Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with uncreated truth alone as its proper object.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with the uncreated alone as its proper object. And that it is concerned solely with uncreated truth, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, through this, that faith is a theological virtue. For every theological virtue has the same thing for its object and its end: if therefore the end of the virtues is not something created, but uncreated, it seems [to follow] etc.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that it is one virtue: because a single virtue ought to have one object: if therefore faith is one virtue, and the created and the uncreated are altogether diverse; therefore if faith has being concerned with the uncreated Truth, it does not have being concerned with created truth as with [its] object.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that faith is a virtue to be done away with through the presence of its object and open knowledge; but the vision of the uncreated True alone is that which does away with the virtue of faith — for faith is not done away with for [those] on the way — therefore it seems that faith is solely concerned with the uncreated Truth as with [its] object.

4. Likewise, faith is a virtue by which assent is given to the very thing believed for its own sake and above all things; but to no truth is assent to be given for its own sake and above all things except that which is the highest True and the uncreated True: therefore the object of faith consists in that alone.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through the definition of the article given by Richard, by which he says that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe": therefore if the article is the object of faith, it seems that faith is concerned solely with uncreated truth and with God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Faith consists in the truth contained in the Symbol as in its proper object; but in the Symbol there are not only articles pertaining to the Deity, but indeed also pertaining to the humanity: therefore if the humanity is something created, faith does not consist solely in the uncreated Truth, but also in created [truth].

2. Likewise, faith is of as great a breadth as charity, or greater; but charity loves not only the uncreated Good, but also the created, because it loves not only God, but also the neighbor: therefore faith is not only in the uncreated Truth as in [its] object, but also in created truth.

3. Likewise, no future truth is uncreated truth, because the uncreated True is eternal truth; but our faith is concerned with future truth, because we believe "the resurrection of the flesh," which neither is nor was, but is to come: therefore it seems that faith is not only concerned with the uncreated Truth, but also with the created.

4. Likewise, if someone pertinaciously were to assert that what sacred Scripture says to be true is false, he would be a heretic: therefore it seems that the object of faith extends to all things which are written in sacred Scripture; but in sacred Scripture many more things are written about temporal than about eternal matters, about created than about uncreated, such as that Abraham begot Isaac, and the

like: therefore it seems that the object of faith consists more in created than in uncreated truth.

5. Likewise, the illumination of faith follows, or accompanies, the illumination of prophecy; but prophecy consists chiefly and principally about created truth, since it is the foretelling of things to come: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] of faith itself.

### Conclusion.

> The object of faith properly so called, or formal, which has the character of a motive, is the uncreated True; but the object commonly so called is truth both uncreated, to which assent is given for its own sake, and created, to which assent is given for the sake of another and which has the character of the material.

**I respond:** It must be said that the object of any cognitive habit has to be determined in two ways: either commonly, or properly, that is, *per se* and *per accidens*. Now that is called the common object which has a common acceptation; and the object *per accidens* [is that] which indeed has the character of the material; but that is called the object properly and *per se* which indeed has the character of a motive.

According to this twofold acceptation it happens that one speaks of the object of faith in two ways. For in one way that can be called the object of faith about which faith itself is occupied, as about that which it believes to be true, whether it assents to it for its own sake or for the sake of another. And in this way it is concerned not only with the uncreated Truth, but also with created truth, because faith does not only believe the divine Truth itself in itself, but also in those things which are dictated to it by it, which are many created truths. — But if we speak of the object of faith according to the proper acceptation, inasmuch as that is called the object which has the character of a motive; thus the object of faith is the uncreated Truth. — And just as it happens to be understood in sight that the luminous moves sight in two ways, either as it is absolute, or as it is incorporated into earthly matter; so the divine Truth itself moves in two ways the very intellect illumined through faith: either *per se*, as in the articles pertaining to God himself according to the Divinity, or as it is united to a creature, as in those articles regarding God himself in his assumed humanity, or in an operation created by him, as in creation, reparation, and glorification. — It must therefore be granted that the proper object of faith, according as it has the character of a motive, is the uncreated Truth; and because the reasonings adduced for the first part prove this, therefore they are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the opposite part:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that certain articles regard the humanity, as certain regard the Divinity; the response is now plain, because those articles which are about the humanity and concerning the humanity are predicated of the divine person, about which the uncreated Truth consists, and from that side they have the character of moving. For from that side by which they consist about created truth, they have only the character of the material. Hence just as there is one person in two natures, namely created and uncreated; so there is one moving Truth, which holds the character of object, whether in the articles which regard the Divinity, or in those which regard the humanity, which indeed is the uncreated Truth.

2. To that which is objected, that faith extends to as many things as charity extends to; it must be said that although charity may seem to be concerned with the uncreated Good and with the created good as with its proper object, nevertheless its proper object, as will be shown below, is nothing but the uncreated Good.

3. To that which is objected, that faith is about the future true; it must be said that the future resurrection of the flesh is not the proper object of faith, except inasmuch as it is compared to the divine power and justice, which will raise up the bodies, so that retribution may be made according to merits; and thus by reason of the uncreated True implicated it has the character of object; which uncreated True indeed, so far as concerns itself, abstracts from the character of past and future, although pastness and futureness are noted about its effect, which, so far as concerns itself, has only the character of the material in comparison to the assent of faith, according as was touched upon in the foregoing.

4. To that which is objected, that one would be judged a heretic who pertinaciously denied what is said in sacred Scripture; it must be said that this is not because all things which are contained in sacred Scripture hold the character of proper object and motive with respect to faith itself; but this is because they follow upon its proper object. For since sacred Scripture was set forth by the uncreated Truth itself and by the Holy Spirit; he who would contradict sacred Scripture would contradict him

to whom faith assents for his own sake, namely the highest Truth itself. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that faith has to be occupied about created truth as about its proper object.

5. To that which is objected concerning prophetic illumination, it must be said that prophecy does not have for its principal object and motive those things which the prophet foretells, but has them only for the material object, about which prophecy itself is occupied. Hence the Prophet does not assent to that which he foretells for its own sake, but for the sake of the Truth illumining and instructing him; and from this it cannot be concluded that faith is concerned with created truths, except as with material objects. — It could nevertheless be said that the case is not alike for faith and prophecy, because faith in its object, to which it assents, requires something that has the character of a motive; but prophecy requires nothing of the kind in the thing prophesied, but takes the whole ground of its cognition from the one inspiring it. Therefore it does not follow that, if prophecy is about something, that there must be faith about it as about an object.