Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a1-q5
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### Question V. *On the definition of faith assigned by the Apostle.*

Fifth, inquiry is made concerning the description of faith assigned by the Apostle, since it is the most authentic among the rest. Now the Apostle defines faith thus, to the Hebrews, chapter eleven: *Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing.* But it is shown that this description is inconveniently assigned on account of a fourfold defect, which seems to be in it, namely on account of a defect of *truth,* on account of a defect of *convertibility,* on account of a defect of *evidence,* and on account of a defect of *sufficiency.* — That there is in it a defect of *truth* is shown:

1. First, in this, that it says faith is a *substance;* for either *substance* is taken there *properly,* or *commonly.* If it is taken there *properly,* since substance is divided against *accident*, and faith is an accident, it is false that faith is a substance. But if substance is taken there *commonly* for essence, and the essence of each thing does not differ from that of which it is the essence, but faith differs from the things to be hoped for, it is impossible that faith be the substance of the things to be hoped for.

2. Likewise, it seems to be *false* in this, that it says faith is not only a *substance,* but also an *argument,* since no *virtue* is an *argument,* nor conversely: if therefore faith is a *virtue,* it cannot then be an *argument.* If you say that argument is taken there *transumptively;* it seems that faith ought to be called *argument of things not appearing* neither *transumptively* nor *properly.* For if it is the property of an argument that it argues the mind itself and convinces it of that to which it is directed, making that thing to be clear and open; it seems that there is in it an implication of a twofoldcontradiction, when it says faith is the *argument of things not appearing.* For things which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, *appear* to be true; things also which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, *are convinced* to be true: therefore the account of *argument* is repugnant both to a thing *not appearing* and to the very *habit of faith:* therefore there is in the aforesaid description an implication of opposites: it seems therefore that the aforesaid definition can be refuted for a defect of *truth.*

3. Likewise, it seems that it can be censured for a defect of *convertibility*. For this description can fit *hope* itself. For hope is the *substance of things to be hoped for,* and also the *argument of things not appearing,* since by hope we are made certain that we shall have the things which we do not see: therefore it seems that, if this whole description fits *hope,* then it is not convertible with *faith* itself.

4. Likewise, to believe that eternal punishment is to come pertains to faith itself, therefore the believing of eternal punishment is faith; but the believing of eternal punishment is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared: therefore it seems that this description does not fit faith itself generally: therefore it fits neither all nor it alone: therefore it seems able to be censured on account of a defect of *convertibility.*

5. Likewise, it seems able to be censured for a defect of *evidence,* because that which is prior ought not to be defined through that which is posterior, nor the unknown through the more unknown; but faith is prior to hope, faith too, which is in the heart, is better known than those things which do not appear: therefore faith is badly defined through *things to be hoped for,* and through *things not appearing.*

6. Likewise, it pertains to the *evidence* of a definition that what is prior be set before what is posterior: if therefore cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is *argument,* regards cognition, but insofar as it is *substance of things to be hoped for,* regards affection; it seems that the aforesaid definition is assigned as it were through what is posterior and confusedly: and so it seems able to be refuted on account of a defect of *evidence.*

7. Likewise, it seems reprehensible on account of a defect of *sufficiency,* because faith is not only of things future, but also of things present and past, as Augustine says: if therefore the things to be hoped for are only future, it seems that it is insufficiently defined, since it is defined only through things to be hoped for.

8. Likewise, faith is not only the foundation of *hope,* but even of *charity* and of the whole spiritual edifice: therefore it is the substance or foundation of *charity* and of the things to be loved, just as of *hope* and of the things to be hoped for: it seems therefore that he spoke insufficiently, when he said it is the foundation of the things to be hoped for. For since charity is nobler than hope, faith ought rather to be defined through the things *to be loved* than through the things *to be hoped for.* — And so on account of the four said defects the aforesaid description seems to be utterly cast off and repudiated.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The definition of faith given by the Apostle is conveniently and according to art assigned.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that a definition or notification is then rightly assigned, when it contains nothing superfluous, nothing also diminished. And this is, when through that notification the essence of the thing defined is fully indicated and openly manifested and separated from all others; but this is found in the matter proposed, if one attends.

For faith itself according to its essence regards something on the part of the intellect and something on the part of the affect. For it has to stabilize the affect and to illuminate the intellect. And insofar as it stabilizes the affect, it is called *substance* or *foundation;* but insofar as it illuminates the intellect, it is called *argument.* In order, therefore, that the essence of faith might be fully explicated, it was necessary that it be defined or notified so that it be said to be *substance* and *argument* together; for a definition ought to enclose in itself the whole essence of the thing defined.

It ought also nonetheless to notify openly; and since the habit of a virtue is to be notified in two ways, namely through its ultimate end and through its object; now the end of faith itself consists in the eternal beatitude which we hope for, and so in the *things to be hoped for;* but its object consists in truth not seen, and so in the *things not appearing:* therefore it was fitting that faith be defined through the *things to be hoped for* and not appearing, so that thus the notification of faith might not only explicate fully the essence of the thing defined through the *intellect* and the *affect,* but might also manifest it openly through the *end* and the *object.*

A definition ought also to *separate* the thing defined from all others. And since *formed faith* is to be distinguished from *unformed faith,* it is also to be distinguished from the habit of any other virtue; from *unformed* faith, I say, it is distinguished insofar as it sustains the whole spiritual fabric, but from the other virtues insofar as it makes one adhere to *truth not seen:* therefore with respect to these two it is called *substance of things to be hoped for,* that it may be distinguished from unformed faith, and *argument of things not appearing,* that it may be distinguished from the habits of the other virtues.

