Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the object of faith as to the meaning of the name.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the object of faith as to the meaning of the name; for it is wont to be reckoned under the name of *article*. And concerning this two things are asked according to the twofold account of an article.

First it is asked concerning the account of an article which is assigned by Richard.

Second, concerning that which is assigned by Isidore.

### Question I. *On the definition of an article which Richard sets down.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and there is inquiry concerning that account of Richard, which he sets down concerning an article, defining an article thus: «An article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe». Against this account there is objected first by reason of the first part, namely by reason of this, that it is called an *indivisible truth concerning God*.

1. For no complex true thing is an indivisible true thing; but an article is a complex true thing, as an enunciable, as was shown in the preceding: therefore it is not an indivisible truth.

2. Likewise, there is only one indivisible truth concerning God: therefore if an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, there is only one article; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, nothing which is God himself is a truth concerning God; but the object of faith is God himself: therefore the object of faith is not a truth concerning God. But an article is the object of faith: therefore it is unfittingly called an article a truth concerning God.

4. Likewise, that the resurrection is to come is an article; and this is not true of God, but is true of the flesh: therefore that does not belong [to an article] generally: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the aforesaid definition belongs to an article generally nor truly.

Against the second part of the notification, by which it is said *constraining* *to believe*, it is opposed thus.

5. Nothing which is above reason and hidden from reason constrains it to believe; but an article lies hidden from reason and is above reason: therefore it does not seem that it constrains it.

6. Likewise, to nothing toward which we are inclined by mere will are we constrained by anything; but toward believing we are inclined by mere will: therefore by nothing are we constrained to believe: therefore an article does not constrain us.

7. Likewise, as the object of faith stands to the act of believing, so the object of charity stands to the act of loving; but the object of charity does not constrain us to love: therefore neither [does] the object of faith [constrain us] to believe.

8. Likewise, as articles are ordained to the act of believing, so precepts are ordained to the effect of obeying: and as we are constrained to believe the things to be believed, so we are constrained to carry out the commandments: therefore as a thing-to-be-believed is called an article, so a precept ought to be called an article: if therefore a precept does not obtain the name of an article, it seems likewise that neither ought the object of faith itself to be called an article.

### Conclusion.

> The definition of an article assigned by Richard is fitting.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that an article, insofar as of itself by reason of its name, is so called from *constraining* [*arctando*]; but this can be understood in two ways, namely actively and passively. For it is called an article because it is something constrained in itself; and it is called an article because it constrains others. Insofar as it is said passively, an article is something constrained in itself, [and] is the terminus of resolution; but insofar as it is said actively, it is the principle of distinction and discretion. — And in the first way it is taken in natural science, in which are called articles the members or parts which are not resolved into others, but in them the resolution stands, as are called the articles [joints] of the fingers. But insofar as an article is called the principle of distinction, it is wont

to be taken also in the discursive sciences, as in grammar and rhetoric. For an *article* in grammar is something distinct, making a discretion as to genders and as to cases and as to supposits; and in rhetoric an article is called the distinction which is made in a sentence and in utterance.

Since therefore the other sciences serve theology, it too takes the property of its words according to that which it finds rightly said in the other sciences. Since therefore our faith bespeaks the cognition of many things, and that cognition is indeed terminated and distinct; it is necessary, concerning the object of faith itself, that is, concerning God, that there be found certain things to which all the things to be believed are reduced as to those in which the resolution of all the things to be believed stands, and as to those which are the directive principles in all things which are believed; and these are the things which faith principally believes, and which are properly the object of faith. And by reason of this twofold account they ought to be reckoned under the name of article, namely because they are the terminus of resolution, and because [they are] the principle of distinction.

And therefore Richard, defining or describing the article itself, makes it known from this twofold property. For in this that he says first: «an article is an indivisible truth concerning God», it is insinuated that an article is the terminus of resolution; for resolution stops at the indivisible. But in this that is subjoined: «constraining us to believe», it is insinuated that it is the principle of discretion and direction; for it constrains as a directive rule in respect of all those things which are commonly to be believed. — And thus this notification is rightly assigned, because it is not only a real description, but also an interpretation of the name.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that no complex truth is indivisible; it must be said that "indivisible" said of an article does not deny every division, but denies that division which consists in the distinction of the things to be believed, because an article is not distinguished into other articles, for there the stopping-point is. — It can also be said otherwise, that an indivisible truth underlies the very complexion. For as was said before, the intellect, concerning those things which are God's and in God, which are altogether simple, busies itself and understands [them] under a certain complexion; and although the whole, which is God, is God himself, yet the intellect, while it understands something concerning God, understands it in the account of a subject and attributes to it something in the account of a predicate. And because it makes diverse attributions to it, hence it is that it understands the First Truth itself, which is one, in many ways and enunciates [it] in many ways.

2. 3. And by this is clear the response to the two following [objections]: for although the indivisible Truth is one, yet the articles are many, because an article is not only the Truth itself in itself, but as it is compared to some attribution, in respect of which God is in the account of a subject, as God's being creator, God's being triune, God's being one. And by reason of this it is said to be a truth concerning God and many articles, because there are many enunciables concerning God and about God, which it is necessary for faith itself to believe.

4. To that which is objected, that the resurrection of the flesh is not concerning God; it must be said that on the contrary [it is], insofar as it holds the account of an article; for thus our resurrection and the resuscitation of the flesh are compared to the divine power. Hence to believe the resurrection of the flesh is nothing other than to believe that God will resuscitate our bodies, his justice requiring this, and his power effecting it.

5. To that which is objected against the second part, that an article does not constrain reason, since it is above it; it must be said that an article is here defined in comparison to the intellect, not just any intellect, but the intellect informed by faith; and this is noted when it is said constraining us, namely the faithful. But although an article is hidden to the intellect, which indeed does not have faith, and even above it; nevertheless it is not above the intellect insofar as it is illumined and elevated by faith.

6. To that which is objected, that to believe is by mere will, and thus not by constraint; it must be said that there is a constraint which is repugnant to liberty, and there is a constraint which is repugnant to ambiguity; and when it is said an article, because it constrains to believe, this is not said by a coercion of the will, but this is said by the removal of ambiguity, because in the very truth of the article the mind of the believer is determinately fixed, so that it in no way be inclined to the other side. Hence just as that voice is called articulate which is determined to signify something, when before it was indifferent in itself to signify

diverse things; so an article is so called, because it behooves [one] to believe it determinately and to assent to it, with all ambiguity and wavering removed.

7. 8. To that which is objected concerning the object of the other virtues, and also concerning a precept, which constrains to obey; it must be said that it is not similar: because, as was said before, an article is so called not only because it constrains by obliging, but because it constrains by distinguishing and discerning, and because to it the resolution stops; and since this properly belongs to faith itself, which is the virtue perfecting the intellect itself, to which pertains the principle and rule of discretion: hence it is that the object of faith alone vindicates to itself the name of article.