Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt.*

Fifth it is asked, whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt. And that it is characterized by certitude, it seems:

1. First, through that which is said in Romans 8: *I am certain that neither death nor life nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God*; but the Apostle was not certain of this with the certitude of *comprehension*: therefore he was certain with the certitude of *expectation* or of the confidence of hope itself; therefore hope in its act renders a man certain.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of hope which the Master sets down in the text: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude »: if therefore the expectation regards the act of hope itself, hope in its act is characterized by certitude.

3. Likewise, that which removes hesitation or wavering bestows certitude; but hesitation, which makes a man waver, is removed through the confidence of hope: therefore hope gives certitude to the one hoping: therefore in its act it is characterized by certitude.

4. Likewise, just as it is impossible that the highest Truth should deceive and beguile one who believes in it, so it is impossible that it should desert anyone confiding in it: therefore just as one believing in God is certain of the truth believed, so one hoping in him is certain of the salvation expected: therefore it seems that certitude consists in the act of hope itself.

5. Likewise, if « virtue is more certain than any art », the anchor of all virtues ought to be most certain: since therefore hope itself stands to the virtues themselves as a kind of anchor, it seems therefore that hope itself in its act is exceedingly certain.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hope according to its act proceeds from the habit, or from the consideration of grace and of merits: but no one is certain whether he has grace, or not: therefore it seems that hope in its act has no certitude.

2. Likewise, nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; but hope is in free choice, and its act and merit depend on the changeableness of the will; likewise also the reward which it expects: therefore it seems that it has no certitude.

3. Likewise, no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; but there are many who have faith, hope, and charity, who are finally made reprobate: therefore in such persons the virtue of hope has no certitude. But for the same reason that it does not have it in such persons, neither does it in others, since it is in all conformably and uniformly: therefore in none does it have certitude.

4. Likewise, because faith is certain, it is impossible that anyone in the act or motion of faith should be deceived or beguiled: therefore if hope has certitude in its act, it is impossible that anyone should be deceived and frustrated of that which he hopes; but this is manifestly false: therefore hope does not have certitude regarding its act. If you should say that no one hoping is deceived, for the reason that hope does not make one expect *simply*, but *under a condition*, namely if he *perseveres unto the end*; *on the contrary*: hope pertains to an act of the irascible power, whose part it is not to attach a condition; and again, granted that that condition be attached, since that condition is exceedingly doubtful, it renders the whole doubtful: therefore whether one hopes absolutely, or with a condition: it seems that there is no certitude regarding the act of hope.

5. Likewise, certitude is opposed to doubt: therefore since doubt pertains to the cognitive power, and « opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing »; certitude regards only the cognitive power. But hope is not in the cognitive, but in the affective: therefore it seems that in its act it has no certitude.

### Conclusion.

> The virtue of hope in its act has a certitude distinct from the certitude of faith.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, without doubt, according to what the authorities and reasons show, the virtue of hope in its act has certitude. But of what kind that certitude is, it is difficult to define.

For some have wished to say that the certitude of hope is not proper to itself nor diverse from the certitude of faith, but rather that hope draws all its certitude from faith, just as knowledge in the *particular* draws its certitude from knowledge in the *universal*. For thus one knows that this mule is sterile, because he knows of every mule in the universal. And thus they say that *hope* stands to *faith* as knowledge in the *particular* stands to knowledge in the *universal*. For as Augustine says, and the Master recites in the text, through faith a man believes that all who are finally good will be saved, and of this he has a certain certitude; through *hope*, however, he is confident that he himself will be saved; whence what the believer believed in general, the one hoping appropriates to himself through hope. And since there is no certitude regarding singulars, except insofar as they are referred to the universal: therefore hope does not appropriate the certitude of faith to itself *absolutely*, but *under a condition*. Whence the one rightly hoping does not hope that he will altogether be saved, but under this condition, namely if he *perseveres unto the end*. They say therefore that the certitude of faith does not differ from the certitude of hope, except that the former is in the *universal*, the latter in the *particular*; the former, moreover, *absolute*, and the latter *conditioned*. Whence the certitude of *faith* is said to be the certitude of *fidelity*, while the certitude of *hope* is the certitude of *confidence*. *Confidence*, moreover, is nothing else, as they say, than a kind of fidelity turned back upon itself. For he confides in something who believes that he will obtain something. — But this manner of speaking, although it may seem probable, does not suffice, for the reason that — as is said in the Gloss on Romans 5 upon that text: *Proof works hope*, that is, the certitude of hope — hope, as the Gloss there suggests, has its own proper certitude; and a man is certified one way of the salvation to be obtained through *faith* itself, certified another way through *hope* itself. Otherwise, if the certitude of hope differed from the certitude of faith only as knowledge in the *particular* from knowledge in the *universal*, then it would not be a habit distinct against faith itself, but rather it ought to be subalternated to it as the particular under the universal, or the special under the general.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, namely that hope itself has certitude, not only that which it *begs* from faith, but also a *proper* one, which is distinguished from the certitude of faith. And that distinction can be known through a twofold difference, namely by reason of the *object*, about which that certitude is concerned, and by reason of the *opposite*, to which it is contrary. By reason of the object, because faith and its certitude is borne upon the complexion itself by reason of the *total composition*. For it is about the true and the false, and the true is about composition, as the Philosopher says. Whence also in what precedes it was shown that the complex enunciable

