Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-a3-q2
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### Question II. *On the definition of the article which Isidore sets down.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the notification of Isidore, which is this: «An article is a perception of divine Truth tending into it.» Against the *first* part of the definition objection is made thus.

1. No truth is its own perception; but an article is divine Truth: therefore this is false: an article is a perception of divine Truth.

2. Likewise, faith is a perception of divine Truth: therefore if an article is a perception of divine Truth, faith is an article.

3. Likewise, the vision of glory is a perception of divine Truth: therefore it seems that the vision of glory is an article of faith; which is simply absurd.

4. Likewise, in the articles there is expressed not only divine Truth, but also divine Goodness and the humanity of Christ: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the definition fits every article generally.

Against the *second* part of the definition objection is made thus.

5. Nothing which is divine Truth itself tends into divine Truth; but an article is divine Truth itself: therefore it is not tending into Truth itself.

6. Likewise, an article is common with respect to the faith of the good and of the wicked; but the wicked, although they perceive the first Truth, nevertheless do not tend into it: therefore to tend into divine Truth is not common to every article.

7. Likewise, certain philosophers had a cognition of God with a certain love, therefore they had at once a perception of divine Truth with a certain tending into it; and yet they had neither faith nor the articles of faith: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid notification is rightly assigned to the article.

8. Likewise, since of one thing there is one definition, it seems that for the notification of the article the notification or definition of Richard suffices: therefore this one of Isidore is superfluous. — It is asked, then, what is the difference between the two.

### Conclusion.

> The definition of the article assigned by Isidore is fitting, insofar as it is of formed faith.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that this description differs in three [respects] from the description of Richard himself. For that description of Richard is, as it were, a certain *interpretation of the name*, but this one is a *real notification*. — Secondly it differs in this, that since *an article* can be considered in two ways: both as it is *in itself* and as it is *with respect to the soul*, the notification of Richard regards the article itself as it is *in itself*; the notification of Isidore regards the article itself as it is a being *with respect to the soul*; therefore he says that it is a *perception of divine Truth*. — The third difference is: that, since one can speak of *faith* in two ways, namely of faith in its *generality* and of *formed* faith, the article too can be considered in two ways: either as it is the object of *faith generally*, or as it is [the object] *of formed faith*; Richard defines the article as it is the object of *faith generally*, and therefore says that it is «constraining us to believe»; but Isidore defines it as it is the object of *formed faith*; and therefore says that it is a «perception of truth tending into God.» And since formed faith regards alike the intellect and the affect, because it illuminates the intellect to believe and excites the affect to tend into God; hence it is that Isidore defines the article first by comparison to the act of the *intellect*, when he says: «An article is a perception of divine Truth»; *secondly* by comparison to the act of the affect, when he subjoins: «tending into it.» And since it is compared to each act under the account of a *moving cause*, hence it is that the aforesaid definition is to be understood as given according to a *causal predication*, so that the sense is: «an article is a perception» etc., that is, an article is that which illuminates us to perceive divine Truth, and which excites us to tend into it. Hence it is called a *tending perception*, because it makes us *perceive* and *tend*, and moves us to *perceiving* and *tending*. — And by this the answer is evident to almost all the things which are objected.

1. For to that which is objected first, that no truth is its own perception; the answer is evident: because it is true by *essential predication*, but it is not true by *causal predication*.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that faith is a perception and also the vision of glory; it must be said that it is not similar: because that is said by *formal predication*, but this is said by *causal predication*. For faith and vision are perception as a *perceptive habit*; but an article is perception as a *moving object* of the perceiving power. — It could also be said that, just as *intellect* sometimes names a *potency*, sometimes a *habit*, sometimes an *act*, sometimes an *object*, as is manifest in various authorities; so too the name of *perception* can be extended to *habit*, *act*, and *object*. Therefore it is said in one way of faith, in another of the article.

4. To that which is objected, that the articles regard not only truth, but also goodness, and not only divine Truth, but also human; it must be said that even if an article concerns in some way the *good*, and concerns also something *created*, nevertheless according to that it does not have the account of a *moving [cause]*, but by this very thing, that it has in itself the account of the *true* and of the *highest True*, to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things. And since *an article* is here defined insofar as it is moving of faith itself, therefore it suffices here in its notification to touch upon divine Truth, from which is the whole and principal ground of moving.

5. To that which is objected concerning the tending, the answer is evident: because that predication is to be understood *causally*. For an article *by terminating* makes [one] tend; for it terminates insofar as it is an *end*, and moves insofar as it is an *object*; and therefore it makes [one] *tend*.

6. To that which is objected concerning the faith of the wicked, it must be said that here the article is defined in comparison to *formed* faith, although even the faith of the wicked,

though it does not actually tend into God, nevertheless renders [one] in a certain way fit for tending, although half-fully.

7. To that which is objected, that the cognition of the philosophers was a perception with a tending; it must be said that it was not that tending which is from *faith*; for never through that cognition could they attain to salvation; therefore, to speak more truly, they rather *lay prostrate* than *tended*.

8. To that which is objected, that of one [thing] there is one definition; it must be said that this is true according to a single comparison and consideration; but according as a thing can be considered in many ways, it can be notified in many ways. Therefore Richard and Isidore notified it in diverse ways, because they considered it in diverse ways; and their diversity was in three [respects], as has been shown above.

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