Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether faith is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul. And that it is in the cognitive part is shown thus:

1. *First*, through Augustine, who defines belief thus in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "To believe is to think with assent." To that power, therefore, belief pertains, to which thinking pertains; but thinking belongs to the cognitive power: therefore so too believing. If, then, faith—whose act is believing—is in that power, it seems that faith is in the cognitive part of the soul.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter ten: *Faith comes from hearing;* and there Gregory says: "It gives understanding, while it illumines the mind from the things heard." If, then, faith comes through hearing, and faith illumines the mind, and both hearing and being illumined pertain to the cognitive part of the soul, it seems that faith is in the cognitive part of the soul.

3. Likewise, the reformation of the image takes place through the three theological virtues; but the image consists not only in the affective power, but also in the cognitive power: therefore it is necessary that some theological virtue reform the cognitive power. But there is no other to assign except faith; if, then, the virtue is in that power which it reforms, it seems that faith is in the cognitive power.

4. Likewise, in the same power are the gratuitous virtue and the gift succeeding it in glory; but vision, which succeeds faith, is in the cognitive power, as is manifest: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, virtue is, as in its subject, in that power about whose act it unfolds difficulty—for a habit is placed in that power for whose work it makes apt—if, then, through faith the *intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ*, then faith forwards the act of the intellective power itself: it is therefore in it as in its subject.

**On the contrary:** 1. Tullius, in defining virtue, says that "virtue is a *voluntary* habit": therefore if faith is a virtue, it is a voluntary habit; but a voluntary habit is in the will as in its subject: therefore so too faith.

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On the Morals of the Church*, in defining virtue says that "virtue is nothing other than ordered love": therefore if every virtue is love, speaking essentially, every virtue is in that power whose office is to love; but this belongs to the affective, not the cognitive, power: therefore every virtue is in the affective power.

3. Likewise, Master Hugh in the book *On the Sacraments* says that "in the affection of faith its substance is found"; but the virtue is in that power as in its proper subject, in which its substance is found: if, then, this is the affective power, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, in no power is there the virtue of faith that can be compelled, because, as Augustine says, "while a man can do other things unwilling, he cannot believe except willing"; but the cognitive power can be compelled: therefore faith cannot be in the cognitive power; and it is either in the cognitive or in the affective power: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, virtue is, as in its subject, in that power which is the principle of the act and operation owed to that virtue; but no one assents to an unseen truth except because he wills it: therefore if the principle of the act of believing takes its origin from the will, it is necessary that faith be in it as in its proper subject. If you say that it is at once in intellect and in affection, against this is that one simple habit cannot be in two powers; but the cognitive and the affective are diverse powers, as was shown above in the second book: therefore if faith is one habit, it cannot be at once and at the same time in those two powers. And again, by this the question is not resolved, because there still remains the question in which of those powers it is first and principally, since whichever of these be granted, the reasons that are for the opposite part seem to stand in the way.

### Conclusion.

> Faith, as it is a virtue and a principle of merit, is in free choice as its subject; as it is a habit, it regards in one way the speculative intellect, in another way the extended or practical intellect, and the affection itself and its act.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that on this point different men have thought differently. For some wished to say that faith is in the cognitive power and in the speculative intellect, insofar as it is speculative. — And their reason is this: that the speculative intellect is said to be that which tends toward the true under the aspect of the true; but faith makes the intellect believe the articles, not because they are good, but because they are true; for thus one believes the damnation of the wicked just as the glorification of the good. And again, charity and faith are distinguished in their object as regards the aspect of the motive; and since charity tends toward God under the aspect of the good, it is necessary that faith tend toward God under the aspect of the true; whence it assents to the highest Truth, not because of its goodness, but because of its truth. Since, then, the speculative intellect regards the true under the aspect of the true, hence it is that they said faith is in the speculative intellect, insofar as it is speculative. — Nor do the words of the philosophers stand against this, since they understood nothing about the virtue of faith.

