Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a1-q1
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### Article (sole article). *On hope according to the absolute consideration.*
### Question I. *Whether hope is a gratuitous virtue.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether hope is a gratuitous virtue. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. To the Romans, chapter eight: *By hope we have been made safe;* but that which makes us attain to salvation, that especially holds the formal character of a gratuitous virtue: if then hope is of this kind, then it is a gratuitous virtue.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm: *The Lord is well pleased with them that fear him, and in them that hope upon his mercy;* but that which renders one acceptable to God either is a gratuitous virtue, or a habit more excellent than it, such as the habit of a gift, or of a beatitude: if then hope is not counted among the habits of the gifts and beatitudes, it must necessarily be counted among the habits of the gratuitous virtues.

3. Likewise, a habit directly opposed to fault has in itself the formal character of a gratuitous virtue; but hope is on every side opposed to fault, since it is opposed to presumption and to despair: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as it is difficult to believe what is above reason, so it is difficult to await what is above all estimation; but through hope is awaited that good which neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man: therefore just as faith is the virtue by which things invisible are believed, so it seems that hope is the virtue by which things inestimable are awaited, that is, spiritual and eternal goods.

5. Likewise, that which most of all strengthens the soul and rectifies and delights it, that most of all has the formal character of a gratuitous virtue — for a virtue is a regulative and confirmative habit of a power, which makes the very soul rejoice concerning the things that are right, as the Philosopher holds — but hope is of this kind — for it confirms and delights, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter six: *We have a most strong comfort, by which we flee to the hope set before us, which we hold as an anchor* etc.; and to the Romans, chapter twelve: *Rejoicing in hope* — it seems therefore manifestly that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. No passion is a virtue: hope is one of the four passions, as Boethius says in *On Consolation*: therefore hope is not a virtue. The *first* [premise] is proved by what the Philosopher says,

that « since there are three things in the soul: *powers, passions* and *habits,* virtue is not in the genus of *passion,* but in the genus of *habit* ». If then hope is not a *virtue,* it is established that neither is it a *gratuitous virtue.*

2. Likewise, just as it happens that one awaits things future, so it happens that one remembers things past; but the remembering of things past is not a virtue, nor does any special virtue consist about it: therefore neither does any virtue consist about the awaiting of things future. But the awaiting of things future either is hope itself, or proceeds from it: therefore it seems that hope itself has not [the property] to be a virtue.

3. Likewise, just as it happens to *hope* rightly and not rightly, so it also happens to *fear* rightly and not rightly; but the habit which directs the soul in *fearing* is not placed in the genus of virtue, as for instance fear: therefore neither [is] the habit which directs in *hoping:* therefore hope, even insofar as it names a *habit,* is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, « every moral virtue consists about the good and the difficult », as the Philosopher holds, therefore much more strongly the gratuitous [virtue]; but in the awaiting of promised goods there is no difficulty: therefore since hope does not consist about the difficult, it does not seem to be in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. Likewise, no gratuitous virtue in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit; but hope in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit — for it proceeds from imperfection that one serves God for the sake of future recompense, since, as Bernard says, « charity does not look to reward » — if then hope makes one await future recompense, it seems to be opposed to the perfection of merit: therefore it is not in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

### Conclusion.

> Hope is a gratuitous virtue, indeed the anchor and support of the gratuitous virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that by the name of hope can be understood an affection of the soul, according to that which the philosophers and the Saints say, that there are four affections of the mind, namely *joy* and *grief, hope* and *fear.* By the name of hope can also be understood the very *thing awaited,* according to that [text] to Titus, chapter two: *Awaiting the blessed hope.* It can nonetheless be taken for the *habit* which directs the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be awaited. And in this third manner of speaking hope is not only a *gratuitous virtue,* but indeed also the *support* and *anchor* of the gratuitous virtues. — It is indeed a *gratuitous virtue,* because in this, that it makes the soul await the things that are above all human estimation and the things that divine bounty has promised, it makes [the soul] wholly *trust* and *lean* upon the supreme and immense bounty, just as faith makes [it] assent to the first Truth, and charity makes [it] cleave to the supreme Goodness; and while the soul leans upon that immense bounty for its own sake and above all things, it is *rectified* and *raised above itself* and made *acceptable to God.* It is necessary therefore that the habit by whose mediation that is brought about should have the formal character of a *gratuitous virtue.* — And because, when the soul leans upon him who cannot fail, although it itself is in itself failing and wavering, it is nonetheless founded through hope as upon a firm rock; and on that account I said that hope is not only in the genus of *gratuitous virtues,* but is also their *anchor* and *support.* — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the objections on the contrary:**

