Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition.*

Third it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition. And that it is, seems [so] by this reasoning.

1. Some philosopher, knowing by compelling reasons that God is one, the creator of all things, can come to faith, in such a way that he does not forget those reasons; but one who knows those reasons has science: therefore it seems that he can have at once concerning the same thing both faith and science.

2. Likewise, someone knowing something by a demonstration *quia* or through the effect, if he begins to know it through the cause or by a demonstration *propter quid*, does not on this account lose the prior cognition, although this second be nobler than that: therefore two cognitions can be had concerning the same thing, of which one is nobler than the other, and the one does not expel the other nor empty it out. And if this is true, then it seems that something can at once be known by acquired ratiocination and by infused illumination: therefore concerning the same thing faith and science can at once be had.

3. Likewise, intellective cognition supervening does not take away sensitive cognition, although one of them be more worthy and more perfect and nobler than the other: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning faith and science, that they can at once be had concerning the same thing and about the same thing.

4. Likewise, «experience is the principle of science»; but concerning one and the same thing faith and experience can be had: therefore concerning one and the same thing faith and science can be had. The major is proved through the Philosopher; the minor is proved in the Blessed Virgin Mary, who knew by faith and by experience that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:** 1. As charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, so faith assents to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; but because charity loves God above all things and for his own sake, it is impossible that it be compatible with the love by which one loves God principally for the sake of earthly things: therefore by parity of reasoning it will be impossible that faith be compatible with a cognition which principally adheres to acquired ratiocination. But such is the cognition of science: therefore it is impossible that faith be concerning the same thing together with science at once and at the same time.

2. Likewise, the vision of the fatherland takes away faith on account of the certitude and evidence in knowing: if therefore what is known through science is certain and open, it seems that it is impossible for anything to be at once known and believed.

3. Likewise, our mind can in no way dissent from that which it knows by the habit of science — for it cannot not believe that a triangle has three angles equal to two right [angles], if it knows how to demonstrate this — but the things that are believed by faith are believed voluntarily, and as they can be believed, so also they can be disbelieved: therefore it seems that the knowledge of science cannot stand together about the same thing with faith itself.

4. Likewise, the things that are known by science are subject to reason; but the things that are believed by faith are above reason, since faith is an illumination raising reason above itself: therefore if the same thing cannot be below reason and above reason, it does not seem that it can be at once known through science and faith.

### Conclusion.

> The science of open comprehension is not compatible with faith; but the science which is from the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination stands together with faith, in such a way that faith is the principal and science the subservient.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that cognition is twofold, namely of open comprehension and by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination. — If we speak of the science of open comprehension, by which God is known in the fatherland; thus it is not compatible with faith, so that the same thing be at once known and believed, for the reason that such cognition simply excludes enigma; and this will better appear below, when treatment is made of the emptying-out of the virtues, namely why and how the act of faith is excluded and emptied out through vision. And concerning this science the authorities of the Saints speak, and the common opinion of the masters holds, that this is true, that the same thing cannot be at once known and believed.

But if we speak of the science which is from the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination, thus some have wished to say that it is still true that it cannot stand together with faith, because through such science the intellect assents to the known thing itself principally on account of the reason itself, assents also necessarily, assents also as to a thing which is below itself; the contrary of which is found in faith, which assents to the first Truth for its own sake and voluntarily, raising reason above itself. And therefore they said that the habit of faith and of science mutually exclude one another, just as charity excludes that love by which one loves God principally for the sake of temporal things.

But the position of others is that concerning one and the same thing there can at once be had science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination together with the habit of faith, according to what Augustine says in the fourteenth [book] *On the Trinity*, expounding that [saying] of the Apostle: To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of science: «To this science I attribute that by which the most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; in which science very many of the faithful are not strong, although they have faith».

And Richard of St. Victor says that «for the things which are of faith there can be had not only probable reasons, but also necessary ones, although it happen that they sometimes escape us». Hence someone believing that God is one, the creator of all things, if he begin from necessary reasons to know that same thing, does not on this account cease to have faith; or if he also knew it before, faith supervening would not expel such cognition, as is plain through experience.