To others, however, it seems it must be said otherwise, namely that faith is in the practical intellect. For the practical intellect is said to be the extended intellect, according to what the Philosopher holds, that "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension." But it happens that the intellect is extended in three ways: either by the conjunction of itself with an affection by which it is inclined; or by the conjunction of itself with an affection toward which it inclines; or by the conjunction of itself with an operation which it directs and regulates. — But in all these ways it happens that faith is placed in the extended or practical intellect according to the various states of faith itself. For faith simply so called, whether it be unformed or formed, which makes a man believe God in those things which he does not see, is in the intellect itself, insofar as it is inclined by the will itself; for he would not believe unless he willed. — But formed faith, by which one believes in God, is in the intellect itself, insofar as it inclines the affection. For in order that someone believe in God through formed faith, it is necessary that he tend toward Him by loving, according to what is held in the text. — But perfect faith, of which the Apostle says that it is one working through love, is indeed in the intellect itself, insofar as, by the mediation of the affection, it directs the work. And thus it is plain that, according to these, faith is in the practical or extended intellect according to the diverse states of faith itself, whether the practical intellect be spoken of commonly,

or properly, or more properly, according as it has to be extended more and more. — But the reason which moves them to posit this is not only the word of the Philosopher, who says that the virtues are in the practical intelligence, but also right reason itself, which says that virtue cannot be anything but a voluntary habit, since praise and merit consist about it; and therefore it is impossible that the virtue of faith be in the intellect, except insofar as the intellect is joined to the affection. But the intellect joined to and intermingled with the affection is said to be the extended intellect or the practical intellect; and therefore these men said that faith is in the practical intellect.

There still remains a third manner of speaking, namely that faith is neither wholly in the cognitive power nor wholly in the affective power, but in one way in this, in another way in that. And this is what Master Hugh of Saint Victor says in the book *On the Sacraments*: "There are two things," he says, "in which faith consists, namely cognition and affection. In the affection indeed the substance of faith is found, but in the cognition its matter." — But the reason which moves toward positing this is that the act of the will is essential to faith itself; for it would never be virtuous to believe, unless it were voluntary. Whence Augustine too says that "virtue is nothing other than ordered love." If, then, faith is a virtue, it regards the act of the will as essential to it: therefore it must also essentially consist about it. Again, since cognition and illumination are essential to faith, by which the intellect is directed into the highest Truth and subjected to it, therefore faith essentially regards the act of reason. And for that reason those who are of this position say that faith is not only in the reason, but also in the will, since it regards both acts essentially. But because the act of reason in respect of the act of the will is material, since reason is inclined by the will, therefore they also said that in the reason the matter of faith is found, but in the affection its substance.

But all these manners of speaking took their principle from great clerics, and each of them has a sufficiently reasonable foundation. And if one understands rightly, he will find that each of them has something of the truth. But that this may become plainer, we must ascend higher to see the subject of *virtue in general;* which indeed we can behold quite plainly, certain things being presupposed. — For virtue is that according to which praise and merit consist, just as fault is that according to which blame and demerit are reckoned. Virtue is also a habit rendering a power apt in respect of some act. If, then, virtue is the principle of praise and merit, it is necessary that it be placed in that power of the soul which is the first principle of a praiseworthy and meritorious work. For if it were placed in a lower power, then the virtue of a natural power would command the gratuitous virtue. If, then, free choice is the principle of merit and demerit, it is necessary that every virtue be placed in free choice. Again, since a habit is in that power about whose act it unfolds difficulty, and virtue is a habit, it is necessary that it be found in that power as in its subject, which it makes apt for the work. Since, then, certain virtues unfold acts of the rational, certain acts of the concupiscible, certain acts of the irascible, therefore some must be placed in the rational, some in the concupiscible, some in the irascible.

