Dist. 25, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/25/q/bon-sent-III-d25-dubia
----------------------------------------
# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *Faith is called great by cognition and by the quantity of articles, or by constancy and devotion.* For first it seems that here there is superfluity, because master Hugh sets down only two things according to which the progress of faith is regarded, namely *cognition* and *affection*; but the Master here sets down four: therefore it seems that either he is deficient, or the Master is superfluous. — Likewise, by the same faith by which one article is believed, the others also are believed: therefore it does not seem that it should be called *great* from the quantity of articles.

**I respond:** It must be said to this that faith has greatness in two ways: one through comparison *to the object*, and this is regarded in the quantity of articles, and what is here called the *quantity* of articles is the dignity of the articles themselves; for articles are not about just any truth, but about the supreme Truth. And in this respect the *quantity* of faith is equal according to the diversity of times, it is equal also according to the plurality of articles, as to that which is *principal* in them, namely as to the first Truth itself; but as to the *connoted* element it might well be granted that one article is more worthy than another, as those which are about the Divinity are more worthy than those which are about the humanity.

It has greatness also through comparison *to the subject*; and because faith regards the subject according to a threefold power, namely according to the *intellective* power and according to the *affective* power and according to the *interpretative* power; according to this the *greatness* is regarded in faith according to a threefold mode, namely through comparison to the *intellective* it is called great by *cognition*, through comparison to the *affective* it is called great by *devotion*, through comparison to the *interpretative* it is called great by *constancy*. For then faith is constant, when one freely *confesses* what he believes. And thus the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid four is clear.

It can otherwise be said, and more according to the intention of the Master, that since faith regards the *intellect* and the *affect*, according as was held above, its greatness is taken both on the part of the one and on the part of the other. But on the part of the *intellect* a *greater greatness* can be regarded in faith in two ways: either because it knows the thing believed *more clearly*, or because it knows it *in more things* or more distinctly. In the first way faith is called great by *cognition*; in the second, by the *quantity of articles*, because it knows how to distinguish the articles better. — Likewise on the part of the *affect* greatness is regarded in two ways: either because it adheres *more firmly*, or because *more intensely*. In the first way it is said to be great by *constancy*, in the second way it is called great by *devotion*. Thus these four are reduced to those two which master Hugh sets down. — And through this the response to the objections is clear; it is also clear that there is no contrariety, nor is there superfluity.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *To some it seems that it sufficed for them to believe only those four, namely the nativity and the death and the resurrection and the coming to judgment.* For since these articles were just as well unknown as the others, it seems that they were not bound to know these any more than the others. — It is asked therefore: why ought they rather to believe these concerning the Mediator than other things?

**I respond:** It must be said that the faith of those upon which it rested ought to have these four principally, as more opportune. For the first indeed they believed as the foundation of the very *faith* of the Mediator, namely the *nativity* itself. — The second indeed, namely the *passion* itself, that it might provoke to *love*. — The third indeed, namely the *resurrection* itself, that it might raise up to *hope*. — The fourth

indeed, namely the *coming to judgment*, that it might govern through *fear*. And because it was necessary for all unto salvation rightly to *believe*, to *love*, to *hope*, and to *fear*; therefore it was fitting that some should believe these four articles explicitly, so that others who relied upon them by believing implicitly might be saved.

Or otherwise. Because no one could by his own merit be freed from the contagion or obligation of original sin, it was fitting that they believe that they could be saved through the merit of Christ and through his satisfaction. But in the merit there are these four to consider, namely the *person* of the one making satisfaction and the *manner* of making satisfaction and its *reward* and the *manner of rewarding*. As to the *person* of the one making satisfaction, it was fitting to believe the *nativity*; as to the *manner* of making satisfaction, it was fitting to believe the *passion*; as to the *reward*, it was fitting to believe the *resurrection*; as to the *manner*, it was fitting to believe the *coming to judgment*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says concerning John the Baptist, that *he seems to have doubted concerning the death of Christ and his descent to the lower regions.* For if *to die* and *to descend to the lower regions* is an article, and John doubted about this: therefore he was unfaithful. But it is established that John was not unfaithful, since the Lord praises him there, in the eleventh chapter of Matthew: therefore he did not doubt. — Likewise, John had borne testimony to him and had made Christ known to others: therefore it does not seem that he doubted, since he sent his disciples to Christ. And this is what Chrysostom says on the eleventh chapter of Matthew: «John, who had learned from the Holy Spirit whatever he had heard, who had preached to the others, who had borne testimony, who had seen the dove, why does he ask thus? If he is ignorant, how was John a witness? You had divulged the signs beforehand; now after the dead have been raised, when he is already as it were known to all, is he not known to you? Far be it». *If you say* that he did not doubt, but bore himself after the manner of one doubting; *it is objected* against this by the authority of Ambrose on Luke, where he says thus: «John knew the Son of God, but not that he would descend to the lower regions». Likewise, in the seventh chapter of Luke in the Gloss: «The pious seer could have believed that the one whom he had foretold would come would not die». Gregory says this same thing in a certain Homily, and it is touched on in the text.

