Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed. And that it is always formed, it seems:

1. *First*, through the definition of hope: « Hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude proceeding from grace and merits »; but it is impossible for the thing defined to be separated from the defining terms: therefore it is impossible for hope to be separated from merits and grace. But when it is with these, it is always formed: therefore it is impossible for the virtue of hope to be unformed.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through that which the Master says in the text: « To hope for anything without merits cannot be called hope, but presumption »: but presumption is a vice opposed to hope: therefore, with merits absent, the vice opposed to hope itself immediately enters in. But a vice opposed to a virtue excludes it not only as to its *formal element*, but also as to the *underlying habit*: therefore it seems that, with merits absent, nothing remains of the virtue of hope: therefore it cannot become unformed.

3. Likewise, faith consists partly in the *affection*, partly in the *intellect*, but charity consists simply in the *affection*; but when disorder is brought about in the *affection* through sin, charity is simply taken away, although faith is not simply taken away, since it has something on the side of the intellect — whence charity cannot be unformed, just as faith can be unformed — therefore if hope holds itself wholly on the side of the *affection*, just as charity does, it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, the virtue of faith is then formed, when it not only believes *God*, but also believes *into God* — for when belief is joined with a tending, then faith is a formed virtue — but it is impossible that anyone should hope without tending toward the thing hoped for — for to hope itself is to tend — therefore it seems that hope is always a formed virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *On True Innocence*: « Since the other virtues are common to the good and the evil, the love of God and of neighbor properly belongs to the good and the pious »: therefore the virtue of hope can be common to the good and the evil; but the evil do not have virtue *with* grace, but *without*; and such are unformed virtues: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, as formed faith stands to formed hope, so unformed faith stands to unformed hope; but formed faith generates formed hope: therefore unformed faith generates unformed hope.

3. Likewise, as hope arises from faith in rewards, so fear arises from faith in punishments; but fear can be unformed and formed: therefore hope also.

4. Likewise, there are many sinners who hope that they will yet do penance and obtain pardon and arrive at glory; it is evident that this is not evil, but rather is ordered toward the good and excludes evil, namely despair; but if this were with grace, it would be an act of a formed virtue: therefore, since without grace it can remain that someone, through merits, should hope to arrive at glory; it seems that the virtue of hope itself can be unformed.

### Conclusion.

> The virtue of hope can be unformed.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the virtue of hope can be unformed. — For someone can hope for eternal life without grace that makes pleasing, as manifestly appears. And again, that act of hoping proceeds from some habit, which habit indeed is good and also holds in some way the character of a virtue, for the reason that it in some way *rectifies* and *invigorates* the power which it perfects. It rectifies indeed, while it bestows some inclination and order toward glory as toward the ultimate end, where one must stand and in which one must rest. It also invigorates in this, that it elevates the power for the expecting of eternal goods and bestows on it a certain stability, lest it succumb through despair. And therefore, just as *faith* without charity is an unformed virtue, because it bestows on the soul a certain *rectitude* and *vigor* which has to be completed and perfected through the infusion of grace; so it must be understood also concerning *hope* itself. Whence also the other things which have been said of unformed faith can

be applied to unformed hope. — The reasons therefore showing that the virtue of hope can become unformed must be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that hope proceeds from merits; it must be said that in *four ways* someone can go forth into the act of hoping. For either he hopes having merits in *purpose* and in *root* and in *effect*, like the just man who has long served God. Or he hopes having merits in *purpose* and in *root*, but not in *effect*, like the one who, before the good use of the virtues, after he has received grace, awaits eternal beatitude. Or he hopes having merits in *purpose* only, not in *root* nor in *effect*, like the one who is a sinner, who purposes to do many good things and to be saved through them. Or he hopes having merits neither in *effect* nor in *root* nor in *purpose*, like the one who, doing evil things and purposing to persevere in evils, believes through God's mercy alone that he will obtain glory, with divine justice disregarded. The *first* act is of hope formed and already exercised; the *second* act is of hope formed and first infused; the *third* act is of unformed hope; and the *fourth* is of presumption itself. When therefore it is said that hope proceeds from grace and merits; it must be said that either *hope* is there defined insofar as it is a *formed* virtue, and thus there is no objection concerning unformed hope; or if *hope* is there defined *generally*, insofar as it is a virtue, it is said to proceed from grace and merits, which indeed are had either in *reality* or are had in *purpose*; and thus there is no counter-instance concerning unformed hope.

2. To that which is objected in the second place, the response is now clear through that which has just been said. For as to what the Master says, that *to hope without merits* is *to presume*; he understands this when someone hopes without merits not only in *reality*, but also in *purpose*; and to hope in this way does not pertain to unformed hope, but to presumption.

3. To that which is objected, that faith can therefore become unformed because it has something on the side of the intellect and something on the side of the affection; it must be said that this is not the *whole* ground, but this is the ground, that the habit of *faith* has some rectitude and vigor in this, that it makes one believe all things believable and excludes error and unbelief, which vigor indeed can be without grace that makes pleasing: and this is to be found in *hope*, which makes one *avoid* presumption and despair and *await* all things to be awaited. And because this ground is found common on both sides, therefore hope can be unformed, just as faith itself; but it is otherwise concerning charity, as will be seen below in its proper place. Therefore the argument did not conclude, because it took a non-cause for a cause.

4. To that which is objected, that hope always has joined with it a tending; it must be said that tending is twofold. For one kind is *full* tending; and this is from operating and cooperating grace, and this makes the virtue to be formed. But another kind is *slight* and *half-full* tending, as is said of the sluggard, that *the sluggard wills and wills not*. And this tending indeed can give some *rectitude* and *vigor* to the will itself and obtains the name of virtue *generally taken*, not of *gratuitous* virtue; and therefore it holds the character of an unformed virtue, not the character of a formed virtue. But when it is said that the tending into God makes belief to be formed; this is understood of the tending which is from a *full* will. But this can be neither in hope nor in faith without grace.