These things presupposed, it is easy to see what is the subject of faith. For if faith is a virtue, about which praise and merit consist, it is necessary that it be placed in free choice. Again, if faith is a habit, by which the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ and leans upon the first Truth for its own sake; and in this way the intellect is said to be in a certain way speculative: it is necessary that the habit of faith be in a certain way in the intellect, insofar as it has the character of the speculative. — And since the intellect is not made apt to assent to that first Truth according to its own judgment, but according to the command of the will, therefore faith does not regard the intellect as purely speculative, but it is necessary that it be in the intellect itself, insofar as it is in a certain way extended and inclined by the affection. — Again, since the very willing to believe is essential to faith itself, hence it is that that habit regards not only the intellect, as it contemplates the highest Truth, nor only as it is inclined by the affection, but also the affection itself.

From these things it is plain that there is no contradiction among the aforesaid positions, if one understands rightly, but rather from them all there is gathered, as it were, one integral truth: namely that faith, as it is a virtue and a principle of merit, regards free choice as its subject; insofar as it is a habit, it regards in one way the speculative intellect and its act, which is to believe the true because it is true; in one way the extended intellect

and its act, which is to believe voluntarily, or by believing to tend toward God; in one way the affection itself and its act, which is to will to assent to that which reason of itself cannot attain.

If you should object that these cannot stand together, because, since faith is a simple habit, and one simple habit is in one power as in its subject, it does not seem that it can regard all those powers as one subject; to this it must be said that nothing prevents saying that one and the same virtue is at once in free choice and in reason and in will: because, as was shown in the second book, free choice does not denote a power distinct from reason and will in reality and essence, but rather, according to what blessed Augustine holds, free choice embraces three powers, namely the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational. And therefore it is no impropriety that each virtue, which is placed in each of those powers as a habit, be placed in free choice as a virtue and a principle of merit. — Similarly there is no impropriety in positing that one habit is in reason and will, in such a way that it regards one of those powers as regards the material act, the other as regards the formal act; just as it is plain that the habit of knowledge in one respect regards memory, namely as regards the retention of the species, and in one respect the understanding, namely as regards the ease of turning; and yet it is called one simple habit. For although the powers are distinct, nevertheless they have to be continued in one subject, by reason of which there can be in them a unity of property, just as one health is posited to be in the many members of the body interiorly, and one comeliness in the many exteriorly.

From these things can be elicited and held generally what is the subject of any virtue, and what is also the subject of any vice or sin. There can also be had the determination of the proposed question, namely what is the subject of faith. For although, insofar as it is a meritorious virtue, it must be said to be in free choice, yet insofar as it is a habit rendering the power apt, it must be placed in a certain way in the cognitive power, as the reasons for the first part show: since to faith it pertains to think, to faith it pertains to illumine and to reform the reason and to take the intellect captive, and to faith too there succeeds vision; all of which regard cognition. Therefore the reasons brought forward for that part are to be conceded.

Nor do the reasons for the opposite stand against them: since although faith regards the act of the cognitive power, yet it does not regard it altogether purely, but insofar as it has an accompanying and in a certain way presiding affection. And therefore it is also necessary to posit that faith is in a certain way in the affection, as Master Hugh of Saint Victor says; and this because it is a voluntary habit and ordered love, and such is the nature of its act that to it no one can be compelled unwilling. And therefore the reasons which are for the following part can be conceded.

But that the reasons do not stand against one another, but both conclude the truth, can be seen quite clearly, if one can grasp that to the being of the virtue of faith there concur at once the act of reason and of the will, which the Apostle well intimates in the very description of faith, when he says that faith is *the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,* touching what is in it of cognition, and what is of affection. For faith would never be a virtue, however much it illumined the intellect, unless it also in a certain way rectified the will; as is plain in the gift of prophecy: for it illumines the intellect toward the same things toward which faith illumines, and yet it is not posited to be a virtue, since in that illumination the will does not cooperate, in the way it cooperates in the assent and act of faith. — From these things can become plain the things that were objected and the like, which can be objected concerning this.