Dist. 24, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/24/q/bon-sent-III-d24-dubia
----------------------------------------
# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *This is the praise of faith, if what is believed is not seen. But on the contrary:* to lack light is rather for blame than for praise, according to that verse of the Psalm: *Man, when he was in honor, did not understand, he was compared* etc.: therefore it seems that the privation of vision rather renders faith blameworthy than commendable. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; since in glory nothing is believed except that which is seen, it seems that faith in the way is more praiseworthy than glory in the fatherland, which is absurd to say. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; but everyone who believes foolishly and falsely believes what he does not see: therefore he who believes foolishly is to be praised.

**I respond:** It must be said that the privation of vision contributes to the praise of belief, presupposing nevertheless rectitude in the belief itself; and this for a twofold cause: first, on account of the humiliation and captivation of the intellect, which is very much to be praised, as the pride of the intellect is very much to be blamed; secondly, because such belief is from mere will, not from any necessity. For no one is compelled to believe what he does not see; and because praise and blame consist about voluntary works: hence it is that Augustine says that the praise of faith is to believe what you do not see: not on account of the privation of vision alone, but on account of the positing of humility and of liberty: of humility on the part of the intellect, and of liberty on the part of the will. — And through this the response to that which is objected first is clear.

To that which is objected secondly concerning glory, the response is likewise clear: because Augustine does not speak of praise of any kind whatever, but of the praise of *merit*; and this praise is in the state of the way, not of the fatherland, and concerning the acts of the way, not concerning the acts of the fatherland. — Likewise the last point is clear: because this is not said of any belief whatever, but of belief that is *right* and *true*, not *foolish* and *false*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Since faith is from hearing, not only exterior, but also interior.* For this seems to be said unfittingly, because, since the sense of sight shows us very many differences of things and is nobler, it seems that faith ought rather to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, the faith of the Apostles was from sight just as from hearing: therefore if all the faith of those who came after was derived from the faith of the Apostles, it seems that it ought rather to be said to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, since faith is an infused habit, it seems that in no way does it have being from hearing.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Philosopher says, a thing happens to be learned in two ways, namely by discovery and by teaching. And the sense of sight indeed serves most that mode of learning which is by discovery; but the sense of hearing serves that mode which is by teaching. Since, therefore, those things which we know by faith we do not know by discovery, but rather by teaching — by teaching, I say, not only of the preacher speaking through the ear of the body, but also of the Holy Spirit speaking through the ear of the heart; hence it is that in the text it is said that faith is not only from exterior hearing, but also interior. And although the Apostles learned much by seeing Christ, nevertheless they learned far more by hearing him who would speak exteriorly, and who would

speak to them interiorly through the Holy Spirit. — And through this the response to the first and second objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that faith is by infusion, not by hearing; it must be said that faith with respect to its *formal* element is by infusion, but with respect to its *material* element, namely as to that knowledge by which it is known « what it is that is said by the name », it is by hearing, so that the one is by the hearing of the heart, and the other by the hearing of the body. Therefore the Apostle says generally that faith is from hearing, more principally by reason of interior hearing than exterior. And thus Gregory says that the discourse of the preacher labors in vain, unless the illumination of the interior teacher is present.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Some things are such that, unless we understand them, we do not believe them; others such that, unless we believe, we do not understand.* First it seems that this division is insufficient, since Augustine himself in the original adds a third member, namely that « some things are believed and never understood » : therefore it seems that the Master sets down the division of credible things insufficiently. — Likewise, it seems to imply something false, that there are certain things which are first believed before they are understood. For if « to believe is to think with assent », and to think is to understand; it seems that all believing precedes understanding. If you say that Augustine understands it of the understanding which relies on reason; then it seems that he says something false, that there are certain things which are first understood before they are believed, because it is said in the seventh chapter of Isaiah according to another translation: *Unless you believe, you will not understand:* therefore that *understanding* always follows the *believing* itself.

In connection with this it is also asked, what are those credible things of which Augustine says that they « are believed and never understood », since we see that all credible things are affirmed by sufficiently probable reasons.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to understand* is spoken of in two ways, according as the Master hints in the text. In one way *to understand* is said broadly *to know* « what it is that is said by the name » ; and that *understanding* always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed which is not in this way first understood. In another way *to understand* is to think with a prior reasoning; according to which Augustine says: « What we understand we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority ». And of this Augustine understands, when he says that there are certain things which are first believed and afterward understood, as are the articles of faith, which are above reason. There are certain things which are not first believed before they are understood, as are the things antecedent to faith, and those things which are of the dictate of natural law, as that God exists, that God is good. There are certain things which are believed and never understood, because they cannot be proved by reason, « as is history, running through human deeds ». For no one can prove by reason that Abraham begot Isaac, but only by authority. — And thus it is clear that *to understand* sometimes precedes faith, sometimes follows, according to that mode of taking it, although according to the first it always precedes.

And through this the response to all that was asked is clear. For as to what is objected first concerning the insufficiency of the division, it must be said that the Master does not intend here to divide credible things, but to show how faith and understanding can stand together about the same thing, and how about the same thing they are ordered. — To the other [objection] the response is likewise clear, because it proceeds concerning *to understand* according as it is taken in the first way. — The last point is likewise clear.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *What is it to know God, except to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly?* For this seems to be false, because either he speaks of the gaze of the mind which is through *species*, or of that which is through *a mirror* and *in an enigma*. If of that which is through *a mirror*, it seems false, because this is not *to know*, but rather *to believe*. If of that which is through *species*, this seems likewise false, because then

God would not be known except in the fatherland; but the Damascene says that the knowledge of God's existing is implanted in all. — Likewise Augustine says, in the twelfth book of *On the City of God*, that « whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower » : therefore if God is in no way bounded by the comprehension of the knower, it seems that in no way can he be known. — Likewise Dionysius says, according to that verse of the Psalm, that *God set darkness as his hiding-place:* therefore it seems impossible to behold God with the mind.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine here speaks of *experiential* cognition, which one has of God whether in the *fatherland* or in the *way*: in the fatherland indeed perfectly, but in the way imperfectly; yet neither is had except by the clean of heart. Hence this knowledge is *wisdom*, because it has joined with it a savor; and through this the intellect is illumined, and the affection is made stable. And therefore he says that *to know* God is nothing other than *to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly*.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it cannot be understood of the cognition of the way nor of the cognition of the fatherland; it must be said that, on the contrary, it can be understood of the cognition of the way. — But the cognition of the way has many grades. For God is known in his *vestige*, he is known in his *image*, he is known also in the *effect of grace*, he is known too through the *intimate union* of God and the soul, according to what the Apostle says: *He who cleaves to God is one spirit.* And this is the most excellent cognition, which Dionysius teaches, which indeed is in ecstatic love and elevates above the cognition of faith according to the common state; and of this Augustine and the Master here understand.

To that which is objected, that *to know* is *to comprehend*; it must be said that Augustine there defines *to know* according as it befits God: and God, whatever he knows, knows by the knowledge of comprehension, because he knows the whole thing fully; but in this manner God is not known by us.

To that of Dionysius the response is likewise clear, because he means to say that God is not beheld in the way in the clarity of his essence, but that he is beheld in the effect of grace and in the experience of his sweetness through the anagogical union itself.