**I respond:** It must be said that the holy Doctors seem to disagree in this question. For some seem to mean that he *did not doubt*; but others seem to mean to say that he *did doubt*. And from this very contrariety certain heretics took occasion to err, so as to say that John was damned, because in the end he doubted in faith. But certainly the evangelical text disagrees with this, in which John is especially praised; all the catholic doctors also disagree, and even the universal Church, which proclaims John not only *holy*, but even *most holy*, and solemnizes both his nativity and his beheading. — Therefore, although the holy Doctors seem to disagree among themselves, nevertheless they hold the same thing in reality.

On account of which it must be understood that there is a threefold mode of doubting. For there is a certain doubt arising from *unfaithfulness*, as the Jews doubted; and there is a doubt arising from *slowness*, as the disciples doubted, to whom it is said in the last chapter of Luke: *O foolish and slow of heart to believe*; and there is a doubt arising from *piety*, as someone from

great passion and admiration bears himself after the manner of one doubting. — It must be said therefore that by the first and second kind of doubting John in no way doubted, yet his disciples did doubt; and thus the Saints understand it, who say that he did not doubt, but provided for the doubt of his disciples. For he sent them to Christ for this reason, that seeing the marvels which he was doing, they might be converted to him. But if we speak of the *third* kind of doubting, thus other Saints have said that John doubted, not with the doubt of *wavering*, but rather of a certain *admiration* and *compassion*, which makes a man bear himself after the manner of one doubting; in the seventh chapter of Luke and the eleventh of Matthew: «He doubted not by *faith*, but by *piety*». And thus it is clear that there is no contrariety among the authorities adduced.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Faith, hope, charity, and work are in some respect equal.* But *on the contrary*: it happens that someone has the habits of the virtues and not the operation: therefore it seems that the operation is not equal to the habits themselves. — Likewise, the thirteenth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians: *If I should have faith, so as to move mountains, but have not charity* etc.: therefore it seems that someone can have great faith, such that he has no charity.

**I respond:** It must be said briefly that those four are equal, according to what is said upon that passage of the twenty-first chapter of the Apocalypse, that the sides of the city were *equal*. For it is said there that «the sides of the city are faith, hope, charity, and work». But concerning the manner of the equality of the *virtues* themselves it will be said more plainly below, where there is a special question and discourse. For the present it suffices to have said only this, that these four are equal according to the account of *meriting*, when they are informed by grace. For *charity* itself is meritorious in its act just as much as *faith*, in one and the same man. Likewise the *work* proceeding from a habit merits just as much as the habit itself pleases. For since there is one sanctifying grace, which makes the soul please God through the habits and operations; hence it is that these four must necessarily be equal according to the divine acceptance, and through this according to the efficacy of meriting.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that habits can be without works; it must be said that here the equality of habits to operations is not assigned in all cases, but in those who have habits together with the operations themselves issuing from them. *Furthermore*, he does not understand it of exterior works, but rather of interior operations, which consist in the motion and use of free choice. And that use indeed has goodness according to the measure of the gratuitous habit of virtue; for it is especially this which «perfects its possessor and renders his work good». To that which is objected, that great faith can be had without charity; it must be said that the Apostle there speaks of *unformed* faith; but this text must be understood of *formed* faith. — And let these things suffice concerning the text; for those things which are set forth before it concerning the faith of Cornelius are plain enough of themselves.