Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether faith is more certain than knowledge.*

Fourthly it is asked whether faith is more certain than knowledge. And that it is so, seems [to follow].

1. Augustine: « Nothing is more certain to a man than his faith »: therefore it seems that faith has a greater, or at least an equal, certainty than knowledge.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher: « Virtue is more certain than every art »; but faith is placed in the genus of virtue, while knowledge and art are of the same genus: therefore there is greater certainty in faith than there is in the habit of knowledge.

3. Likewise, that is known more certainly which is known in the light of the first Truth, than what is known in the light of created truth; but what is known by faith is known in the light of the first Truth, while what [is known] by knowledge is known in the light of created truth: therefore the certainty of faith is greater than that of knowledge.

4. Likewise, that is more certain in which error does not fall, than that about which it is possible to err; but error is not mingled with faith, whereas many errors are mingled with the cognition of the philosophers: therefore the certainty of faith is greater than the certainty of any philosophical knowledge.

5. Likewise, the more certain knowledge has a more certain foundation; but the nobler and more perfect any knowledge is, the more certain it is; but the knowledge of theology is altogether the highest and noblest knowledge: therefore it is most certain. If therefore faith is the foundation of the whole of theological knowledge, it is necessary that it be most certain: therefore there is in it a greater certainty than in any other knowledge.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hugh of Saint Victor: « Faith is a certain certitude of the mind concerning absent things, constituted above opinion and below knowledge »: therefore there is less certainty in faith itself than in the habit of knowledge.

2. Likewise, that is known more certainly about which one cannot doubt, than that about which one can doubt; but what one knows by scientific cognition, one knows in such a way that one cannot doubt about it; whereas one who knows something by the cognition of faith can doubt about it, as is plain: therefore the certainty of knowledge is greater than that of faith.

3. Likewise, that is known more certainly which is known by open vision, than what is known by mere belief; but through knowledge something is known by open vision, through faith [only] by mere belief: therefore knowledge is more certain than faith.

4. Likewise, the more clearly something is known, the more certainly it is known; but faith knows through a *glass in an enigma,* whereas knowledge [knows] with *unveiled face*: therefore the certainty that knowledge has is greater than that which faith has.

5. Likewise, that is known more certainly which can be proved, than what cannot be proved; but what one knows by the habit of knowledge one can prove to another, however much he opposes, and convince him of necessity, so that he cannot contradict; but it is not so with faith: therefore faith does not have as much certainty as the habit of knowledge has.

### Conclusion.

> The certainty of faith is surpassed by the knowledge that is the open vision of God, but it surpasses the knowledge that is the cognition of things believable according to the state of the wayfarer, and sometimes also the knowledge of other knowable things as regards the certainty of adherence, but not [the certainty] of speculation.

**I respond:** It must be said that when we compare the certainty of faith to the certainty of knowledge, it can be understood in two ways. For in one way *knowledge* can be called the open and certain vision of God in the fatherland; and in this way there is no question or doubt that knowledge in this way excels faith itself in certainty, just as glory excels grace, and the state of the fatherland the state of the wayfarer. — In another way *knowledge* is called the cognition which one has on the way; and this can be in two ways: either with respect to those things with respect to which there is faith; or with respect to other knowable things. If with respect to those things with respect to which there is faith, then, speaking simply, faith is more certain than knowledge. Hence if some philosopher knew one of the articles by reasoning, as that God is the creator, or that God is the rewarder; he never knew so certainly through his knowledge as the true believer knows through his faith.

But if we speak of knowledge insofar as it is the cognition of other knowable things, then in a certain way faith is more certain than knowledge, and in a certain way the contrary. For there is a certainty of *speculation,* and there is a certainty of *adherence;* and the first indeed regards the *intellect*, while the second regards the affect itself. — If we speak of the certainty of adherence, then there is greater certainty in faith itself than there is in the habit of knowledge, because true faith makes the believer himself adhere to the truth believed more than any knowledge [makes one adhere] to some thing known. For we see that true believers can be inclined neither by arguments nor by torments nor by blandishments to deny, at least in words, the truth which they believe; which no knowing man of sound mind would do for anything he knows, except insofar as the teaching of faith dictates that one ought not to lie. For a geometer would be foolish who, for any certain conclusion of geometry, would dare to undergo death. Hence the true believer, even if he knew the whole of philosophical knowledge, would rather lose all that knowledge than be ignorant of a single article; so much does he adhere to the truth believed. Concerning the certainty of *adherence,* therefore, it is true that faith is more certain than philosophical knowledge, and this certainty regards truth and teaching *according to piety*; and concerning this certainty the arguments adduced for the first part conclude.