And so it is clear that the aforesaid notification contains nothing *superfluous,* nothing *diminished;* nor is there in it a clause nor a word, indeed not even a syllable idle. It must therefore be confessed that it is conveniently and according to art assigned, so that it has in itself *truth, convertibility, evidence,* and *sufficiency* so perfectly and completely that not even the most skilled of the philosophers could assign it more artfully and more completely.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that faith is falsely said to be a *substance;* it must be said that *substance* is said in two ways, namely *properly* and *transumptively.* Properly indeed it is said in four ways, namely *substance-matter, substance-form, substance-composite, substance* which is the essence of each thing. *Transumptively* that is called *substance* which has some property of substance said in one of those ways. But when it is said: faith is a *substance,* this is not said insofar as this noun *substance* is taken in its proper signification, but insofar as it is taken in its *transumptive* signification. For it is called *substance* because it is the foundation of the spiritual fabric after the likeness of matter, which provides support for forms and accidents. And that it is so taken is clear through the notification of Damascene, who, in place of that which the Apostle says: *Faith is a substance,* says *hypostasis.* For he says thus: « Faith is the *hypostasis* of the things which are hoped for, and the refutation of those things which are not seen »:

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is also falsely said to be an *argument;* it must be said similarly that *argument* is said in two ways, namely *properly* and *transumptively.* Properly indeed *argument* is taken according to a fourfold acceptation. For in one way *argument* is called a *ratiocination,* according as it is divided into four species, namely into the *syllogism, induction, enthymeme,* and *example.* In another way *argument* is called the brief collection of a lengthy discourse. In a third way *argument* is called the *middle* itself, in which consists the whole force of the argumentation. In a fourth way *argument* is called the *maximal proposition* itself, in which consists the firmness of the whole inference. But in all these acceptations it is called *argument,* because it *argues* and *illuminates* the mind to intuit something and firmly to adhere to it. — And according to this property whatever it be that argues and illuminates the mind to see something hidden can *transumptively* be called *argument.* And in this way faith is said to be the *argument of things not appearing,* since it so makes the intellect assent to them as a true argument makes one assent to a proved conclusion. — And through this is clear the response to those things which argued against the aforesaid definition for a defect of *truth.*

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that in the aforesaid definition there is a defect of *convertibility;* it must be said that the aforesaid notification does not fit *hope,* since, although hope itself can in some way be called *substance of things to be hoped for,* it cannot nevertheless be called *foundation,* like faith, because it is not the first of the virtues. But although this can in some way be attributed to it, nevertheless the following part of the definition, which is *argument of things not appearing,* fits faith *alone,* which makes the intellect assent to Truth itself; but this belongs neither to *hope* nor to *charity,* although there belongs to them a certain kind of experiential certitude, most of all to *hope* itself.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the believing of punishments is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared; it must be said that faith is called the substance of things to be hoped for not as of a *subject*, but as of an *end,* as has been said before. But although the believing of punishments is of things *to be feared* by way of *object,* it is nevertheless of things *to be hoped for* by way of *end.* For one believes in eternal punishments in order that he may attain the goods to be hoped for.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that there is there a defect of *evidence,* because faith is defined through things posterior and unknown; it must be said that this is false; for it is defined through the *end* and the *object,* as was seen before. But although the end of faith itself, which consists in the things to be hoped for, is posterior to faith itself with respect to *attainment,* it is nevertheless prior with respect to *intention*. And although the object of faith itself, which consists in truth not appearing, is unknown to the unbelieving man, it is nonetheless known to the man having faith; and although it be unknown what it is, it is nevertheless known that it itself *does not appear.* And so it is plain that the aforesaid notification is not through what is posterior and unknown, but rather through what is prior and better known.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that in it there is a preposterous order, because *argument* ought to be said before *foundation* on the ground that the intellect precedes the affect; it must be said that, although the act of the intellect *precedes* the act of the affect, nothing nevertheless prevents the intellect from sometimes *following* the affect, as for instance when it is inclined to assent to something according to the command of the will. And in this way it was said above to be the case in the act of faith, which therefore has the account of a virtue, because that assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore the Apostle most rightly ordered [it], when he set that of faith which regards the affective before that which regards the cognitive.

*To 7 and 8.* To that which is objected concerning a defect of *sufficiency,* that it ought to be defined through things *to be loved,* just as through things *to be hoped for,* so through things *past,* just as through things *future;* the response is already clear: because, although faith is of things past and future, or even of things to be hoped for and to be loved, it is of the things to be hoped for alone as of an *end,* toward which it tends; and through this, that faith is here defined by comparison to the end and the completion of the whole spiritual edifice, there is given consequently to understand the whole fabric of that same edifice. And through this those two objections are clear. It is clear also why it is rather said to be the *foundation of things to be hoped for* than of things *to be believed,* or *to be feared.* For through this, that it is said *of things to be hoped for,* there is rather given to understand the *end* of the virtue, which is the very beatitude awaited, than through this, that it is said *to be believed,* or *to be loved,* or *to be feared.* For those acts are not only toward the end, but also toward the things which are toward the end.