Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On unformed faith.*

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning unformed faith, about which five things are asked.

First, inquiry is made concerning its genus.

Second, inquiry is made concerning its origin.

Third, inquiry is made concerning its subject.

Fourth, inquiry is made concerning its duration.

Fifth and last, inquiry is made concerning its taking-of-form.

### Question I. *Whether unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, or not.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning unformed faith as regards its genus, namely whether it is in the genus of virtue, or not. And that it is in the genus of virtue seems so:

1. *First*, from what Augustine says in the book which is entitled by some *On True Innocence*: "Whereas the other virtues can be common to the good and the wicked, love alone is the proper and special

virtue of the godly and of the Saints"; therefore faith is a virtue common to the good and the wicked; but in the wicked nothing is found except unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is a virtue.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher holds, for things difficult and arduous art and virtue are necessary to the rational mind itself: therefore, since the articles of faith are difficult to believe, that they may be believed easily, art or virtue is necessary; but unformed faith makes the articles to be believed easily, as is evident in many sinners: therefore unformed faith is either art or virtue; but it is not art nor science: therefore it seems that it is a virtue.

3. Likewise, it is of greater difficulty to believe the articles of faith than to refrain from the act of lust, since the latter unraised reason can do; but the former, namely to believe, it cannot do unless it be raised above itself; but to refrain, charity being set aside, is an act of virtue: therefore also to believe. But that believing belongs to unformed faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that which is directly opposed to vice and sin is a virtue; but the habit of unformed faith is directly opposed to heresy and unbelief themselves, which are vices and sins, nor can it stand together with them: therefore it is necessary that unformed faith be a virtue.

5. Likewise, the humility by which one humbles himself or his affection under the commands of the divine Majesty has the character of a virtue: therefore by like reasoning that humility too, by which one humbles himself under the rules of the divine Truth, even apart from charity has the character of a virtue; but unformed faith is of this sort, by which *the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ* so as to assent to him in all the articles: therefore unformed faith is in the genus of virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. James, chapter two: *Faith without works is dead;* but nothing that is dead has in itself the character of a virtue: if therefore faith without grace and charity lacks fruitful works and is thus dead, then it no longer has the character of a virtue.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says, and as was treated above in the second book, distinction twenty-seven: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill"; but by unformed faith one does not live rightly, and many use it ill: therefore unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue.

3. Likewise, every virtue is either cardinal or theological: if therefore unformed faith is a virtue, it is either cardinal or theological; but it is not theological, since it does not tend toward God, nor is it cardinal, since it is not concerned with a created good: therefore it is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, when one heretic believes ten articles and disbelieves others, although those articles are above reason, nevertheless the faith by which he believes them is not said to be a virtue: therefore if by the same faith by which ten articles are believed all can also be believed, it seems that unformed faith in wicked Christians in no way holds the character of a virtue.

5. Likewise, when a disciple believes and assents to a master in those things which are not seen by him and are above his understanding, although he assents in things which are above himself, nevertheless that believing is not said to be a virtue: therefore by like reasoning it seems that a man does not need any virtue for assenting to the first Truth itself; but unformed faith does nothing other than make one assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things: therefore it seems that unformed faith is not a virtue.

### Conclusion

> Unformed faith is in the genus of virtue commonly so called.

**I respond:** It must be said that virtue is wont to be taken in two ways, when we say that some habit is a virtue, namely properly and commonly. For *properly* virtue is called a right reason leading to the end; and in this way virtue is the principle of a meritorious work and is said only of a habit informed by grace, without which one cannot attain to the end of glory. *In another way* virtue is called commonly a habit rectifying a power by some rectitude of justice and strengthening it about a difficult work, although it does not lead it to the end. And taking virtue in this way, unformed political habits are said to be virtues; in this way too unformed faith, which indeed is in wicked Christians, has its being in the genus of virtue. — For through that habit the intellect of man is in a certain way rectified, while it is taken captive *into the obedience of Christ* so as to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; it is also strengthened, that it may be-

lieve true things not apparent and shun things erroneous and fantastic; as appears in many Christians lacking charity, who willingly and humbly hear the words pertaining to the doctrine of faith and steadfastly and manfully abhor heretical depravity. And thus it can be granted that unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, insofar as the name of virtue is taken *broadly* and is extended to a habit rectifying and strengthening a power in those acts about which the way of justice consists. — And since the arguments for the first part proceed in this way, they are therefore to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that faith without works is dead; it must be said that it is not called *dead* because it lacks all usefulness and efficacy, but because it lacks the gratuitous life, which is the perfect life; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is not a virtue *simply*, but that it is not a virtue *properly* so called.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is a good quality of the mind etc.; it must be said that Augustine there defines virtue *properly* so called, namely gratuitous virtue; and in this way it is to be granted that unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. From this, however, it does not follow that it is in no way contained, insofar as virtue is taken *broadly*: rather there is here the sophism of the *consequent*.

3. To that which is objected, that every virtue is either cardinal or theological; it must be said that that division is of *formed* virtue, insofar as cardinal and theological virtue is taken *properly*: and thus unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. — Yet it could be said that, just as faith has the character of an incomplete virtue, so it has the character of a theological virtue, since in a certain way it directs toward God, though only half-fully.

4. To that which is objected concerning the heretic who believes ten articles; it must be said that even if the heretic has some illumination with respect to those true articles which he believes, and some aptitude for believing them; nevertheless that aptitude and believing ought not to be called a virtue, because it neither rectifies the power nor strengthens it: it does not *rectify* the power, because his intellect is not taken captive fully into the obedience of the highest Truth; it does not *strengthen*, because through it he does not reject the falsehood opposed to truth. And these two things were required for a habit to obtain the name and character of a virtue. — But it is not so with unformed faith, which is in wicked Christians, because they assent and adhere to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, so that in that habit there is rectification and strength, and from this a certain perfection. Hence that unformed faith alone is in the genus of virtue, by which all the articles are believed either explicitly or implicitly, by which also all errors are rejected. For this alone is that which has in itself a certain perfection of rectitude and strength.

5. To that which is objected concerning the disciple assenting to a master, that he does not need a habit of virtue; it must be said that it is not similar, because that believing by which a disciple assents to a master can be a way into falsehood just as into truth, for the reason that his master can assert both true and false things. But it is not so with the believing by which one assents to the first Truth, which can in no way be a way except into truth and rectitude. And on account of this, because in itself it is rectifying of the mind; and the believing by which a Christian assents to God is the way of salvation, so that in no way is it of itself ordered to the opposite: therefore it obtains the character of a virtue more than that believing by which a disciple assents to a master, which indeed can be an occasion of error.