Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *On the object of faith according to the thing.*
### Question I. *Whether the object of faith is so true that no falsity can underlie it.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the object of faith is so true that no falsity can underlie it. And that falsity can underlie faith, seems [to be the case].

1. Whatever has a contingent thing underlying it can have falsity underlying it, because every contingent thing can be false; but a true contingent thing underlies faith: therefore falsity can underlie faith. The major proposition is manifest of itself; the minor is proved: because faith was about the passion of Christ and the incarnation; and both were contingent — for it was not necessary that Christ be slain, nor that the Son of God be incarnate, since the human race could have been freed in another way — it remains therefore that the conclusion is true.

2. Likewise, a habit is conformed to its object, about which it is occupied: if therefore the habit of faith is occupied about the credible, it must be conformed to it; but some credible thing, such as that Christ would suffer, could be falsified, since it was contingent: therefore the habit of faith, by which that was believed, could be falsified: therefore falsity can underlie faith.

3. Likewise, let us be in the middle time after the death of Abraham and before the incarnation of Christ; in that time it is necessary that Abraham believed that Christ would suffer, yet it was also possible that Christ not suffer; but the possible is compatible with everything necessary: therefore these two could stand together, namely that Abraham had believed that Christ would suffer, and that Christ was not going to suffer; and if so, then falsity would underlie faith: if therefore it was possible for falsity to underlie faith then, it seems by parity of reasoning [that it is so] now too. — That for that time it was possible that Christ not suffer is manifest, because it was contingent that he suffer, since it depended on the will of those who killed him; and the rule is that the opposite of a contingent thing is contingent. That again it was necessary that Abraham had believed is manifest, because every affirmative statement about the past is necessary. If you say that this is true when it does not depend on the future; it is shown that it is so in the present case: because «to believe is nothing other than to think with assent»; and after Abraham thought about this statement: that Christ was to be incarnate, it was necessary that he had thought about it; and after he assented, it was necessary that he had assented; and after he went forth into the act of faith, it was necessary that he had gone forth: therefore it seems that it was simply necessary that he had believed: it seems therefore necessary that falsity could underlie Abraham's faith.

4. Likewise, everything which underlies hope also underlies faith; but falsity can underlie hope, as is clear when someone foreknown [to damnation], existing in grace, hopes that he will have eternal life: therefore it necessarily follows that falsity sometimes underlies faith.

5. Likewise, the act of charity presupposes the act of faith; but falsity can underlie the act of charity: therefore [it can underlie] also

the act of faith. The major is manifest, the minor is proved by this, that the Apostle out of charity wished to go to the Spaniards, [yet] he did not go; and I out of charity wish my neighbor to be good, who nevertheless is not good: and so falsity can underlie the act of charity.

6. Likewise, the act of adoration is from the act of faith, therefore what is laid under adoration is laid under faith itself; but it sometimes happens that falsity underlies the adoration of some faithful person, as when he adores an unconsecrated host as consecrated, due diligence having been applied, and such adoration is meritorious, and so takes its origin from faith and charity: therefore if falsity underlies it, it seems that [it underlies] faith too.

**On the contrary:** 1. Faith on the way belongs only to him whose will be the vision in the fatherland; but falsity cannot underlie the vision in the fatherland: therefore neither [can it underlie] faith on the way.

2. Likewise, as charity is related to the good, so faith is related to the true; but charity never desires anything but the good: therefore faith never makes [one] believe anything but the true: therefore falsity does not underlie faith.

3. Likewise, faith assents to the First Truth on its own account and above all things in believing; but the First Truth cannot dictate to it anything but the true: therefore it cannot assent to anything but the true: therefore nothing can underlie it but the true.

4. Likewise, whatever cognition has falsity underlying it, that cognition is rather a principle of deception than of illumination; but faith is the illumination of the mind, as Augustine says: therefore falsity cannot underlie faith.

5. Likewise, «virtue is more certain than every art» and science; but falsity cannot underlie science: if therefore faith is a virtue, it seems [it cannot underlie faith] etc.

6. Likewise, faith which rests on the principles of the sciences cannot be falsified: therefore much more that which rests on the Principle of principles; and this is the catholic faith: therefore in no way can falsity underlie it.

