Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether faith is concerned with the complex or with the incomplex.*

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is concerned with the complex, or with the incomplex. And that it is concerned with the complex seems [to be the case]:

1. «To believe, as Augustine says, is to think with assent»; but the assent of reason is not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it seems therefore that faith is concerned with the complex, as with its proper object.

2. Likewise, faith believes something because [it is] true, and rejects [something] because [it is] false; but the true and the false are concerned with complexity: therefore it seems that the habit of faith also regards the complex itself, or the enunciable, as its object.

3. Likewise, faith is a mean between opinion and knowledge, as Hugh holds; but both opinion and knowledge are concerned with the complex: therefore, since a mean takes on the nature of the extremes, it seems likewise [to be the case] that faith too [is].

4. Likewise, faith is opposed to error; but no one errs except from this, that he attributes something to something which ought not to be attributed, or removes what ought not to be removed; but this happens only in complexity: therefore every error consists in complexity. If therefore «opposites are by nature apt to be concerned with the same thing», it seems likewise that faith too has the true complex for its object.

5. Likewise, if the true incomplex itself is the object of faith, then since the Jews have a credulity concerning the incarnation, the Jews would have faith of the incarnation; which is manifestly false — indeed they err concerning that article; similarly those who would believe the resurrection to have already taken place would have faith of the resurrection, who nevertheless are agreed to err concerning the resurrection: it remains therefore that something incomplex is not the object of faith itself; and it is [either] complex or incomplex: therefore complex.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that [text] of First Corinthians, chapter ten: *They all drank the same spiritual drink*; the Gloss of Augustine: «The times are changed, but yet faith is not varied»: if therefore faith is not varied, neither [is] the object of faith: since therefore the enunciables which are believed are varied — because they believed that Christ was to suffer, [whereas] we [believe] that He has suffered; they [believed He] was to be incarnate, [whereas] we [believe He] has been incarnate: it remains therefore that faith is not concerned with the enunciable or with the complex as with its object.

2. Likewise, the object of faith is the uncreated Truth, as was shown before — whence Richard of Saint Victor says that «an article is a truth about God» — if therefore God is most simple, and in the simple no complexity or composition falls; it seems that the object of faith is not the true complex, but the incomplex.

3. Likewise, faith is concerned with the same thing, and about the same thing, with which the future vision [is concerned]; but vision is concerned with the true incomplex and by way of incomplexity — for vision will be a simple gaze upon the highest light — therefore it seems that faith likewise consists about the true incomplex by way of the incomplex.

4. Likewise, hope and charity are concerned with incomplex things and by way of incomplexity, because hope awaits beatitude, and charity loves God: therefore, since the theological virtues have the same thing for their object as to the reality, it seems that faith too consists about the true incomplex.

5. Likewise, if faith consists about the true complex; then since at the time of the passion very few knew that Christ was suffering, and at the time of the incarnation very few knew that Christ was being incarnate, very few would have had faith; Cornelius too would not have had faith, who did not know that Christ was incarnate nor [that He had] suffered, and yet it is read of him that his alms pleased God — but without faith, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven, it is impossible to please God — if therefore these incongruities should follow, it is unfitting to hold that faith consists about complexity.

### Conclusion.

> Faith properly consists about the true complex.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this question different [authors] have held different views.

For some wished to say that faith consists about the incomplex, as about its proper object; and these said that the articles of faith are not enunciables, but realities, such as the incarnation, the passion, and the resurrection; and these indeed are the same at every time, just as faith itself [is]. But that the act of faith passes over upon the very believable as upon the complex — this is on account of a defect of the intellect, which cannot behold the whole by a simple gaze, but first beholds this and afterward that, composing one with the other.

But since the assent of faith itself is properly upon complexity; and for the perfection of faith it is necessary not only to think about the incarnation, but also necessary to believe that the incarnation has already taken place: therefore others said that the articles are enunciables, and that faith consists about the complex, especially since faith, as regards certain articles, regards the uncreated and the created together, and can be of no created thing except insofar as it is composed with the uncreated itself, as was held before: if therefore the intellect does not grasp it except by way of complexity, it seems more reasonable to hold and to say that faith is concerned with the true complex, or under the formal character of the complex. And since one who errs concerning the true complex as regards the difference of time is simply judged a heretic — as if someone were to believe the resurrection to have already taken place, or the incarnation to be future — therefore they said not only that faith is concerned with the true complex, but also concerned with the true complex under a determinate difference of time. And if you object to them concerning the change of faith on account of the change of these enunciables; they answer, following the Nominalists, that the enunciables are not changed, because *that you will run*, *that you run*, *that you have run*, uttered at different times, signify the same, and are one enunciable, because there is one reality which they signify, and one time for which they are uttered; and therefore they are one as to reality and truth, although they seem to be diverse in vocal expression. — Otherwise too they answer. Granted that these enunciables are diverse, yet because there is one Truth, to which faith principally assents, and by reason of which it believes these enunciables, [a Truth] which indeed is not changed according to the diversity of time, although the enunciables themselves are diversified; on account of this faith is not changed and diversified, but rather at different times faith consists unchanged.