But if we speak of the certainty of *speculation,* which indeed regards the intellect itself and bare truth; then it can be conceded that there is greater certainty in some knowledge than in faith, because one can know something through knowledge so certainly that one can in no way doubt about it, nor in any way disbelieve it, nor in his heart contradict it in any way, as is plain in the cognition of axioms and of first principles. And in this way the arguments for the following part proceed, as is plain to one who treats [the matter]. — And through this the response to the question proposed is plain; the response to the objections is also plain. For they proceed by diverse ways. For the arguments adduced for the first part conclude about the certainty of *adherence;* but the arguments to the opposite, about the certainty of *speculation.* Nevertheless the arguments adduced for the first part seem to conclude about the certainty of *speculation,* that by that certainty faith is more certain than knowledge, which is false. Therefore it must be attempted to resolve them.

1. To that word of Augustine, by which it is said that nothing is more certain to a man than his faith: it can be said that it does nothing for the matter, because he is not speaking of the certainty which one has *through* faith, but which one has *about* faith, which one has in the mind; and that is a certainty of knowledge, for the faithful man knows that he has faith.

2. To that of the Philosopher, that virtue is more certain than every art; it must be said that he is speaking of virtue and art insofar as they are compared to the same [object]. For one knows much better how to find the mean and the object through the habit of virtue than through the habit of pure cognition. But it is not to be understood generally that virtue is more certain about its proper object than any knowledge is about its own.

3. To that which is objected, that what is seen in the light of the uncreated Truth seems to be seen more certainly than what is seen in the light of created truth; it must be said that this is true when the light of the uncreated Truth shines *fully,* as it will be in the fatherland. But when it shines *half-fully,* it is not necessary that it have truth; as is plain, because a man can see more certainly by the light of a candle than by the light of the sun, where the sun does not shine fully; and so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For although the irradiation by the mediation of faith comes from the eternal Truth itself, nevertheless the irradiation is not *full,* since the *glass* and the *enigma* remain.

4. To that which is objected, that the cognition with which error is not mingled is more certain; it must be said that it is true; but just as error is not mingled with *faith,* so neither [is it mingled] with *knowledge*, insofar as it is knowledge, but this is only from a defect on the part of the knower. So too it happens in faith itself on the part of the believer, as is plain in the faithful man who, on account of a distortion of the intellect, falls from the cognition of faith into heresy, while a false belief mingles itself with true belief. Hence from this it cannot be concluded that faith is more certain than knowledge. Yet this is true, that the teaching of faith has been handed down more truthfully than any philosophical knowledge, because the Holy Spirit and Christ himself, who taught the truth of faith and of sacred Scripture, said nothing false in anything nor can be reprehended in anything; which I judge can truly be said of no philosopher in the handing down of any teaching, but rather they are found to have mingled many false things with true ones.

5. To that which is objected, that the nobler knowledge is, the more certain; it must be said that this does not have truth. For, as the Philosopher says, « the certainty of mathematical knowledge is greater than that of divine [knowledge] » — and yet the divine is nobler than the mathematical — but this is on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding; because, as the Philosopher says, « as the eye of the night-owl is to the light, so is our intellect to the most manifest things of nature »; whence those things which are most certain in themselves, it sometimes knows doubtfully. And yet that less certain cognition is more noble and perfect, since it is about a nobler thing. For it is better to know even a little something about God than to have knowledge of the heavenly or earthly things. — But the arguments to the opposite part are to be conceded; for they conclude about the certainty of *speculation,* as is sufficiently clear and appears to one who treats [the matter].