Dist. 23, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/23/q/bon-sent-III-d23-dubia
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that notification which the Master sets down: *Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed.* For this definition seems to be assigned less correctly, because in the twentieth chapter of John it was said to Thomas: *Because you have seen me, you have believed;* it is established that Thomas believed by true faith: therefore this definition does not fit faith universally. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the diversity of the notifications of faith itself, which are assigned by various teachers. For it seems that this is less correct, because, since « of one thing there is one *being* » ; and « a definition is the account indicating *what the being is* » ; it seems that only a single definition ought to be assigned to faith. It is asked, therefore, in regard to what, and how they are differently assigned?

**I respond:** It must be said that the virtue of faith, according as it can be considered in many ways, can be notified in diverse ways. For faith is considered with respect to its *proper genus*; and thus it is defined by Augustine: « Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed ».

It is considered, secondly, with respect to its *ultimate end*; and thus it is defined by the Apostle: « Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing » ; and this definition is explained by the Damascene in his book: « Faith is the hypostasis of those things which are hoped for, the refutation of things which are not seen ».

It is considered, thirdly, with respect to its *object* and its *motive principle*; and thus it is defined by Augustine, to Consentius: « Faith is the illumination of the mind toward the highest Truth » .

It is considered, nevertheless, with respect to its *proper act*; and thus it is defined by the Damascene: « Faith is an unsought consent » concerning the first Truth; or, according to others, *affirmatively*: « a sought consent », because in different translations both are found; and both can be understood truly, because, although they seem to say the opposite, the one explains the other. For when faith is called a *sought consent*, this is to say, that is, a consent *not investigated*; and then the *in-* is taken *privatively* and is worth just as much as *unsought consent*, that is, the assent by which someone freely assents to the Truth, not relying on any reasoning.

It is considered also in relation to its *subject*; and thus it is defined by Dionysius in the book on the Divine Names, chapter seven: « Faith is the single foundation of believers, establishing them in the Truth ».

It is considered also in comparison with *other habits* with respect to the *mode of assenting*; and thus it is defined by Hugh in the book on the Sacraments: « Faith is a certain certitude about absent things, established above opinion and below knowledge » .

From these things it is clear that faith can be notified in diverse ways, according as it can be considered in diverse ways, namely in comparison with its *proper genus*, with its *ultimate end*, with its *object*, with its *proper act*, with its *subject*, and with a *disparate habit*.

To that which is first objected concerning Thomas, that he both saw and believed; it must be said that he *believed* one thing,

namely the Divinity, and *saw* another, namely the humanity. But this will be determined better below, when the object of faith is treated.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *faith is taken in three modes.* For it seems that he distinguishes faith itself insufficiently; for we see that faith is sometimes taken for *conscience* itself, according as it is said in the fourteenth chapter of Romans: *Whatever is not from faith is sin;* which is not contained under any of the aforesaid. — In connection with this it is asked, in how many modes faith is spoken of.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith is found to be taken in ten modes. — For sometimes it is taken for a *pledge*; in the fifth chapter of First Timothy: *They have made void their first faith.* — Sometimes for *fidelity*; in the seventh chapter of Jeremiah: *Faith and the holy one have perished from the earth.* — Sometimes for *conscience*; in the fourteenth chapter of Romans: *Whatever is not from faith is sin.* — Sometimes for the *Sacrament of faith*, according as Augustine says, to Boniface, that for little ones to have faith is nothing other than to have the Sacrament of faith. — Sometimes for the *acceptance of a conclusion proved by reason*, according as Boethius says: « An argument is the account producing belief in a doubtful matter ». — Sometimes for the *cognition of comprehension*, according as it is said in the first chapter of Romans: *The justice of God is revealed from faith unto faith;* the Gloss: « unto the faith of vision », which is called faith because it is most confident and most certain. — Sometimes for the *habit of unformed faith*; in the second chapter of James: *Faith without works is dead.* — Sometimes for the *habit of formed faith*; in the first chapter of Romans: *The just man lives from faith.* — Sometimes for the *act of faith*, according as Augustine says: « Faith is to believe what you do not see ». — Sometimes for the *object of faith* itself, according as it is said in the Symbol of Athanasius: « This is the catholic faith » etc.