But because that position of the Nominalists, which said that the enunciables of different times are one, is not commonly approved — indeed is false, as was shown in the first book; likewise neither does that other mode of speaking suffice, that for the immutability of faith the immutability of the formal ground of believing should suffice — for if the articles are enunciables and are called immutable on account of the immutable formal ground of believing, by parity of reasoning all would be called one article on account of the single formal ground of believing which is in them — therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that since the habit of faith makes the mind assent to the believable or believed; and the assent of the mind is borne not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it must be held that the very object of faith, insofar as faith is borne upon it, has the formal character of the complex. And because it happens in two ways that faith is borne into its object, namely either implicitly or explicitly; therefore according to the twofold mode the complex is said to be the object of faith, or faith [is said] to consist about the complex. For faith, as regards its substance, regards the complex or the enunciable, not concerning a determinate difference of time, but rather some statement which is common and indifferent to every time, as that Christ was to suffer. But explicit faith regards the complex under a determinate difference of time, as it is now necessary to believe that the incarnation has taken place, and that the resurrection is to come. As therefore explication is accidental to faith and does not change the essence of faith; so too the variation of the determinate time does not vary faith, so that it should be one and another according to species. — And this mode of speaking is sufficiently probable. Therefore, maintaining it, we can say that faith properly consists about the true complex. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected, concerning the change of enunciables, the response is now clear: because an enunciable which does not concern a determinate difference of time is not changed at different times, and this is that about which faith has to consist, insofar as [it is] faith; but only those enunciables are varied which concern a determinate difference of time, and about this faith consists, insofar as [it is] explicit. And from this it cannot be concluded that faith is one and another, but that the explication of faith is varied at different times.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is concerned with the uncreated Truth, about which there is no complexity; it must be said that, as was said in the first book, although God is most simple, nevertheless concerning Him it truly happens that one enunciates this of this by way of complexity, for the reason that the intellect does not place that complexity upon the reality, but upon itself in understanding; nor yet does it err, because it cannot grasp the simplicity of the divine being except under such composition and collation. And in this way it is to be understood in faith. — Moreover, faith is not only about the uncreated Truth in itself, but also as it is compared to created truth, as was said above; and that comparison is under a certain complexity, and therefore that reason does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that faith in the way and vision in the fatherland are of the same thing; it must be said that one and the same thing can be apprehended by way of the incomplex and by way of the complex, as is clear in the apprehension of sense and intellect. For sense, when it apprehends a white thing, apprehends by way of a certain incomplexity, because the exterior sense does not know how to compose or divide; but the intellect, when it apprehends that same thing which sense was apprehending, takes it under the mode of complexity, predicating this of this, composing this with that and saying that this is white; and

so the complex and the incomplex do not make a diversity on the part of the thing comprehended, but on the part of the mode of comprehending, because one and the same thing can be apprehended under the mode of complexity and of incomplexity. And therefore it does not follow that, if vision is of the same thing of which faith is, and vision is not under the formal character of complexity, therefore neither [is] faith; rather there is here a *figure of speech*, or even an *accident*, because one proceeds from the unity of the thing to the unity of the mode. And if you ask why faith does not assent to its object by way of the incomplex, as vision [does]; the response is plain enough: because the vision of the fatherland will, by one and a simple gaze, cause many things to be seen and known, on account of the perfection of glory; but it is not so concerning cognition according to the state of the way, which state faith itself regards.

4. To that which is objected concerning hope and charity, it must be said that it is not similar: because properly it belongs to the intellect to be occupied about the complex, but to the affection to be occupied about the reality itself; and because the reality in itself has the character of incomplexity, but as it is in the intellect, has the character of complexity: hence it is that, although the virtues which regard the affection are concerned with their object apart from the character of complexity, yet not so faith, which is the rule of the intellect. — Nor does it hold, that if the object of the theological virtues is the same, on account of this, insofar as it is [the object] of faith, it should lack complexity, just as [it does] insofar as it is [the object] of the others. For the complex and the incomplex do not state a variation on the part of the thing, but only on the part of the mode, as was seen before; and although the theological virtues have the same object as to reality and substance, they nevertheless have a differing [object] according to formal character and mode.

5. To that which is objected concerning Cornelius, the response is now clear: because Cornelius had implicit faith, and therefore did not believe the incarnation or the passion under a determinate difference of time; and therefore he did not err, but the explication of faith was lacking to him, for the making of which the Lord sent the architect of the Church.

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