1. As to that which is first objected on the contrary, that hope is a passion; the response is already plain: for the name of hope is taken equivocally, namely for the very *affection* and for the *habit* regulating the motion of that affection. Hence hope, insofar as it is a *virtue,* is a *habit* which is the principle of motion, which is *from the soul*; but *passion* is rather *toward the soul;* and insofar as the motion of awaiting or of hope is *from the soul,* it can thus be done rightly and not rightly, according to the command of free choice. And as to this, the perfection of virtue, or the deformity of vice, is to be regarded about it.

2. As to that which is objected, that as awaiting stands to things future, so remembering [stands] to things past; it must be said that the case is not in every respect alike concerning the remembering of things past and the awaiting of things future. For the rectification and the bending-aside of the soul does not consist principally about the things that are past in the way it does about the things that are future, except consequently. For virtue properly orders rather to that which is to be done than to that which has been done. — Moreover, there is another dissimilarity, because remembering regards the act of the cognitive [power], but awaiting [regards] the motion of the affective [power]; but the rectitude of virtue is not so regarded in respect of the things that belong to cognition as in respect of the things that belong to affection. Hence even to remembering, insofar as it is joined to affection, is annexed an act of virtue, as for instance of prudence, or of penance, or of charity or benevolence: insofar as one recalls past *deeds,* that one may act better in future, or past *evils,* that one may grieve, or past *benefits,* that one may give thanks.

3. As to that which is objected, that fear is not in the genus of virtue even insofar as it is a habit, therefore neither is hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because the affection of fear itself consists in a certain recoiling, but the affection of hope consists in a certain stretching-forth; and therefore the affection of fear has more of *passion,* but the affection of hope has more of *action.* And since the habits of the virtues direct the soul in *acts,* in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said, that « virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly »; hence it is that hope is more in the genus of virtue than fear.

And from this same cause it is plain why the habit of virtue consists rather about the affection of hope than about any of the other three affections. For *joy* and *grief,* because they have their objects conjoined to them, are more in the receiving; but the affection of *hope* is, among the rest, that which has more of the character of acting and which more states a motion from the soul; although it too according to something of itself states a passion about the soul; and according to that it does not belong to it that the habit of virtue should consist about it, but rather insofar as it states the character of motion and of the stretching-forth of the soul itself into the very thing hoped for.

4. As to that which is objected, that to await a good is not difficult; it must be said that just as to believe what is seen has no difficulty, yet to believe most firmly what is not seen has great difficulty; so it is to be understood that although to hope for present goods, which are in some manner seen in themselves, or in their like, is not very difficult; yet to await with sure confidence invisible and eternal goods, which the eye has not seen, and for their sake to despise temporal goods and to be borne above all those things that are seen — this has great difficulty and great dignity. And therefore it is undoubtedly true that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. As to that which is objected last, that hope in its act hinders the perfection of merit; it must be said that this is false, indeed, as the Apostle shows, it arises from the perfection of merit; for the greater and better merits one has, the more firmly and surely one hopes. — And if it be objected that « charity does not look to reward »; it must be said that this is understood of *created* reward; but concerning *uncreated* reward it has no truth, because the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to possess God. But perfect hope looks rather to the *uncreated* reward, of which the Lord said to Abraham, Genesis chapter fifteen: *I am thy reward,* than to the *created.* For one awaits through the habit of hope to hold in the fatherland him to whom by charity in the way one desired to be united. — There is also another manner of responding, by distinguishing in the bargaining by which one serves God for the sake of the reward which one awaits: for there is a certain bargaining which sets its end in *one's own advantage;* and this is an evil bargaining and does not proceed from right and formed hope. There is also a certain [bargaining] which does not set its end in one's own good, but refers and orders the whole to the supreme Good; and this bargaining hope makes, which is a gratuitous virtue; and this is rightly not opposed [to merit]. — Yet the first manner of speaking seems to be more reasonable, because hope can stand, with every intention of mercenary love

excluded. For however perfect love may be in the way, the virtue of hope is conjoined to it. Hence it must simply be said that the awaiting of the eternal good is not mercenary, nor does it diminish merit, nor does it conduce to the imperfection of charity or of merit, except insofar as the mind of man looks very affectionately and intensely to the advantage of his own good. But there are many who await beatitude, and yet care little about themselves and much about God.