But concerning all these modes it is fitting to speak of faith according to a certain *analogy*, for the reason that in all of them there is found a certain account of assent and of a certain *credulity*, although not uniformly. But of these ten modes the Master takes up only three, because they are the ones that serve his principal purpose, namely the explanation of the aforesaid definition.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *To believe in God is one thing, to believe God another, to believe a God another.* For if habits are distinguished by their acts, it seems that it does not belong to one faith to do all these things, but to diverse ones; which is false, because by one faith we do all these three things. — Likewise, it seems that he defines *to believe in God* badly, when he says that *to believe in God is by believing to love* etc. For if *to believe* and *to love* are disparate acts, it seems that the one ought not to be defined through the other. — Likewise, it seems to be a piling-up of words, when he says: *by believing to love, by believing to go into him**, by believing to be incorporated;* for the same thing seems to be said through those words.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says, the mode of believing is one and another, or the manner is one and another: *to believe God* and *a God* and *in God.* And these acts can indeed pertain to diverse habits; they can also pertain to the same one, since they are not so diverse that they do not have an order to one another. For *to believe a God* regards the divine Truth as *object*; *to believe God*, as *motive*; *to believe in God*, as *ultimate end.* And these three comparisons can be found about the same habit. And since faith does not tend perfectly into God as into an *end*, except insofar as it is joined to charity; therefore the act of be-

lieving in God is defined through the act of loving, not as through a *proper* act, but as through an *annexed* act. — And again, because a fourfold genus of act is annexed to faith itself, according as it is joined to charity, according to a fourfold comparison; therefore he sets down four things in its notification. For faith, insofar as it is joined to charity, orders one *to love God*, *to do good*, *to bear* *evil*, *to love one's neighbor.* And according to these four, he sets down four acts in that notification, namely by believing *to love* with respect to the affection, by believing *to go* with respect to the good work, by believing *to cleave* to him with respect to the toleration of evil, by believing *to be incorporated* into the members with respect to the love of neighbor. — And thus the response to the things that were asked is clear.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says: *Each one sees that faith itself is in his heart.* For if the virtues are connected to one another, and someone knows that he has faith; it seems consequently that he knows that he has charity; the contrary of which was shown in the first book, in the seventeenth distinction. — Likewise, if faith is seen and is most certainly known, because it is essentially in the soul, since charity and grace are essentially in the soul; the question is why it is not most certainly known by those by whom it is had.

In connection with this it is also asked about the *modes of vision* which Augustine assigns in the text; for that same division seems to be superfluous, since on Genesis according to the letter, in the twelfth book, and in the Gloss on the twelfth chapter of Second Corinthians, only three kinds of vision are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the word of Augustine, *faith*, existing essentially in the soul, is known through its *essence*; and this all commonly hold.

But concerning *charity* some say that it is seen *essentially*, and that a man who has charity knows that he has it; but he does not know whether he perseveres in it. For they say that this is generally true, that of all things which are essentially in the soul the soul has certain knowledge, because it knows them through their essence, whether it be a habit of grace, or of charity, or of any other virtue. — But this response is contrary to experiential cognition itself. For there are many things in us which lie hidden from us; and many souls are deformed which in no way know their own deformities; and there are many things in us which lie open. And therefore it must not be said that all things which are in the soul essentially are held by sure vision and cognition. And concerning charity and grace it is plain enough, because few or none are there who know with certitude that they are in grace; and this is better known if it is inquired of holy and good men.

Therefore others say otherwise, that something is known in two ways, namely by the *knowledge of acquaintance* and by the *knowledge of discernment*, according as it is handed down by Augustine in the book on the Trinity, that to *know* a thing is one thing, to think about it and dis-

tinguish it another. They say, therefore, that all things which are essentially in the soul are most certainly known by the *knowledge of acquaintance*; by which knowledge Augustine says that the soul cannot be ignorant of itself; and thus both faith and charity and other things too are known. But if we speak of the *knowledge of discernment*, then it does not hold true, for the reason that those things which are essentially in the soul, even if they are known by the knowledge of acquaintance, are nevertheless not always *discerned* from other things, as Augustine says of the soul itself, that even if it cannot fail to *know* itself, it sometimes does not know how to *discern* itself from other things; as is clear concerning those who held that the soul is a body, or water, or fire. And in this manner one does not have acquaintance with the charity which is in oneself, nor with the grace that makes one pleasing, because he does not know how to discern it from the gift of grace freely given, on account of the clouding of the mind itself by the involvement of phantasms. — But not even this yet suffices, because one who has faith knows the habit itself not only by the knowledge of acquaintance, but also by that of discernment and of cognition; for he discerns it from the other habits of the virtues.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that the cognition by which the soul knows that which it has in itself is the cognition of a certain *experience*; for through this someone knows that he has faith, while, entering inward to himself, he experiences whether he is ready to believe; thus concerning the other habits of the virtues and all other things that lie hidden within. Since, therefore, the soul cannot have *experience* except of that which is in its own power, and of that which regards the act of the soul, since experience denotes the use of some power; hence it is that, when certain things are so in the soul that they render its power *fit for some work*, or stand about some interior work, such things can be known by the soul itself *with certitude.* Hence if someone is fit for some work, he most certainly knows that he has that habit, as the believer the habit of believing, and the lover the habit of loving, and so concerning the rest. But when certain things are so in the soul that they themselves principally do not regard the use of some power, like a character, or like the deformity of past fault, or which are above the power of the soul itself, like grace, insofar as it renders one acceptable to God, and charity likewise; because the soul cannot have *experience* of such things, it cannot have certain *acquaintance.* Therefore when it is said that those things which are essentially in the soul are known with certitude; this is understood of those things of which the soul can take *certain experiment*; but of those of which it cannot take experiment except by conjecture, it does not know except by conjecturing. And since concerning faith, according as it renders one *fit for believing*, most certain *experience* can be had; but according as one's *believing* is *acceptable* to God, certain *experience* cannot be had, but only *conjecture*: hence it is that faith, with respect to the *underlying habit*, is most certainly seen by the soul; but insofar as it is *formed*, it is not known except by *conjecture*; and thus it is connected with the others. — And through this the response to that which is objected concerning charity and grace is clear.

