Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one.*

Thirdly it is asked whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one. And it seems that it is theological.

1. *1 Corinthians* 13: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three*: therefore by the Apostle hope is numbered among the theological virtues: if then truly and properly, it is necessary that hope be found in the genus of a theological virtue.

2. Likewise, that virtue is theological which has the end of the cardinal virtues for its object; but hope has the end of all the virtues for its object — for it awaits the highest beatitude and the perfect reward — therefore it is a theological virtue.

3. Likewise, the virtue which most of all serves contemplation and makes one tend upward is a theological virtue:
but hope is of this kind, since, as the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 6, *hope enters even to the interior of the veil*: therefore hope is a theological virtue.

4. Likewise, the spiritual edifice is begun through a theological virtue, namely through faith, and is consummated through a theological virtue, namely through charity: therefore it must be raised up through a theological virtue, because «the middle ought to be of the same nature as the extremes». If then it is raised up through hope, it remains that hope is a theological virtue.

5. Likewise, the image of *creation* is reformed through the image of *re-creation*: if then the image of *creation* necessarily requires three natural powers, it seems likewise that the image of *re-creation* necessarily requires three virtues. Therefore if the image must be reformed through the theological virtues, it is necessary that the theological virtues be three: but there is no other to be given besides faith and charity except hope itself: therefore hope is a theological virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. No virtue concerning whose act an excess can be found is a theological virtue, but rather a cardinal one — which is plain, because it is impossible to believe too much, and impossible also to love too much — but concerning the act of hope an excess can be found, as is plain in the one who presumes and hopes for more than his merits demand: therefore it seems that hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

2. Likewise, the virtue which is a mean between two vices is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one; but hope is a mean between two vices, namely between despair and presumption: therefore hope is not to be reduced to a theological virtue, but rather to a cardinal one.

3. Likewise, hope is wont to be distinguished in manifold ways, namely the hope of pardon, the hope of grace, and the hope of glory; but pardon and grace are goods ordered to the end, whereas a cardinal virtue is concerned with the things that are ordered to the end: if then hope is concerned with such things, hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

4. Likewise, to endure and to await are acts of longanimity and patience; but «habits are distinguished through their acts»: therefore since to await is the proper act of hope itself, longanimity and hope are the same habits and must be placed in the same genus of virtue. But longanimity is placed under the genus of cardinal virtue: for it is posited and assigned to be a part of fortitude: therefore it seems that hope too is a cardinal virtue.

5. Likewise, it pertains to cardinal fortitude rightly to order and to strengthen against afflicting things and against deterring things; but hope is of this kind, because it makes a person rejoice in tribulation and be steadfast: therefore it seems that hope is a part of cardinal fortitude: therefore it is not in the genus of theological virtue.

### Conclusion.

> *Hope is in the genus of theological virtue.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt hope is in the genus of theological virtue. — And the ground of this is taken from the side of the object and from the side of the subject: from the side of the object indeed, because, just as faith in believing assents to God himself as the one dictating things true, so hope leans upon him as the one promising great things. Hence just as the object of faith itself, which has the character of a motive, is something uncreated, which is God, by reason of which faith too is posited to be in the genus of theological virtue; so too must it be said and understood concerning hope itself. — The ground can also be taken from the side of the subject: because, since the soul according to its higher face must be reformed through the theological virtues, and hope is one of the virtues, contributing to the reformation of the image and the perfecting of the soul according to its higher part, it is necessary that hope be a theological virtue. — Hence
just as in the fatherland there will be three endowments according to the three powers of the soul, of which one will reform and consummate the rational, namely vision itself, another the concupiscible, namely love, the third the irascible, namely perfect holding; so too on the way it is necessary to posit them concerning the theological virtues, to which the endowments must correspond.