But the reason why such science can at once be concerning the same thing together with faith itself, so that the one cognition does not expel the other, is that science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination, although it makes some certitude and evidence concerning divine things, yet that certitude and evidence is not entirely clear, so long as we are in the way. For although someone can by necessary reasons prove that God is, and that God is one; yet to discern the divine being itself and the unity of God itself, and how that unity does not exclude the plurality of persons, he cannot, unless he be «cleansed by the justice of faith». Hence the illumination and certitude of such science is not so great that, when it is had, the illumination of faith would be superfluous, nay rather it is very necessary together with it. — And a sign of this is, that, although some philosophers knew many true things concerning God, yet, because they lacked faith, in many things they erred, or even failed. — Hence as in the preceding [questions] it was said that faith can stand together with exterior vision, because that has joined to it a hiddenness concerning the person of Christ; so it is to be understood concerning the habit of faith and such a mode of knowing, that they can be at once compatible in the same thing and in respect of the same thing. — Hence the reasons which are for this side are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that charity is not compatible with the love which principally adheres to another thing; it can be responded that it is not similar: since to love God for the sake of a creature finally pertains to the iniquitous and libidinous love, which has a repugnance to right love; but to assent to some truth proved on account of a proving reason, while the inference is true and necessary, neither does this bespeak sin nor bespeak error, and therefore it does not thus have a repugnance to faith; therefore it is not similar. — But this still does not solve [it] fully, because, whatever be [the case] concerning charity, these two do not seem able to be at once compatible, that someone assent to the believed truth for its own sake, and that he assent to it for the sake of another. — On account of which it is to be noted that this preposition *propter* («for the sake of») can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it denotes the final cause; in another way, as it bespeaks the moving reason. If as it bespeaks the final cause, thus one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, just as it cannot be loved for its own sake and for the sake of another. If it bespeaks the moving reason, since there can be several moving reasons for assenting to one and the same thing, just as one conclusion can be proved through the cause and through the effect, it can also be proved through something extrinsic and through something intrinsic; thus it is not unfitting that someone assent to some truth for its own sake and for the sake of another, yet by diverse habits and considerations. — But not even this still solves [it] fully, because it is said in John, chapter four: And the Samaritans believing spoke: Now we believe not on account of thy word; which is the word of faith, and thus it seems that the assent of faith is not compatible with the assent of science, which principally relies upon reason. — And therefore some have wished to say that, even if cognition be not taken away as to the habit, it is taken away as to the act, because it no longer has the use of it, nor the motion. — Yet this need not be said, nor does it seem fitting, that someone should have the habit, and not be able to have the use, especially since he does not have the power bound by any impediment.

And therefore it can be said that when someone is at once knowing and believing, the habit of faith holds in him the primacy; and therefore by such an assent of faith he assents to the Truth itself for its own sake, in such a way that *propter* bespeaks the principally moving reason. By the assent of science also he assents to the same thing on account of reason, in such a way that *propter* does not bespeak the reason principally moving it. But although one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, in such a way that he believe principally thus and thus; yet for its own sake and for the sake of another they can well be compatible with one another, in such a way that the one be principal, and the other be subservient. Hence that

which the faithful said: Now we believe not on account of thy word; is to be understood principally.

2. To that which is objected concerning the vision of the fatherland, that it takes away faith; it must be said that it is not similar: because, when it excludes all hiddenness, then the belief of faith is not necessary: but it is not so concerning the science which is had through leading-by-the-hand reason.

3. To that which is objected, that one who knows cannot dissent from that which he knows; it must be said that it is true as to that which he knows concerning it, yet as to that which lies hidden, he can dissent from it; and by reason of that the belief of faith is necessary to him, just as some philosopher who knows how to prove, by necessary reason, that God is one, cannot dissent from this; yet he would dissent from this, if someone should say that that unity can be compatible with plurality; which indeed escapes him and exceeds the powers of his cognition and science.

4. To that which is objected, that faith is of those things which are above reason, and science of those which are below; it must be said that, just as nothing prevents one and the same from being hidden and open; so nothing prevents one and the same, according to one and another mode of knowing, from being below and above; and so known and believed. For although the everlasting power and Divinity can be known through acquired science, or even innate, in itself; yet as it is compared to the plurality of persons, or to the humility of our humanity, which God assumed, it is entirely above reason and above science. For if someone relies on the judgment of reason and science, he would by no means believe it possible that the highest Unity be compatible with itself the plurality of persons; nor that the highest Majesty could be united with our lowliness; nor that the highest Power should from non-operating become operating without its own mutability, and other like things, which seem to be repugnant to the common conceptions of the mind according to philosophy. Hence very little does science attain the cognition of divine things, unless it rely on faith; because in one and the same thing that is most open to faith which is most hidden to science; as is plain concerning the highest and noblest questions, whose truth escaped the philosophers, namely concerning the creation of the world, concerning the power and wisdom of God, which escaped the philosophers and are now manifest to simple Christians. On account of which the Apostle says that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world; because all wisdom concerning God in the way without faith is more folly than true science. For it casts down the one searching into error, unless he be directed and aided through the illumination of faith; whence through it [science] is not expelled, but rather perfected.