### Conclusion.

> Falsity cannot underlie faith, because falsity in the thing believed and truth in the believer or in the faith cannot stand together at the same time.

**I respond:** It must be said that since the habit of faith illuminates the mind itself to assent to the believed truth according to the illustration of the divine prescience; and since falsity cannot underlie the divine prescience, because it cannot be falsified: it is necessary to hold that neither does falsity underlie the habit of faith itself, nor can it underlie it. — For just as the divine prescience, because it does not depend on things, most certainly knows not only those things which are to come necessarily, but also contingent things, in such a way that it cannot be deceived concerning them, as was shown in the first book; so also faith, which rests on the cognition of the divine prescience, by which it is also illuminated and directed, has a sure belief and illumination concerning future contingent things too, in such a way that, although those things, as far as is from themselves, may not come about, faith nevertheless can neither be deceived nor err. For just as concerning that which is foreknown by God to come about, it can be granted that it is possible for it not to come about of itself and absolutely, yet it is not compossible with the foresight of its opposite. — because these two cannot stand together at the same time, that God foresaw one thing and that the opposite come about; for then the divine prescience would be deceived — in this manner it must be understood in the assent of faith, which rests on the divine foresight. Hence although the contingent thing believed can in itself not come about, yet these two cannot stand together at the same time, that it not come about and that it be believed. And therefore it must be granted that falsity cannot underlie faith, because falsity in the thing believed and truth in the believer or in the faith cannot stand together at the same time. — And the reasons which are for this side are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is objected on the contrary, that whatever has a contingent thing underlying it can have falsity underlying it, because every contingent thing can be false; the answer is by elimination [of the minor], because a true contingent thing can underlie the divine foresight, yet falsity cannot underlie it; for God foresees true contingent things, but nevertheless those things which he foresees are never false. And just as this has its instance in the divine foreknowledge, so also in the illumination which proceeds from it, such as is the habit of faith, as has been said.

2. To that which is objected, that the habit of knowing must be conformed to the knowable itself; it must be said that this holds true when the habit of knowing depends on the knowable itself according to existence in its proper genus, as is acquired science according to lower causes and grounds; but concerning that genus of cognition which does not depend on the

thing known itself, it is not necessary that it be conformed to the knowable itself according to its existence in itself, but according to its existence in its cause. And such is the cognition of faith and of prophecy and of any divine revelation, which does not depend on that which is believed or on that which is revealed, but on that light by which it is illuminated for the knowing of this. And because that light is certain even concerning a contingent thing; hence it is that, since the habit of faith is conformed to that on which it depends, it cannot be falsified nor waver on account of the contingency of the thing believed.

3. To that which is objected, that the contingent can stand with any necessary thing; it must be said that it is true. Yet to that which it adds, that the opposite of some article is contingent, as before the incarnation it was contingent that Christ not be incarnate and not suffer; some answer by elimination, for the reason that concerning the incarnation and the passion there is no article as to the event, that it so come about, but as to the order, that it so befit. Hence Abraham did not believe that Christ be incarnate, but that Christ was to be incarnate, that there be force in the word; because "to be incarnate" denotes the event, but "to be about to be incarnate" denotes the befitting order. And although it is contingent that Christ be incarnate as to the event, yet as to fittingness it is necessary; for it is impossible that this not be becoming and fitting. — But this manner of speaking cannot stand, because the faithful believed just as the Prophets foretold; and the Prophets foretold not only that it was fitting [for Christ] to be incarnate, but also the future event. And again, just as we believe Christ to be incarnate in the past, so they believed Christ to be about to be incarnate in the future.

And therefore others speak otherwise, [saying] that although the thing believed can be contingent in itself, yet, regard being had to the divine prescience, which immutably foresaw, it is necessary that it come about; and therefore the opposite of it cannot stand either with the act of the divine prescience or with the act of our faith. — But neither does that resolve [the difficulty], because there is no contingent thing which God has not foreseen, if it is going to come about; nor by his foresight is anything of its contingency taken away from it: therefore however much God has foreseen something, it is necessary to hold that the contingent can stand with any necessary thing. For if it could not stand with the necessary, it would be impossible for it to come about.

