the highest Goodness. But one does not have this rectitude unwillingly, but *willingly*. For no one believes God more than himself, except through this, that he wills to hold his intellect captive *in obedience to Christ*. If therefore the captivity of the intellect in obedience to the highest Truth pertains to the rectitude of life, the will, by which one wills thus to hold himself captive, is a right will, and the habit by means of which one is made ready and helped to this makes for the rectitude of the will. — If therefore *justice* is nothing other than «rectitude of will»; and faith is nothing other than a habit by which our intellect is voluntarily held captive in obedience to Christ: it remains that the habit of faith pertains to the rectitude of life according to the rule of justice; and therefore it has in itself the character of a virtue truly and properly.

Nor does it only have in itself the character of a virtue truly, but also of the charioteer of all the virtues whatsoever, both the theological, namely, and the cardinal. For without faith there is no knowledge of the highest and true Good; and without the knowledge of the highest and true Good there can be no *expectation and love* of the true Good. For knowledge is the forerunner and directs the affect to expecting and desiring; and so faith necessarily precedes hope and charity as their rule and charioteer. *Again*, without the knowledge of the highest Good there can be no right intention — this alone is done with a right intention, which is done for the glory and honor of God — and without a right intention no act of virtue proceeds rightly. Since therefore the habit of faith is that by means of which the highest Good is acknowledged by our minds; hence it is that «faith directs our intention», and through this it is the rule of every good operation and of every meritorious virtue. And therefore it ought to be called not only a gratuitous virtue, but also the rule and charioteer of the gratuitous virtues. — And the authorities and reasons which are on this side are to be granted.

1. To that, however, which is first objected on the contrary, that faith holds the mean between knowledge and opinion; it must be said that faith is assigned as a kind of mean between knowledge and opinion by Hugh, not because it is composed of those two, as a mean is composed of extremes, but because it holds the middle place as to the degree of certitude; for it is more certain than opinion, and less than knowledge, as will be seen below: but concerning this mean it is not

necessary that it be in the same proximate genus with the extremes. — It could also be said that this has no necessity in matters of conduct, inasmuch as the mean is found in the genus of virtue, and the extremes are in the genus of vices.

2. To that which is objected, that knowledge is distinguished in this from virtue, that it is directed to the true, and virtue to the good; it can be said that the Philosopher is speaking there of *habitual* virtue, which is concerned with actions and passions, of which he says that «virtue is operative in the passions and operations of the best men»; and virtue of this kind orders us in those things which are for the end. But of intellectual virtue, of which kind are wisdom and understanding, which order us to the end itself, it does not hold true; and in this way faith is a virtue, not in the way set forth before. — But this manner of speaking seems to be open to challenge in this, that not only of habitual virtue, but also of every other virtue under the character of virtue, this difference seems able to be assigned with respect to knowledge.

And therefore it must be said that the object of faith is true in one way, the object of knowledge in another: the object of knowledge, I say, is such because it is the true seen; but the object of faith is such because it is the true — the true, I say, not seen, but salvific. For because it is not seen, another habit is required for knowing it than is the habit of knowledge; because it is salvific, therefore that habit orders us to salvation and to the blessed life, and therefore it has the complete character of a virtue. And thus it is plain that nothing prevents faith from being able to be directed to the true, and yet nonetheless to be a virtue, inasmuch as it is directed to the true in another way than knowledge, according to the twofold condition assigned beforehand. For it is directed to the truth not seen and the salvific truth. For because it is not seen, it is believed voluntarily; but because it is not only not seen, but also salvific, it is believed voluntarily and meritoriously, which two things are foreign to the speculation of knowledge. Hence the truth to which faith is directed is a truth *according to godliness*, which indeed is known to Catholics, but was unknown to the philosophers.

3. To that which is objected, that to believe without reason is blameworthy; it must be said that this is true where authority does not supply the place of reason. But where authority supplies the place of reason, it is not blameworthy, but highly commendable. And so it is in faith, since, even if there is not present to the intellect of the believer himself the reason on account of which he ought to assent to the truth, there is nevertheless present the authority of the highest Truth, which persuades his heart; and we know that this highest Truth cannot lie, and therefore it is impious not to believe it. Therefore this does not take away, but rather confers upon faith that it is a virtue.

4. To that which is objected, that the more rational something is, the more it agrees with perfect virtue; it must be said that a thing is called rational in two ways: either because it is consonant with reason elevated and illumined by the light of the supernal Truth, or because it is consonant with reason turned toward sensible knowledge. If it be called rational in the first way, there is no counter-instance. If it be called rational in the second way, it is false, since frequently reason turned toward sensible things judges to be true things which are false, and to be good things which are evil, and conversely. Hence many things seem to it irrational which are highly rational, as is plain: for many things seem irrational to philosophers which nonetheless seem highly rational to Christians, such as to be entirely continent and to beg entirely and the like. And as much as the judgment of a man surpasses the judgment of a boy, so much does the judgment of a Christian man surpass the judgment of a single philosopher, and the judgment of reason turned upward the judgment of reason pressed down to lower things. And therefore this does not prevent faith from being a virtue, because it believes certain things which seem to be irrational to the animal man — for they are rational to the spiritual man — nay, this makes for the character of virtue, that it believes without reason. For if it believed by a compelling reason, that credulity would not be voluntary, but necessary, and so would not be virtuous nor meritorious; as will be better made clear below.