Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether faith is one virtue.*

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is one virtue. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. To the *Ephesians*, chapter four, it is said: *One God, one faith, and one baptism;* but baptism has unity according to species, and indeed it is the Sacrament of faith: therefore it seems much more strongly that faith itself does too.

2. Likewise, first to the *Corinthians*, chapter thirteen: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three;* but hope and charity have unity according to species: therefore faith does too.

3. Likewise, faith assents to nothing except on account of the highest Truth; and the highest Truth is only one: therefore the ground of believing is one. But a habit is diversified according to form and species on the side of the motive and inclining ground: if therefore the ground of believing is one, it is necessary that the virtue of faith, by which one believes, be one in species.

4. Likewise, one who believes God is not judged to be faithful unless he believes in all the articles; but faith-the-virtue makes each one to be faithful: therefore there is no true faith-the-virtue unless through it all things believable are believed and gathered into one. But they would not be gathered into one through faith unless faith were one virtue: therefore it is necessary that faith be one with respect to all things believable.

5. Likewise, there is not, according to species, another obedience by which I obey God in the commandments of the first table and in the commandments of the second, although the commandments of the first table order [us] to God, while the commandments of the second order [us] to the neighbor: therefore by parity of reasoning there will not be another faith by which one assents to the first Truth in the articles regarding the Divinity and in the articles regarding the humanity. And there is nothing else to be given according to which faith is multiplied and diversified: therefore it is necessary that the virtue of faith be one according to species.

**On the contrary:** 1. « Habits are diversified through acts, and acts through objects »; but the object of faith is not only uncreated truth, as that God is three and one, but also created truth, as that Christ was born and suffered: if therefore the created and the uncreated have nothing in common, but rather differ essentially and formally; it is necessary to hold that the faith by which we believe the Divinity, and the faith by which we believe the humanity, are one and another according to species.

2. Likewise, just as the *will* is related to things willed, and *knowledge* to things knowable, so is *faith* related to things believable; but wills are diversified and numbered according to the diversity of things willed, likewise *forms of knowledge* according to the diversity of things knowable: it seems therefore by like reasoning that faith must be diversified according to the diversity of things believable; and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, the gift of *wisdom* and [the gift] of *knowledge* are diverse gifts, and this for no other reason than that the one is about eternal things, and the other is about temporal things: if therefore faith is about these and about those, it seems that it too must be formally diversified.

4. Likewise, *fear* and *hope* are formally differing affections, and this because fear is about future evils, but hope about future goods; but faith is not only about future goods, as about eternal glory, but also about future evils, as about eternal punishment: therefore it seems that faith too must be formally diversified about these and about those.

5. Likewise, no virtue has the full character of a virtue unless a right intention with respect to the end accompanies it; but « it is faith that directs the intention »: therefore it is necessary that faith range over all the virtues as regards their ends: therefore if a virtue that ranges over all the virtues is not a special virtue, but a virtue general to all; it seems that from this it can be gathered that faith is not one virtue according to species.

### Conclusion.

> Faith, whether it be in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one virtue according to species, although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith, whether in the same [subject] or in diverse [subjects], is one according to species, because it is not divided into species, although in diverse [subjects] it is diversified according to number. — And the reason for this is that the unity of a virtue is regarded according to the unity of its principal act; and the unity of the principal act is regarded according to the unity of the first object; and since the first object of faith is one: hence it is that the virtue of faith must necessarily be one. — But this becomes plainer through an example in something similar. For as we see in the habit of seeing, that the visive power has an object *per accidens*, as we are said to see a horse and a man; it has also an object *per se*, as we are said to see white and black; it has also an object not only *per se*, but even *primarily*, as we are said to see the luminous — and although the object *per accidens*, that is, the material object of sight itself, is diversified in species, as a horse differs in species from a man, and even the object *per se* differs in species, as white differs in species from black; nevertheless the habit of seeing is not diversified according to species, because the character of the first object, namely the character of luminosity itself, is one in every visible thing — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, although faith has many objects *per accidens*, as all the things that follow upon the articles, and also many objects *per se*, as the articles themselves, many and distinct; nevertheless, because the ground of believing is one in all of them, namely the highest Truth itself, on which faith itself relies for its own sake and above all: therefore faith itself is one in species, however great a difference is found among things believable. — And there is a parallel: if I were to believe some truthful man, because he is truthful, with the same credence by which I would believe him to be truthful, I would believe all the things he says to be true, however he might speak about diverse matters. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — And therefore the arguments showing that faith has unity according to species are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected first, that acts are diversified through objects; the response is already clear, since this is not understood of just any object, but of the object that is an object *per se* and *primarily*, which indeed has not only the character of the material, but also the character of the active and the motive; in this way, however, there is no object of faith except the highest Truth itself, as will appear better below, when the object of faith is inquired into.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is related to things believable just as the will to things willed, and knowledge to things knowable; it must be said that it is not alike, since knowledge in diverse knowable things beholds diverse grounds and diverse media, through which it knows them: likewise the will in diverse things willed beholds diverse desirable things, on account of which it desires them. Therefore both the will and knowledge are diversified in respect of those things which they desire and know. But faith beholds a single ground, according to which it believes all things believable. And therefore on account of the diversity of things believable it need not be diversified.

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom and [the gift] of knowledge are diversified; it must be said that it is not alike: because wisdom is occupied about eternal things according to eternal grounds, and knowledge about temporal things according to temporal grounds; and therefore they are diversified, because they are occupied according to other and other grounds. But faith is not so; rather, it is concerned both with created and with uncreated things according to the dictate of eternal Truth; and therefore it does not have to be diversified in this way.

4. To that which is objected, that fear and hope are diversified, because they are about goods and evils; it must be said that it is not alike: because fear regards evil, as evil, and hope [regards] good, as good, and thus according to diverse grounds. But faith does not consider good and evil except insofar as they fall under the dictate of Truth, and thus under one ground. For it believes that the wicked are punished just as that the good are rewarded; for the one is true just as the other, and Truth dictates the one just as the other.

5. To that which is objected, that faith directs all the virtues; it must be said that from this it does not follow that faith is a general virtue, because it happens that the virtues encompass one another, and the object of one virtue can well be the material [object] of another virtue, and yet they are distinct from one another, because they are distinguished in respect of their proper objects, which have not only the character of the material, but also the character of the motive. For the material object brings about neither agreement in species nor difference. — And on account of this it does not follow that faith is common to the other virtues, because it regards their objects and ends. For it regards those only by way of matter, about which it is concerned; yet it has its proper and first object distinct from the other virtues, and according to the unity of this object it is to be held that faith is one according to species, as was shown in what precedes.