And therefore there is yet a third manner of speaking, which grants that the contingent can stand with the necessary, and that the opposite of some article is or was contingent. But it denies that which is objected in the third place, namely that it was necessary that Abraham had believed that Christ would suffer. And if you object that every statement about the past is necessary; the answer to this is that it is true of that statement which passes wholly into the past; but that statement connotes a future contingent; and because every statement which encloses within itself a contingent thing is contingent: therefore that whole statement, "Abraham believed that Christ would suffer," is contingent. For although the principal composition is about the past, what is connoted is nevertheless about the future.

And this is clear thus: because "to believe" denotes an act of free will according to the direction of the light conforming our intellect to the divine prescience — whence the sense is: Abraham believed that Christ would suffer, that is: Abraham was illuminated so that he assented and saw this which God had foreseen would come about — and because in the foresight of a contingent event there is enclosed or connoted a future contingent: hence it is that in that statement about the past there is enclosed the event of a future contingent, and therefore the whole statement is to be judged to be contingent. And if you object that it is simply necessary that Abraham had thought about this and assented to this, therefore it is simply necessary that Abraham had believed; it must be said that it is true that it is necessary that Abraham had thought about this; but it is not necessary that he assented to this contingent thing believed, and [assented] by this assent of faith. For faith assented in him just as God foresaw; but the divine foresight foresees in such a way that, although the act of divine foreknowledge is in itself necessary, yet its comparison to the future contingent is not necessary, but contingent. In this manner too it must be understood, that although it is necessary, after Abraham believed, that free will was moved according to the rule and dictate of faith; and necessary that that movement was meritorious; yet its ordering to the future contingent was contingent, just as is the ordering of the divine prescience,

to which it is conformed. And because the word "believing" and "assenting" encloses within itself that ordering according to conformity to the divine foresight; hence it is that, just as it is contingent that God foresaw some future contingent, so it is contingent that Abraham believed a future contingent; it is also contingent that he assented; it is also contingent that some Prophet prophesied. For in all these there is one answer, which is founded on this, that although the acts pass into the past, yet they state an ordering to a future contingent; and so they connote the event of a future contingent, and from that connotation it is necessary to judge the whole statement contingent, as was shown in the first book by three infallible rules in the question concerning prescience.

4. To that which is objected, that falsity underlies hope; it must be said that, according as hope is a virtue and is moved virtuously, falsity does not underlie it. For since hope is a certitude «coming forth from grace and merits», no one hopes that he will have eternal life except with the presupposition of merits; and because the efficacy of merit includes final perseverance: hence it is that in the act of hope the condition of final perseverance is implied. For everyone who rightly hopes expects eternal life in this way, if he will have persevered in grace unto the end; and this indeed is true, and our faith dictates it. And so the answer to that argument is by elimination of the minor, because the foreknown [to damnation] does not expect eternal life simply, but under a condition. But if anyone, apart from divine revelation, without any condition hopes that he will have eternal life; this is not a movement pertaining to faith and hope, but to a false estimation.

5. To that which is objected, that the act of charity presupposes the act of faith; it must be said that it is true that it presupposes the act of faith as regulating and directing its act, but it is not necessary that it presuppose the act of faith as concurring upon that object. For everything which charity desires, faith dictates is to be desired, and so directs its act. Yet not everything which charity desires does faith believe, because of many things it happens to say that they are good; but it is false to say that they are true. For "good" denotes a habitual aptitude and ordering, but "true" denotes actual inherence and existence. Hence it was good for the Apostle to go to Spain, although it was not true; and therefore it was desirable, although it was not believable. For although falsity can stand with the object of charity, because something can be false and good; nevertheless it cannot stand with the object of faith, because the same thing cannot at once be false and true.

6. To that which is objected, that falsity can underlie adoration; it must be said that falsity never underlies the adoration made according to the direction and rule of faith, for the reason that faith says that nothing is to be adored for certain except that of which a certain cognition is had; but concerning that of which certitude is not had, it says it is to be adored on a presupposed condition. Hence every faithful person rightly adoring a consecrated host adores under this condition, if those things which are necessary for consecration according to the divine institution have been duly carried out around it; and so he is never deceived nor errs.