To that which he objects concerning the sufficiency of those modes, it must be said that *the modes of seeing* can be distinguished in two ways: either on the part of the *knowing power*, or on the part of the *medium.* If on the part of the *cognitive power*, since it is threefold, namely the exterior sensitive, the imaginative, and the intellective; thus *vision* is distinguished as threefold, namely corporeal, imaginative, and intellectual. — But if on the part of the *medium*, then there are six differences, whose sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that is seen by the soul is seen either through its *essence*, or is seen through its *species*, or is seen through *another thing*, simply differing from it. If it is seen through its *essence*, thus there is one mode, which is placed in the sixth place. If through its *species*, this can be in three ways: for that species is either wholly *concreted to matter*, or *abstracted*, or *partly concreted, partly abstracted.* It is concreted when it is apprehended by the exterior sense, although there is some abstraction there; simply abstracted, when it is apprehended by the intellect; in the middle manner, when it is apprehended by the imagination; and thus

these are the first three modes. — But if a thing is to be known through a thing *differing* from it, this can be in two ways: either because it is compared to it under the account of the *similar*, or in the account of an *effect.* And thus there are two modes, namely the fourth and the fifth. And if you object that something can be compared to another in the account of the *disparate*, or in the account of the *contrary*; it must be said that neither the *disparate* nor the *contrary* makes a thing known, except insofar as it hints at some mode in the account of the *similar.* Hence one who knows that « white disperses [the sight] » consequently knows that « black gathers [it] », because « the opposite is related to the opposite in the same way as the proposed to the proposed ».

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The future resurrection is proved, because the Patriarchs and other saints believed thus*, and on account of this he means to say that faith is called an *argument.* For this seems to tend rather to the opposite than to the point at issue. For if that which is believed is *proved* through the authority of the Fathers, then it seems that faith is not an *argument*, but rather a *conclusion*: therefore if faith is an *argument*, it seems that he does not say correctly that the resurrection is proved through the faith of the Fathers. — Likewise, if the argument *from authority* is most uncertain, and faith draws its foundation from the argument from *authority*: therefore it seems that faith is most uncertain.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to some the word of the Master is here understood of the faith which is *acquired* from the inspection of the Scriptures, but not of that which is *inspired* and which is numbered among the spiritual charisms. — But that does not satisfy, because the Master says this in order to explain that definition which the Apostle assigns; and it is established that the Apostle speaks of *formed* faith.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that according to what the Master says, that which is believed through faith « is proved through faith itself ». For that very thing which is believed is proved through *authority*; but authority is of no efficacy in proving except through *faith*: and thus the whole firmness of the argument returns to faith. Hence if someone asks whether the resurrection is to be, it is proved to him through the authorities of sacred Scripture and through the words of the Prophets, who said thus. But if he asks further that I prove to him that they themselves said the truth; it will be answered him that we know that they said the truth, because they were illumined by the Holy Spirit, and so were made certain through the *faith* which they received from God; and we are made certain of their certification through the *faith* which we receive from God himself. — And thus it is clear that the exposition of the Master is good, because by this he does not mean to say that faith is *proved*, but rather that faith *proves*, so that it is truly and properly called by the Apostle « *argument* ».

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *faith precedes charity.* For this seems to be false, because, as Ambrose says, « charity is the mother of the virtues » and the head; and the mother precedes that of which she is the mother. — Likewise, the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm: *Do not emulate*, says that « hope is the entrance to faith »: therefore it seems that faith is not first among the theological virtues, according as it is said in the text. — Likewise, all the virtues are infused at the same time: therefore it does not seem that any order is found in them.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of faith and the other virtues, namely with respect to the *ha-*

*bit* and with respect to the *act.* If with respect to the *habit*, then there is *simultaneity*; if with respect to the *act*, then there is a *natural order*, for the reason that the act of faith is *preambular* to the act of hope and of charity. For no one hopes for or loves anything unless he knows it and in some way believes it.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that *charity is the mother*; it must be said that this is understood with respect to the account of *meriting.* Moreover, charity is called the *mother of the virtues*, not because she generates them, but because she fosters and nourishes them, so that they may come to the state of perfection.

To that which is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that faith is not taken there for *faith-the-virtue*, or its act, but for that which *succeeds* faith, namely for the most blessed *vision* itself.