is the article. But hope and its certitude is not about the complexion by reason of the *whole*, but by reason of the *thing attributed*. Whence when it is said: I hope that I shall have eternal life, there is not hoped there this *total saying*, but there is hoped *eternal life*; and thus the certitude of hope regards the *attribution* itself or the thing attributed, but the certitude of faith the *complexion* itself. — Also by reason of the *opposite*, to which it is contrary, the distinction falls there. For the certitude of faith is repugnant to error and doubt; the certitude of hope, however, is repugnant to diffidence and hesitation. But although these two certitudes are diverse, nevertheless in this they share in common, that each is a kind of firmness. For faith firms the intellect, lest it disbelieve; hope, however, firms the affect, lest it lose confidence. — And from this is gathered a third diversity, by which the certitude of faith differs from the certitude of hope, because it differs not only by reason of *object* and by reason of *opposite*, but also by reason of *subject*, since the one is about the *intellect*, the other about the *affect*. — But it must be attended to, that certitude about the intellect has being in two modes. For one is that which makes the intellect *able* to overcome error and exclude doubt; and such certitude is the certitude of the *wayfaring* state. But another is the certitude which renders the intellect *incapable* of error; and this is the certitude of the *fatherland*. — In this same mode it must be understood also in the certitude of the affect. For one so firms the affect that it can overcome diffidence; another so firms it that it can in no way be moved or hesitate. The first is of hope in the way, the second of holding-fast in the fatherland.

Thus therefore it is clear that the virtue of hope has certitude in its act; it is also clear what and of what kind that certitude is; since it is differing from the certitude of faith and is less than the certitude of glory; for it is not the certitude of *perpetual confirmation*, but of a certain *manly adherence*. — Therefore the reasons showing that hope in its act has certitude are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that no certitude is had of the merits and grace from which hope proceeds; it must be said that, although certitude of merits is not had through *necessary knowledge*, nevertheless certitude can be had through *probable conjecture* and through a certain *confidence* of the good will itself, which rises up from a good conscience. For purity of conscience, which is introduced through the expulsion of fault, gives to the soul itself a certain security and certitude concerning the merit already begun, and consequently certitude concerning the reward to be attained.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; it must be said that this is true, if it rests in the will itself, according as the will leans upon *itself*; but if it rests in the will itself, insofar as the will leans upon *God*, who is our firmness, according as Augustine says in the book of Confessions; in this mode it can have strength and certitude; and in such a mode hope has to consist in our will. For it makes us, by leaning upon the highest firmness and confiding of it, and through this it bestows on us a certain certitude of attaining salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; it must be said that there is a certitude of *order* and a certitude of *event*. When therefore it is said that hope has certitude in its act; it must be said that this is true of the certitude of *order*, because efficaciously and infallibly true hope orders toward salvation. But when he objects that no one is certain of that which he does not attain; the objection runs concerning certitude according to the other difference, which indeed is the certitude of *event*. And therefore that reason does not compel.

4. To that which is objected, that if hope were certain, it could not be deceived, just as neither can faith; it must be said that just as *necessity* is twofold, namely absolute and conditioned, so *certitude* is twofold. If we speak of *conditioned* certitude, thus there is in hope a certitude of necessity and of infallibility; for each one is infallibly certain that, if he perseveres unto the end in grace and in good merits, he will come to salvation. But if we speak of *absolute* certitude, thus there is in hope itself a certitude of probability; for he who has a good conscience and purpose can probably be certain that works proceeding from such a will are meritorious before God, and through this be confident that he will attain eternal life. Whence as to what he shows concerning that condition, that it is doubtful, and that hope does not attach it: it must be said that even if hope does not attach it of itself, it nevertheless attaches it through the rule of directing faith. And although also that condition is not altogether certain with the certitude of *manifest knowledge*, it is nevertheless

certain with the certitude of a certain *confidence*, as has been said before.

5. To that which is finally objected, that certitude regards the cognitive power; the response is now clear through the things that have been said before; for certitude not only regards the intellect, but also the affect.