Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First Peter, chapter three: *Ready always to give a reason to everyone that asketh you of that hope and faith which is in you*; but a probable reason is generative of opinion: if therefore faith is compatible with a probable reason, it is therefore compatible also with a probable opinion.

2. Likewise, Peter, archbishop of Ravenna: «It is not safe to believe without a reason»; therefore a probable reason makes for the usefulness and security of faith: if therefore opinion is to be generated from a probable reason, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the gift of knowledge, of understanding, and of wisdom can stand together with faith; but «what we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, to reason»: therefore reasoning can stand together with faith. But with whatever probable reasoning stands, opinion too stands: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the doctrine of theology stands together with faith, since it is explicative of faith, and is concerned with those things with which faith is concerned: if therefore in the doctrine of theology many probable reasons are made, it seems that the probability of reason remains together with faith: therefore by parity of reasoning the probability of opinion generated from reasons too will be able to be in the same [subject] and with respect to the same [thing] in which and with respect to which faith itself is.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter eleven: *Faith is the evidence of things that appear not*; but those things of which there is probable opinion are things that appear — «for the probable is that which seems [so] to all, or to most» — therefore it seems that probable opinion and faith cannot be at once about the same thing.

2. Likewise, the acceptance of probable opinion is gathered from human reasoning; but, as Gregory says, «faith has no merit, where human reason offers proof»: therefore it seems that probable acceptance takes away merit from faith itself: therefore it cannot be compatible with the habit of faith itself.

3. Likewise, «opinion is the acceptance of one part with fear of the other», therefore where there is opinion, there is wavering; but faith excludes all wavering, since it causes [one] to adhere firmly: therefore faith cannot stand together with opinion at once.

4. Likewise, opinion adheres to a reason for its own sake, whence, the probability of the reason failing, the probability of the opinion fails; but faith adheres to the Truth itself for its own sake and above all things: therefore faith and opinion have repugnance [to each other]: therefore it does not seem that they can be at once in the soul about the same matter.

### Conclusion.

> Concerning the same [thing] there can be faith and probable opinion, not insofar as it has doubt annexed, but insofar as it expresses an acceptance generated and left behind from probable reasons.

**I respond:** It must be said that probable opinion is wont to be taken in two ways: in one way opinion is called «the acceptance of one part with fear of the other»; in another way opinion is called an acceptance of the soul generated from probable reasons, according to which it is wont to be said that the dialectical syllogism generates opinion, but the demonstrative syllogism generates knowledge.

If therefore opinion be taken in the first way, insofar as it has annexed to itself fear and wavering, thus it cannot stand together with the habit of faith about the same matter, for the reason that faith causes [one] to consent fully to one part, in such a way that it altogether reckons its opposite false and erroneous, nor could it through any supervening reason be inclined to the opposite; and therefore, because it removes the fluctuation of opinion, in this way of speaking of opinion, opinion together with faith cannot be compatible. — But if opinion be taken in the second way, namely as an acceptance left behind from probable reasons; thus it must be said that about the same [thing] there can be at once and together opinion and faith, since many of the faithful have, for the things which they believe, many likely reasons and many probable ones, which are apt to generate opinion as regards the second way of speaking of opinion; and that acceptance, indeed, when generated, is not repugnant to faith, but rather serves and ministers to it. For it is in faith a kindling as regards the weak, and a delight as regards the perfect.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also clear. For probable opinion, according to one way of speaking, can stand together with faith, as the reasons for the first part show; rather, the probability of reasons confers much upon faith, as was said in the beginning of the first book. According to the other way of speaking, insofar as it sounds toward imperfection, namely as it expresses wavering and the reliance of the assent itself upon the probability of a reason principally, thus it has repugnance with faith; and thus the reasons for the second part proceed, especially the last two, of which one is taken from the uncertainty of the opinion itself, and the other from the support of the opinion itself, because it relies principally upon a proving reason.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To that which is objected first about the word of the Apostle, that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; it must be said that the Apostle removes there from the object of belief not just any appearance; for he does not remove the appearance of probable opinion, but of certitudinal apprehension, as God appears to the blessed.

2. To that which is objected from the word of Gregory: *Faith has no merit* etc.; it must be said that Gregory understands this [to mean] when the believing of faith relies altogether upon the proof of a probable reason; and in this way true faith does not stand with opinion, in such a way that it relies upon opinion as upon a foundation; rather, much more does that probable acceptance, acquired from reasons, of which it was said that it can be called opinion, rely upon faith itself as upon something firmer. And the sign of this is that many reasons seem to us probable and very reasonable concerning faith, which seem to be certain abuses to unbelieving men. Therefore that acceptance relies upon faith more than conversely, although in some way it fosters and delights faith, as has been said.

3, 4. To the last two reasons there is no need to respond; because they proceed concerning opinion itself according to the other way of speaking, according to which it cannot stand together with faith at once, as was touched upon before.

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