And thus both from the side of the subject and from the side of the object it is gathered that hope must be placed under the genus of theological virtue. For the theological virtues have God for their object, and the higher part of the soul for their subject. — Therefore the arguments that are for that side must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that concerning the act of hope an excess can be found; it must be said that concerning the act of hope an excess can never be found by reason of the excessiveness and intensity of the act itself; for no one can trust too much in the Lord; but if it has an excess, this is on account of the defect of some condition which is required in the act of hoping, as when, his merits being neglected, one altogether presumes upon the mercy of God. But this does not make hope itself to be in the genus of cardinal virtue; because, as for what is said — that a theological virtue differs from a cardinal one in this, that in the theological no excess can be found, as in the cardinal — this is understood of that excess which consists in the intensity of the act, not of that which lies in the omission of a due condition. For an excess of this kind, said in the second sense, has a repugnance with every virtue; but the first has no repugnance with a theological virtue, which has an infinite object, so that it can neither be loved too much nor desired too much; but it has a repugnance with a cardinal virtue, whose object is a created and finite and limited good; and on this account it is required that in the act there be a determinate measure, beyond which if it proceed, it goes out from the limit established for it according to the determination of the virtue.

2. To that which is objected, that hope is a mean between two vices; it must be said that some virtue can be said to be a mean of two vices in two ways: either as eliminative and destructive of both, or as constituted out of both as regards the goods that are in them. If it is a mean as constituted, just as liberality has something of avarice in this, that it keeps the things to be kept, and something of prodigality in this, that it gives the things to be given; thus it is in the genus of cardinal virtue. But if it is a mean only as eliminative; then it is not necessary that it be a cardinal virtue; and in this manner hope is a mean between despair and presumption. For it frees from that twofold evil, just as faith concerning Trinity and Unity frees from the error of Arius and from the error of Sabellius. And therefore that argument does not compel one to hold that hope is not a theological virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that by hope not only glory is hoped for, but also grace and pardon; it must be said that the genus or species of a virtue is not determined by any object whatever, but by that object which has the character of a motive. Now although hope is concerned with created goods, which it awaits; nevertheless the moving ground is not anything created, but some immensity of that highest uncreated Good on which it leans. And therefore, although through hope one awaits full grace and perfect pardon, because hope is compared to it as to its matter; on account of these it is not necessary to place it in the genus of cardinal virtue, just as in the foregoing it was held concerning faith. — And if you object that obedience is posited to be a cardinal virtue, and likewise latria, because they not only consider an uncreated object but also concern something created — namely obedience the precept, and latria the worship due — and on this account it ought so to be with hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because both latria and obedience concern something created in such a way that by reason of it they regard an exterior act. But it is not so with hope; for hope consists only in the interior affection, which takes its chief ground of movement from the higher side, namely from the side of the uncreated object.

4. To that which is objected, that it belongs to longanimity to await, in the way it belongs to hope; it must be said that the awaiting of longanimity, which is a part of fortitude, is other than the awaiting of hope. For the awaiting of hope consists in a certain stretching-out toward eternal goods, which indeed arises from the confidence by which the soul leans upon God himself with its whole strength. But the awaiting of longanimity is that by which the soul, with constancy of mind and strength of spirit, awaits to triumph over all afflicting and deterring things: and thus the act
of longanimity, insofar as it is of fortitude, differs from the act of hope both as regards the object about which and as regards the motive. And therefore it does not follow that, if longanimity is in the genus of cardinal virtue, the virtue of hope must on this account be placed under the same genus.

5. To that which is objected, that hope strengthens against afflicting things; it must be said that some act can belong to a virtue in three ways: either as eliciting, or as commanding, or as assisting. Now to bear terrible things bravely belongs to the virtue of fortitude as eliciting; but it belongs to faith as commanding and dictating, according to what is said in *Hebrews* 11 concerning the holy men, that *by faith they conquered kingdoms and were made strong in war*; but it belongs to hope and charity as assisting. For the love of God and the certain awaiting of future beatitude greatly aid the virtue of fortitude, so that it may be able to bear all evils, according to that saying of blessed Gregory: «The hope of reward lessens the force of the lash».